@Freddy: As you say: timing.

Again you correctly state: Air and sea supremacy. Germans were going to win a war of attrition. Losses, production and numbers amount to similar strengths. While Britain lost less pilots the Germans trained a lot more. Given the relative equality in the air the question is who lasts longer in that "trenchwar". That is what it essentially came to.

Fuel for my JU52s is plenty in France where they will go after delivering to the forward airbase. The fuel for my JU87s on the other hand (not to mention my fighters) is the questionable item. The barges as you said were in use for troops. Now as I am shifting troops to the JUs and MEs I get more transport capacity on sea. Which means even in the first wave I can (theoretically) have more equipment and supplies.

Against a fully functioning RAF there is no way the combined forces of the Wehrmacht can succeed. But if you recall my precondition of RAF being significantly pummeled and 11th Fightergroup being with 12th while Luftwaffe HAS bases on British soil. This would also remove the limits from ports that can be held. With immediately available airpower any port can be held. The question is how long and moreover how much damage can the British do on short notice to deny the port capacity to the invading force.

Correct again that known pro-German elements were taken care of. I think Ithoriel was more referring to the opportunistic elements. You do not know them until they show themselves.

Concerning your reserve figures my post Dunkerque figures say less than 400 tanks in the whole UK. Which is roughly the number the Germans would land as well. And forgive me but: Erprobungsverband Ostsee. The German improvised specialised landing craft did very well in the Baltic. Zero losses in 3 campaigns and evacuation at the end of the war. They must have been rather good considering the lack of experience the Germans had.

@OldenBUA: S day: 252 planes available. Which means September 15th. How many are available end of February? I also do not know but I would suggest it were some more. The objectives are in fact virtually the same. Capture a forward base (airfield(s)). Take a port (seaborne invasion plus airborne elements). Do not think airborne = paras. As I said. Fly in regular army soldiers and ship their heavy gear. But even a ME321 can transport a Panzer IV. At that time more than a match for what any other nation fielded.

For the airdrops to work. I did take opposition at the airfields into consideration. Since this is a new element and a diversion from original Sealion I am quite confident this can work and regular army units start arriving 3 hours after the assault. If the British however can deny the airfield longer than S+2 then the airborne assault will collaps. Concerning the opposition I would again like to point out that superior numbers were not able to defend against known assaults in Crete. Admitted the Luftwaffe had little regard to conservation crashlanding several JUs directly on the objectives.

Please all keep in mind this is totally fictious assuming the Luftwaffe keeps up their campaign against RAF and infrastructure rather than switching to the Blitz which accomplished absolutely nothing for the war effort. Much less I actually believe this stiffened British resolve never to surrender.

As we disucss more and more points come up that original Sealion never took into consideration. My current tasklist:

Determine potential available airtransport end of February 1941.
Look up favourable weather patterns (monlight at night, low winds etc.)
Determine figures on tanks and artillery available to both sides.


Question @ all: Should I rather just report findings and reply via PM or leave it like this?

Forgive me, all I know about Erprobungsverband Ostsee is from Leixicon der Wehrmacht and they give a strength in June 1941 of 4 freighters , 16 coasters , 5 heavy artillery carriers , 3 Light artillery carriers , 9 steam tugs , 14 converted to Behelfslandungsbooten Motorprähmen (command landing boats??), 12 barges , 24 motor boats and 9 fishing trawlers (i think that's a correct translation). I like their LWS 300 tractor though, is that on Hotchkiss running gear? but they are not a major troop carrying force!

No one is disputing the Fallschirmjager on Crete, but things could have easily have gone differently!

February in the Channel isn't something to look forward too!

While I think about it, will you be invading Greece (April) or Crete (May) or even the Soviet Union?

True the Me321 can transport a MkIV, but it's a glider so unless you've already landed specialist vehicles, they can't be moved on the ground and you've also got to ensure that those highly trained Me110 Troikaschlepp pilots doing the towing survive otherwise the 321s are stuck!

I'm happy to continue here as long as the moderators and you are 

Quote from: sebigboss79 on 17 December 2013, 03:45:43 PM

For the airdrops to work. I did take opposition at the airfields into consideration. Since this is a new element and a diversion from original Sealion I am quite confident this can work and regular army units start arriving 3 hours after the assault.

Maybe you're not getting what I am saying. This idea of reinforcements (Luftlande division) being flown in after capturing the airfield is exactly the same plan as was used elsewhere. Rather than a big bonus, as you seem to think, it's a very, very big liability. It was only chosen because it was the only way, as there was simply not enough transport available.

If anything goes wrong with the original plan, as I'm sure it will, those transport planes will either get shot to pieces, land on a hostile airstrip, (crash) land somewhere else in the hope of being able to take off again, or simply abandon the mission and return home, if they are lucky. This is what happened in all other plans using the same stratagem.

For Ypenburg airfield, the initial assault used 53 planes. Of these, 27 were available for the second wave, and 15 for the third wave (which was cancelled).

Quote from: OldenBUA on 17 December 2013, 07:11:20 PM
Maybe you're not getting what I am saying. This idea of reinforcements (Luftlande division) being flown in after capturing the airfield is exactly the same plan as was used elsewhere. Rather than a big bonus, as you seem to think, it's a very, very big liability. It was only chosen because it was the only way, as there was simply not enough transport available.

If anything goes wrong with the original plan, as I'm sure it will, those transport planes will either get shot to pieces, land on a hostile airstrip, (crash) land somewhere else in the hope of being able to take off again, or simply abandon the mission and return home, if they are lucky. This is what happened in all other plans using the same stratagem.

For Ypenburg airfield, the initial assault used 53 planes. Of these, 27 were available for the second wave, and 15 for the third wave (which was cancelled).

I agree - you are being massively over optimistic at getting the planes turned around.

If you look at operations like Market Garden where the aircraft where re-used there were all sorts of problems. And here they had several things in their favour:
1) Very low losses of aircraft on day 1
2) Only planning on 1 drop a day
3) Very experienced airforces and airborne forces.

Its fairly telling that the allied air portable division (52nd) was never used in this way and was used as normal infantry.

I think if you are thinking that the aircraft that drop the paras over England, can get back to base, refuel, get loaded up with infantry, then head back again, and land safely within 3 hours - this just isn't going to happen It sounds unlikely for a single aircraft let alone on a divisional scale.

Well my work is cut out.

@OldenBUA: Yes I do know about turnaround times and I do anticipate opposition. Again: See Crete. The comparison with Market Garden is actually very valid plus I have postulated fairly good weather. Thus looking for a feasible time end of February onward.
Concerning turnaround I actually calculated with 15 hours for 3 trips starting at 6am.

The more intersting question is how much juice would the British leave behind and how fast an airfield can be available for service - more like if. Interestingly the initial preparations of the defense forces were, surprise surprise against paratroopers. According to said book all possible landing places for gliders were blocked. The ME321 was available from June 1941 and if a large scale airborne drop is to be made that needs to come forward 6 months. With 20 being produced per month there are then 40 - 60 available on S-day.

That means on a single trip 8,000 soldiers or 40 tanks. A significant force of 2,000+ soldiers plus equipment and tanks becomes then available behind enemy lines. Again IF the ME321 could eb made available 6 months earlier!

We can conclude the airdrop faces similar difficulties as the whole invasion and we remember that Sandhurst ruled the invasion successful up untill the GHQ line. My losses for the aircraft may be optimistic and thus my army casualties surpass some estimates. Whatever numbers hypothetical exercises use the cannot be defended I made a choice, I could have made another. Crete could and should have gone different but it did not. As an immediate reaction Churchill orders paratroopers being trained and anti-invasion plans anticipate large scale airborne operations. As PatG initially put it: The barges are sh*te.

@freddy: The Erprobungsverbad contained some (by far not all) craft. But they worked very well. TheTroikaschlepp was conducted with  3 ME 109s the BF110 and HE111s could pull the ME321. In order for this plan to work the assault must quickly take the airfield, defend it and make it serviceable for further operations. The JU52s can land on almost any sufficiently flat surface. The HE111s have limited rough surface capability.

I am quite positive this thread is not a concern of the moderators but I would like to keep it unclogged. There is a lot I have to research and I can only do that after Christmas.


The airborne issue becomes a matter of above taking, holding and using. If that can be accomplished and moreover troops come in by air or sea to take the ground as well. Then this Sealion has a major advantage over the "real" one. I would like a comment on reaction time of the armed forces. How fast would a general alarm be sounded if said assault takes place at 3am? How fast can forces be assembled and a significant counterattack against the airfield be mounted? What would happen if those preparations coincide with the beach assault? I assume Germans knew the reaction time roughly and would time their different assault accordingly.

Interesting topic - probably my favourite 'what if' scenarios, and whilst certainly no expert, I have done a little reading on the subject.

One interesting book well worth reading if you haven't already, is "Invasion: The German Invasion of England July 1940" by Kenneth Macksey. Obviously this is suggesting a very early invasion, close on the tail of Dunkirk, at a time when many would argue the German's would have been incapable of staging an invasion.

Many good points made so far, however a couple come to mind that haven't been:

1) Re D-Day, yes the allies had the advantage of long preperation and air supremacy, but in this scenario it is being suggested that a) Germany had air supremely, certainly could have happened if the Luftwaffa had stuck to striking directly at the RAF and their bases, and b) the English coast was no 'Fortress Europe'! The invading Germans would have faced far lighter fortifications, especially with an earlier date.

2) Lack of German sea superiority has also been mentioned, but the biggest threat to the RN at this time was probably itself. I haven't got the references to hand, but the Admiralty made it clear they did not want to bring their larger vessels into the channel as lack of manoeuvrability would have made them extremely vulnerable to torpedo and/or air attack.

3) Once ashore, lack of heavy equipment would be less of a hindrance to the Germans than might be thought. If they had the assumed air superiority, they were masters of the combined arms approach, something the British were still in denial about.

4) Probably the most controversial aspect, and one people seem very shy to talk about, was the style and quality of the early high command. Morale was low for a long time after Dunkirk, and Generals had to be pressured into acting, they certainly hadn't grasped the concepts of modern war and combined arms. Look at the early North Africa campaign, where Wavell etc were happy to sit behind defenses. O'Conner etc only came into their own once let off the leash.  Obviously this situation changed dramatically later, so again an early invasion date is crucial.

5) As assumptions are being made that the Germans gain air superiority prior to invasion, what of the radar stations? Knocking these out would have been key to preventing advance warning of an approaching air assault.

6) Perhaps the greatest 'what if' ... What if the Germans hadn't allowed the British Army to escape from Dunkirk? Britain would have been a far weaker, far more demoralised target.

Just my interpretation. Ultimately, Germany' greatest weakness was Hitler's ever changing mind.

@ sebigboss79, I shall enjoy following your progress with this, and wish you the best of luck if you do decide to go ahead and write a book.

Cheers,

Kev

@sebigboss79

There was something in the newspapers a couple of years ago about the redevelopment of old airfields and the amount of explosive demolitions stuff that was being unearthed and then having to be cleared. So you may be forced to only use grass fields until engineers can clear the main sector bases.

sorry to say it again but you need to pick your landing dates and then stick to them as there are different issues almost on a monthly basis.

If you are looking at Feb 1941 then you'll be facing well equipped opposition with completed beach defences and stop lines. Invade July 1940 then it's the Germans with the logistic problems but oddly POL wouldn't be one of them as the UK was 'awash' with aviation fuel. You've just got to stop it being destroyed or incinerating your troops!!! The fuel tanks that would have been used at Dover to set light to the sea in the harbour were only removed when the M20 was extended and an extended link road was needed between same and the Archcliffe Fort roundabout.

@squirrel

1) Re D-day, true the UK coast wasn't the Atlantic Wall, but it didn't need to be. It was probably the most fortified coast that the Germans would ever have assaulted and would still need careful planning to avoid a disaster!

2)The RN quite rightly said no capital ships, but they weren't needed. The Luftwaffe weren't that good, at that time, in hitting fast manouvering ships of any sort as they hadn't been trained for that. the Dunkirk attacks were mostly against ships that were stopped or moving slowly. The Luftwaffe made something like 21 attacks against small torpedo boats during the Battle of Britain and sunk none and there were something like 700 MTBs MGBs, sloops etc, they can't be ignored.

3)Hmmm....the ground troops still need artillery and supplies. But, yes if they had full superiority and had captured the south coast airfields intact, then they could support any advance.

4)IF the British and French armies had been captured at Dunkirk, a vote of no confidence in Churchill taken, then maybe peace overtures might have been made. Stunned may have been a better word to describe the high command, but don't forget that they would have been fighting a defensive battle, so sitting behind defences may not have been a bad thing! At a local level the troops had gained valuable experience in a new type of warfare.

5) Radar Stations were useful, but not necessary, there was an extensive network of well trained observers available. Less time to respond but still giving an advance warning.

6) see 4

if you do write the book, put me down for a copy!

regards

Freddy326

Agreed, the British south coast had some impressive fortifications, in places, though I recall a documentary on tv not long ago stating that at the beginning of the war many of the guns only had a handful of rounds of ammunition, and in one caee they stated only 2! That number stuck in my mind! So sadly I'm not sure how effective they would have been.

With regard to the invading troops needing artillery support, the whole concept of 'Blitzkrieg' was that aircraft replaced it to enable forces to keep moving. With the experience gained in Poland and France, and with full air superiority, that wouldn't have been a problem!

I agree defending MTB's, MGB's etc would be a big factor, and I have no reliable source available to hand, but 700 in mid 1940 sounds optimistic. Don't forget the Germans had similar craft available as well as U-boats, hence why the RN wouldn't commit capital ships.

Cheers,

Kev

Hi folks and thanks again for the many contributions.

As stated there are issues and what ifs on a daily basis. I would like to base this scenario on the Sandhurst Wargame but as stated change the input to the following situation:

RAF 11th Group is beaten and ceases to be a factor. It is pulled back and merged with 12th Group leaving Southern England at mercy of the Luftwaffe. HE111s, DO17s and JU87 run havoc and basically control the theatre of operations. (Actually Admirality forbade any shipping in the channel at one point due to German dominance).

Germans need 10 days (8 in Original setup) to heavily mine the flanks of the invasion and assemble to Invasion force and achieving +5 Status. That leaves for S+3 days the Channel to the Germans with only limited forces available to the RN. -> I need actual figures of the forces between Poole and Ramsgate. Ramsgate to Brighton is more important the other invasion theatre was for 6th Army under von Leeb as a reserve force.

It is worth noting that none of the several plans was satisfying to any arm of the Wehrmacht. The final plan somewhat limits the scenario to Ramsgate-Brighton which means narrower corridor to defend and less forces directly available for the RN. The 6th army threatening more western beaches is a bit of a nobrainer. a) it cannot be reasonably sealed off, Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe combined cannot credibly defend such a convoy even and especially at night! b) Falling in the flanks of the British forces defending the beaches against von Rundstedt's invasion force is a useful but imho wrongly allocated threat. The initial idea of landing in the midlands would imho cut Britain in half and being caught zippers down would lead to negotiations no matter how well the southern campaign goes.

Ergo: These reserves must reach British soil differently: My suggested extended airdrop maybe?
Problem: The increased airtransport capacity is not available before mid 1941. Solution: Incorporate the airdrop in the original plan in favour of secondary landing of 6th army.
Under such preconditions I find it possible to bring forward deployment of the ME321 some months. Initial flight was in February 1941 and full scale production soon after.

While Luftwaffe runs wild and softens defenses largely unopposed the number of JU52s and ME321s will increase beyond the Original 252 JU52. Assuming average buildingspeed throughout the war I get about 20 new JU52s per month. That is additional 120 JU52s untill end February/beginning March, not counting losses and repairs. That is 370 JU52s and 40 - 60 ME321s which I will use as an input.

Certainly the precondition of Luftwaffe being unopposed would alter the strength of RN in the area but for simplicity this number shall remain the same.

Feedback for Squirrel and freddy:

1) I really enjoy the approach of "how can this work" thanks again and I am happy to put your names in as references and contributors. The first crowdwritten research
2) The UK has several suitable areas for landing, basically the whole east coast which cannot be credibly defended. Same goes for the Atlantikwall. Such a defense was not and is not possible.
3) RN needs no big ships, possibly not even cruisers. The problem is how many will "go through" as Admiral Ruge stated. I imagine the German subs and JU87s to constantly harrass the assortment of ships that will be tasked to counter the invasion.
4) The invasion fleet was not a "sitting duck". Besides airsupport several ships have a number of guns up to 105mm and 88mms. More than suitable to defend against MTBs. Destroyers is entirely the problem of the Luftwaffe and the German small vessels.
5) After limiting RNs movements with airsuperiority we can assume German naval forces to patrol and the invasion fleet therefore to achieve surprise. Most possibly not complete surprise but assuming a single british destroyer getting the word out before it is sunk by German forces. It will certainly take time to gather a significant force and if timing is halfway on the German side the airborne landings have succeeded and it is daylight enough so Luftwaffe can defend the fleet against the forces gathered to sink it. Some will get through and cause losses. That is anticipated in the German plan. (in fact the German plan assumed being caught in the open)
6) Germans are bringing heavy equipment. Even more so if troops are ferried by plane and make room for equipment on the ships. The original plan has some 400 tanks.
7) IF Dunkirk would have gone for the Germans (and remember Rommel and Co. were watching the British and were forbidden to interfere!) then the invasion is an almost automatic success and Great Britain under Mosley will sue for peace.
Radar stations were quite sturdy but their utility lines (phone, electricity) were easy targets. Assuming air superiority the Radar chain is eliminated and spotters are not particularly useful at night. Moreover it severely reduces warning time. Under these circumstances I find it very optimistic that British defenses are on full alert sooner than 6-7 am (= S+ 4-5hours). Being alert and aware does not mean you can do something about the invasion. The Germans have significant time to establish their position both at the airfields and at the beaches. Resistance seems very impossible untill mid afternnon on S-day. Such counterattack against an enemy that has set position will inevitably fail. The only chance would be a significant blow either in the very first few hours or an all out attack when the Germans break out of their perimeter. In consequence untill that break out it will be the task of the Homeguard to harrass the enemy whereer they can, leading to reprisal from the Germans.
9) I redestribute 6th Army as follows:Infantrie Divisions 56 and 62 are airferried to southern England joining the airborne landing. The remaining forces and an armoured division from strategic reserves are held in France. Should the opportunity arise this force will land in the Midlands and threaten London from the North.
10) The window of opportunity is certainly not getting bigger but you can approximate. Especially under the "given" air superiority the Germans will have the edge in the field BUT face a motivated and well dug in enemy which will level the field. It is a matter of supplies and how well the Luftwaffe can make up for the naval inferiority.
11) Use of gas: Absolutely out of question. As much as success in Sealion does not win the war for Germany, all such a move would accomplish is misery for the British Island. Even if all invading forces are eliminated the Luftwaffe still owns the sky and the Germans will retaliate. With air dominance there is little the British can do against an escalating gas war. I am quite sure Churchill would face severe concequences should he really give that order.
12) I came across other scenarios like the French fleet being taken by the Germans or the Soviets participating in the airborne assault (largest para army at the time). It seems unfathomable why Hitler did not use the Soviets for this venture and allowed the tension to build up that fast. Both dictators knew the endgame would come but the Soviets were looking forward to take on England at that time.

Again it comes down to hit one or two airfields in force, capture them reasonably intact and reachable for the seaborne invasion within 48 hours. This assault (Operation Backstab) is crucial for the whole operation. Selection criteria for the airfield: damaged but repairable within 24 hours. Defendable with 2 - 5,000 men plus tanks and fieldguns. Airfield must be operational for JU87s to make up the lack of Heavy guns.

There are a couple of issues in this that are overlooked.

The first is that winning of the initial air war was not to gain air dominance over Southern England, but to gain dominance over the north sea and the Western Approaches - without which no invasion force could have crossed the Channel. One needs to look at the naval invasions later in the war to understand that the technical and logistical problems involved were huge - even very small scale landings, like the British attack on Madagascar proved far from straight forward. An operation on the scale proposed by Sealion was in all likelihood by beyond the technical capabilities of the Germans - unless of course the British completely lost their mind and yielded to American pressure to give them the Royal Navy.

The second issue is that Sealion was never an operation that was any more than a threat. As the Russians would still have annexed the regions on the Rumanian border, which were to lead a year later to Barbarossa in order to protect the German oil supplies. One of the interesting aspects of the second world war that is overlooked is how much of the early war German propaganda was focused on the German allies, and the important role they were playing - which seems rather a side track - but in terms of policy the threat to Rumania was of far more importance than the non-preparations on the French coast for an invasion that was never going to happen.

Quote from: fateeore on 30 December 2013, 12:08:23 AM
There are a couple of issues in this that are overlooked.

Not really the ones you have mentioned, I am afraid. First and foremost if your presumptions are on track why does the Sandhurst wargame conclude the Germans CAN land, get a bridgehead and then move up to the GHQ line?

Quote from: fateeore on 30 December 2013, 12:08:23 AMThe first is that winning of the initial air war was not to gain air dominance over Southern England, but to gain dominance over the north sea and the Western Approaches - without which no invasion force could have crossed the Channel. One needs to look at the naval invasions later in the war to understand that the technical and logistical problems involved were huge - even very small scale landings, like the British attack on Madagascar proved far from straight forward. An operation on the scale proposed by Sealion was in all likelihood by beyond the technical capabilities of the Germans - unless of course the British completely lost their mind and yielded to American pressure to give them the Royal Navy.

Concerning he Western approaches please elaborate how this is relevant. Any major force would be reported and closely watched by the Irish and a picket line of German submarines. I find the task to move through submarine infested waters somewhat tricky. Moreover if the Germans manage to sink a couple of major surface combattants the RN will be wondering whether they should REALLY press such a suicide attack. After all the British ain't Japanese, are they?

Concerning the technical capabilities refer to the Sandhursr Wargames. Besides the high degree of improvisation and "make do" the battle is decided on the supply lines. One should also not forget the amount of supplies the British deposited for both military and civilians in case of an invasion. I am sure the Germans would have been sportsman enough to not touch these to feed themselves - not.

Quote from: fateeore on 30 December 2013, 12:08:23 AMThe second issue is that Sealion was never an operation that was any more than a threat.

You are correct here. Hitler hoped the British would see reason and Raeder concluded hat once the situation makes invasion possible it would not be needed anymore. But then again, while the Brits are occupied with fortifying Festung England they cannot do much elsewhere. E.G. Malta was rife to fall but when the Germans did not follow up the invasion of Crete the Med theatre became somewhat the Achilles heel not only for Rommel.

Quote from: fateeore on 30 December 2013, 12:08:23 AMAs the Russians would still have annexed the regions on the Rumanian border, which were to lead a year later to Barbarossa in order to protect the German oil supplies. One of the interesting aspects of the second world war that is overlooked is how much of the early war German propaganda was focused on the German allies, and the important role they were playing - which seems rather a side track - but in terms of policy the threat to Rumania was of far more importance than the non-preparations on the French coast for an invasion that was never going to happen.

Actually Stalin was giving Adolf quite some degree of help and having the largest airborne force in the world at that time what would have happened if the Germans had really asked for Russian troops? Stalin would have granted a limited involvement which means anything from another airborne assault to a little force of about a million throwaway troops. We can discuss possible Soviet involvement ad absurdum. Fact is under the right circumstances the GHQ line will break and Great Britain occupied. As you stated the problem solely is one of supplies in the given case. And how well land and seaborne assets fare against an enemy that commands the sky is also well documented throughout the war.

But even if Luftwaffe prooves incapable once more one must also consider the fact that any British shipping in the channel was forbidden at some time due to German guns in france dominating the channel. A somewhat peculiar notion but this, too is in the archives. Now what would happen once German artillery is also placed on British soil? What if German Stukas unopposed are based on Southern England airfields? I strongly recommend Norman Longmate's elaborations on a possibly successful Sealion, in particular is ramblings on "how close it was" and the contemplation of certain circles even at the time. Downplaying the danger certainly was not how Churchill perceived the "threat". The possibility of Britain falling was real under the right circumstances. Not more, not less. And please care to re-read my initial post: Even if Sealion is a success it is not the way to win the war.

The Sandhurst wargame is just that a wargame. Unless the Germans land there isn't much point in the German side showing up.

The Western Approaches are relevant due to Portsmouth and Plymouth. And according to plans drawn up at the time the British were planning to adopt suicidal tactics to prevent any landings. As you identify supplies are the key to any naval operation, which is why I pointed out the difficulties of later operations, most of which were carried out with capacity far in excess of anything the Germans possessed in 1940, and all of which ran into difficulties that stretched their capacity at times to breaking point.

As for Malta, this was less important than Gibraltar, and Franco withstood German and French pressure to move against that fortress.

You have an odd notion of the game being played in Eastern and Central Europe. The idea that the Russians would have supplied troops or assistance for an invasion of Britain is patently absurd. There is a world of difference between supplying food and material to buy land and short term breathing space, and actively assisting an enemy that one is planning to invade at sometime after 1942. It was the same game Hitler played in the 1930's, the same as the British and French played in the Czech crisis, it's called diplomacy.

You keep coming back to this 'fact' that the Germans dominated the channel, but I would suggest that you are misunderstanding it's significance. The RAF identified the problem was pilots not aircraft, therefore the decision was made to withdraw their force from the channel in order to minimize the risk of losing the former. Instead relying upon radar to flag up threats and to tackle them once over land, which made the task of recovering pilots that much easier. Given that this was a siege, your premise appears to be that because the besiegers controlled the airspace over the moat they controlled the castle. Which was clearly not the case, as real life events showed.

Quote from: fateeore on 30 December 2013, 02:04:03 PM
The Sandhurst wargame is just that a wargame. Unless the Germans land there isn't much point in the German side showing up.

THE Wargame of said event, refereed by professional soldiers with one of the umpires being no one less than Adolf Galland himself. I mistakenly assumed some classroom generals playing around but was pleasantly surprised at the illustre cadre that actually took part in this wargame. My only criticism and the reason for this thread is the presumption the Germans would attempt the invasion without dominance of the air. Yet said wargame conclude the Germans succeed to a large extent. Now let us debate how much MORE the Germans can do if they actully achieved dominance of the air - which they were about to.

Quote from: fateeore on 30 December 2013, 02:04:03 PMThe Western Approaches are relevant due to Portsmouth and Plymouth. And according to plans drawn up at the time the British were planning to adopt suicidal tactics to prevent any landings. As you identify supplies are the key to any naval operation, which is why I pointed out the difficulties of later operations, most of which were carried out with capacity far in excess of anything the Germans possessed in 1940, and all of which ran into difficulties that stretched their capacity at times to breaking point.

The actual plans drawn where about when to withdraw the fleet to Canada. And the original plans and any plans I have read about did not contain any "prevent the landing at all costs" clause, I am quite sure about that. The military sense to sacrifice the RN to prevent a landing is, my apologies, ridiculous. OKW calculated that 90 % losses of the invasion force were acceptable. So throwing away the fleet to destroy half a million German troops accomplishes what for the defense? Exactly: Zero.

While Admiral Ruge stated that "some will get through" I still fail to see the impact of any force in/near the Channel on the actual invasion. You assume the somewhat 40 Destoyers Britain could muster on short notice plus the MTBs will defend themselves against the Luftwaffe (in excess of 1,000 Bombers just waiting to sink them) PLUS German artillery (the reason why Churchill forbade any operations in the Channel) AND the forces the Kriegsmarine had and would muster to defend the invasion fleet? Well..Good luck I guess.... and that does not take into account the heavy minefields Ruge was going to lay for 10 days. Face it: The first 3-4 days only the forces within the minefields are combat effective. Royal Navy becomes a factor once the Homefleet sails from Scapa flow (through minefields submarines and Luftwaffe) to counter the invasion. Well not the invasion but the supplies. And of course the Luftwaffe would rather watch the display of seapower than to sink it once it enters the confines of the channel.

Quote from: fateeore on 30 December 2013, 02:04:03 PMAs for Malta, this was less important than Gibraltar, and Franco withstood German and French pressure to move against that fortress.

The importance of Malta was highlighted multiple times. You might find Rommel's pondering about the thorn in his side quite interesting. For Gibraltar:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Felix    actually quite a good summary for once from wikipedia.

The importance of Gibraltar is highlighted several times but the war in Egypt is lost and won via the neutralisation of Malta. Again I find it an interesting task to move the fleet from Gibraltar to interfere with German/Italian supply lines when the Axis Airpower would control the Med.

Quote from: fateeore on 30 December 2013, 02:04:03 PMYou have an odd notion of the game being played in Eastern and Central Europe. The idea that the Russians would have supplied troops or assistance for an invasion of Britain is patently absurd. There is a world of difference between supplying food and material to buy land and short term breathing space, and actively assisting an enemy that one is planning to invade at sometime after 1942. It was the same game Hitler played in the 1930's, the same as the British and French played in the Czech crisis, it's called diplomacy.

No, it is called having studied these events for over 20 years. Concerning the Red Army the documents show a great eagerness of the officers shaking hands at the river Bug to tackle England next. It was admittedly Hitler's fault to let the relations with the Soviets detoriate that rapidly. Stalin had no mind about any offensive operations until 1944 and even when told the exact time and date of the German attack the preparations to retaliate were limited to bringing Moscows AA defence to 75% alert. Some units at Brest Litowsk were specifically told not to fire back even when the Germans crossed the river in boats. The events of Barbarossa up until Stalingrad pretty much speak for themselves.

Quote from: fateeore on 30 December 2013, 02:04:03 PMYou keep coming back to this 'fact' that the Germans dominated the channel, but I would suggest that you are misunderstanding it's significance.

The order that forbade any British shipping is well documented, check the National archives or the book I mentioned before. I would like to point out another event occurring after German dominance of the Channel had been lost: Operation Cerberus. So even under much less preferable odds the Germans were (still) able to do pretty much what they wanted. I am not sure you are on top of events.

Quote from: fateeore on 30 December 2013, 02:04:03 PMThe RAF identified the problem was pilots not aircraft, therefore the decision was made to withdraw their force from the channel in order to minimize the risk of losing the former. Instead relying upon radar to flag up threats and to tackle them once over land, which made the task of recovering pilots that much easier. Given that this was a siege, your premise appears to be that because the besiegers controlled the airspace over the moat they controlled the castle. Which was clearly not the case, as real life events showed.

The airfields close to the intended landing areas were manned when the Battle of Britain started which makes your statement appear a little strange. If you wish to call this a siege then I must correct your presumptions. IF (and had you bothered to read the thread you would know it is an IF) the Germans win air superiority instead of starting to bomb London THEN and only then RAF will withdraw to the Midlands to conserve strength. This then implies the usefulness of Chain Home has reached its end as there is no forces to use the information. Whether the Germans are so kind NOT to bomb the installations is entirely another matter but if Luftwaffe commands the sky they presumably would take every opportunity to weaken the resistance by bombing infrarstructure. So the Germans do not controll only the airspace, they also command all four castle towers - in the given scenario.

Even at the best assumptions (and the numbers Churchill was given by RAF were knowingly exaggerated) the Battle of Britain had become a stalemate where losses on both sides were moving in scale. Basically a trench war in the sky. Now who would win such a battle when both sides can replace losses in planes and pilots but only one side's plane production capacity is being attacked?

Please, so far all comments have been very sensible and constructive but this is close to utter nonsense. Your research is sloppy especially concerning the Royal Navy. You might find the memo of Admirality dated September 4th 1940 quite interesting. It refers to the concerns Admirality has about their ability to prevent and interfere the German landings under the presumption the Luftwaffe controls the sky. So when military professionals both at the Sandhurst Wargame and the actual Royal Navy of 1940 grant the Germans the possibility to succeed I do not see how your version of events is credible at all. Again please remove politics/hating Jerry/Rule Britannia from this thread and try to add value with facts. Particularly freddy has been most helpful in this matter mostly because he was (or so I assume) checking his facts and was willing to research these matters beyond the "Hitler bad, Churchill rules" nonsense.

Let's keep everything friendly in this one please, very easy for it to stray into bickering.  All posts are valid, and the content and accuracy of them can be discussed politely.

Quote from: Leon on 30 December 2013, 10:11:20 PM
Let's keep everything friendly in this one please, very easy for it to stray into bickering.  All posts are valid, and the content and accuracy of them can be discussed politely.

Hear, hear.
Cheers - Phil.