1866 - Bavarian overtures

[cameronian]

I have taken this directly from Mike Bennighof's 1866 game page. Can anyone corroborate this version of events ? My own understanding was that Beck was unable to shift the Bavarians beyond a commitment to defend the Main. Is this another example of Bennighof Balls ?

As relations between Austria and Prussia deteriorated in the spring of 1866, the smaller German states had to choose sides between the two German-speaking great powers. All four of the "middle states" – the kingdoms of Bavaria, Saxony, Hannover and Württemberg – aligned themselves with Austria. On paper this represented an enormous accession of military strength to the Austrian side of the argument; in the field, it would prove much less so.

Bavaria, the largest of the middle states, took on a very aggressive role in the weeks before open warfare broke out, pressuring the other South German states to line up alongside the Habsburgs. Bavarian diplomats offered bribes on the one hand, promising the Württembergers that they would acquire the Principality of Hohenzollern, a Prussian enclave almost entirely surrounded by Württemberg territory, at the conclusion of a successful war. And on the other they pointed out to the Grand Duke of Baden's ministers that much of the duchy's territory had been Austrian before the Napoleonic Wars and would be carved up between Austria, Württemberg and Bavaria should the grand duke choose the wrong side in the looming war.

By acting as Austria's enforcers during pre-war diplomacy, Bavaria allowed Austrian Emperor Franz Josef and his ministers to claim that they had used no coercion. The German states lined up against Prussia because of the rightness of the Austrian position, despite the Austrians' having signaled their willingness to throw out the German Confederation's constitution. Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck had picked the quarrel over territory seized from Denmark in 1864 by Austria and Prussia in the name of the Confederation; the Austrians answered that they would give it all to Prussia in exchange for acceptable compensation and happily leave the other Germans out of it altogether.

Bavaria's willingness to act as Austria's attack dog went beyond diplomatic efforts. The Bavarians also offered to march alongside the Austrians into the main theater of war in Bohemia.

The pre-war army of the German Confederation had been organized into ten very large corps: each would have four infantry divisions, each of two brigades (an Austrian or Prussian corps had a total of four brigades). Of these corps, Prussia was to provide three and Austria three. Of the other four, Bavaria provided one, the VII Corps. The VIII Corps came from other South German states, chiefly Baden, Württemburg and Hesse-Darmstadt. The IX would be made up of troops from Saxony, Nassau, Hesse-Kassel and some smaller states. And finally the X Corps would have the Royal Hannoverian Army and contingents from Oldenburg, Mecklenburg and the other North German states.

Bavaria mobilized about 70,000 men for war, with 42,000 of those intended for the field army. To coordinate strategy with the Austrians, the Bavarians dispatched their chief of staff, Ludwig Freiherr von der Tann, to first Vienna and then Olmütz, site of the Austrian North Army's headquarters. Von der Tann laid out a very forward proposal: the Bavarians would march north into Bohemia and join the Saxons to form the left wing of the Austrian North Army. They would bring along the brigade from Nassau slated to join the IX Corps and, if they could be mobilized in time, the division from Hesse-Kassel.

At the time, the North Army's commander, Ludwig von Bendek, did not intend to march forward into Bohemia. Olmütz provided a large, well-sited fortified camp that could shelter his entire army and set it astride the Prussian route to Vienna. Other strategists, von der Tann among them, believed that this plan threw away Austria's greatest strategic advantage. The Prussians were clearly planning to move into Bohemia in two widely-separated wings, and North Army could move between them to seize an interior position and fall on each wing in turn.

Von der Tann's plan would have brought another 40,000 to 60,000 troops to North Army, and allowed the two German oversized corps to protect Benedek's flank while the bulk of North Army fell on the Prussians emerging into Bohemia at Trautenau and Nachod. Benedek rejected the offer, suggesting that the Bavarians instead operate in western Germany to support the Hannoverians.

Exactly why Benedek turned down von der Tann's offer is not clear; the Austrians expected to win with the forces they had and perhaps he did not wish to share credit with a Bavarian. There's also the ever-present financial issue; Austria struggled to meet its peacetime burdens and the war would explode the Austrian budget. If 45,000 Bavarians marched into Bohemia, they would expect the Austrians to feed them and provide their daily beer ration as provided in Bavarian law.

Arriving back in Munich after war had been declared, von der Tann relayed this disappointing news and the Bavarian staff made new arrangements. They would instead march north to join up with Hannover, while the Nassauers would join the VIII Corps along with the Hesse-Kassel division and an Austrian brigade scraped together from various fortress garrisons in western Germany

Once these plans were already in motion, Benedek received strong prodding from Emperor Franz Josef to follow a course more or less along the lines suggested by the Bavarian general: head for the northern border and interpose his army between those of the Prussians. The Austrians did so, and fought a series of actions along the border without the help of the Bavarians.

As an independent force, the VII and IX Federal Corps together would have had about 75,000 troops. They would not have been expected to defeat the Prussians outright, just occupy them while North Army dealt with the other half of the Prussian invasion. The most likely place for such a Bavarian stand would have been at Jicin, where the Austro-Saxons faced the Prussian First Army. Jicin occupied a vital crossroads and stood behind a semi-circular ring of hills. Austrian planners since the previous century had recommended the spot for a stand against potential Prussian invaders, with its naturally strong geography in front and good communications behind.

And that's the essence of our Battles of 1866: Blood & Iron expansion book, which places von der Tann and the Royal Bavarian Army on the battlefield of Jicin in late June 1866. There are six new scenarios for Battles of 1866: Frontier Battles exploring the different ways that Bavarian intervention might have played out on the battlefield of Jicin. There are also 64 new silky-smooth, die-cut playing pieces: 24 of them huge double-sized ones representing infantry brigades (nine Bavarian, two Prussian) and 40 of them merely large.



While it's an "alternative history" set, it's one deeply rooted in historical probabilities; the battle as shown here is probably more likely to have occurred than that which actually happened. Once Austria made the decision for war, the time to pinch pfennigs should have been over. But that was never the Austrian way.

Now is the whole thing an alternative history or just the last bit ?

[Duke Speedy of Leighton]

Sounds fun!

[holdfast]

But the Austrians, marching as fast as their legs would carry them, failed to get to Nachod ahead of the Prussians. Adding more troops to the already large number of Austrians all dependent on one railway for supply, all marching in the same direction, doesn't make them any quicker, so they would always arrive at Nachod behind the Prussians. The Alternative History could have Steinmetz obeying his orders and moving trough the defile at Nachod the night before he actually did, which gets the Prussians there even earlier.

[mollinary]

I have taken this directly from Mike Bennighof's 1866 game page. Can anyone corroborate this version of events ? My own understanding was that Beck was unable to shift the Bavarians beyond a commitment to defend the Main. Is this another example of Bennighof Balls ?

As relations between Austria and Prussia deteriorated in the spring of 1866, the smaller German states had to choose sides between the two German-speaking great powers. All four of the "middle states" – the kingdoms of Bavaria, Saxony, Hannover and Württemberg – aligned themselves with Austria. On paper this represented an enormous accession of military strength to the Austrian side of the argument; in the field, it would prove much less so.

Bavaria, the largest of the middle states, took on a very aggressive role in the weeks before open warfare broke out, pressuring the other South German states to line up alongside the Habsburgs. Bavarian diplomats offered bribes on the one hand, promising the Württembergers that they would acquire the Principality of Hohenzollern, a Prussian enclave almost entirely surrounded by Württemberg territory, at the conclusion of a successful war. And on the other they pointed out to the Grand Duke of Baden's ministers that much of the duchy's territory had been Austrian before the Napoleonic Wars and would be carved up between Austria, Württemberg and Bavaria should the grand duke choose the wrong side in the looming war.

By acting as Austria's enforcers during pre-war diplomacy, Bavaria allowed Austrian Emperor Franz Josef and his ministers to claim that they had used no coercion. The German states lined up against Prussia because of the rightness of the Austrian position, despite the Austrians' having signaled their willingness to throw out the German Confederation's constitution. Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck had picked the quarrel over territory seized from Denmark in 1864 by Austria and Prussia in the name of the Confederation; the Austrians answered that they would give it all to Prussia in exchange for acceptable compensation and happily leave the other Germans out of it altogether.

Bavaria's willingness to act as Austria's attack dog went beyond diplomatic efforts. The Bavarians also offered to march alongside the Austrians into the main theater of war in Bohemia.

The pre-war army of the German Confederation had been organized into ten very large corps: each would have four infantry divisions, each of two brigades (an Austrian or Prussian corps had a total of four brigades). Of these corps, Prussia was to provide three and Austria three. Of the other four, Bavaria provided one, the VII Corps. The VIII Corps came from other South German states, chiefly Baden, Württemburg and Hesse-Darmstadt. The IX would be made up of troops from Saxony, Nassau, Hesse-Kassel and some smaller states. And finally the X Corps would have the Royal Hannoverian Army and contingents from Oldenburg, Mecklenburg and the other North German states.

Bavaria mobilized about 70,000 men for war, with 42,000 of those intended for the field army. To coordinate strategy with the Austrians, the Bavarians dispatched their chief of staff, Ludwig Freiherr von der Tann, to first Vienna and then Olmütz, site of the Austrian North Army's headquarters. Von der Tann laid out a very forward proposal: the Bavarians would march north into Bohemia and join the Saxons to form the left wing of the Austrian North Army. They would bring along the brigade from Nassau slated to join the IX Corps and, if they could be mobilized in time, the division from Hesse-Kassel.

At the time, the North Army's commander, Ludwig von Bendek, did not intend to march forward into Bohemia. Olmütz provided a large, well-sited fortified camp that could shelter his entire army and set it astride the Prussian route to Vienna. Other strategists, von der Tann among them, believed that this plan threw away Austria's greatest strategic advantage. The Prussians were clearly planning to move into Bohemia in two widely-separated wings, and North Army could move between them to seize an interior position and fall on each wing in turn.

Von der Tann's plan would have brought another 40,000 to 60,000 troops to North Army, and allowed the two German oversized corps to protect Benedek's flank while the bulk of North Army fell on the Prussians emerging into Bohemia at Trautenau and Nachod. Benedek rejected the offer, suggesting that the Bavarians instead operate in western Germany to support the Hannoverians.

Exactly why Benedek turned down von der Tann's offer is not clear; the Austrians expected to win with the forces they had and perhaps he did not wish to share credit with a Bavarian. There's also the ever-present financial issue; Austria struggled to meet its peacetime burdens and the war would explode the Austrian budget. If 45,000 Bavarians marched into Bohemia, they would expect the Austrians to feed them and provide their daily beer ration as provided in Bavarian law.

Arriving back in Munich after war had been declared, von der Tann relayed this disappointing news and the Bavarian staff made new arrangements. They would instead march north to join up with Hannover, while the Nassauers would join the VIII Corps along with the Hesse-Kassel division and an Austrian brigade scraped together from various fortress garrisons in western Germany

Now is the whole thing an alternative history or just the last bit ?

Hi Cam,

All I can find is the following couple of paras in Stuart Sutherland's translation of the official Bavarian History of 1866:

"By 10 June the Bavarian government had ranged itself on the Austrian side, and since war was coming ever closer LtG v der Tann was despatched to Vienna and the Austrian HQ at Olmutz in order to undertake discussions for this  extreme case. It was agreed that Prince Carl would have independent command of the Bavarian army and the Wurttemberg, Baden, Grand Ducal Hesse and Nassau troops....... He would act in conjunction with the general directives from the Austrian high command, but he would also take into account Bavarian national interests and those of the other south German states when considering protection of their lands. Nothing definite was agreed to about Strategy. The proposal that the Austrians in Bohemia and Bavaria make a simultaneous advance into Saxony and join there was straightaway turned down by the Austrians. There remained two alternatives, that Prince Carl's Corps join the Northern Army it that it operate independently 8n western Germany. Talks about this were to continue in Munic, b7t by the time LtG v der Tann arrived home on the evening of the 16th war had already begun.

The movement of the Bavarian army into Bohemia now appeared to be impossible. Not 9mly was it much in doubt whether the 7nion with the Austrians could take place before the first encounters with the enemy occurred there, not forgetting that during this sideways movement the rear and flanks of the Bavarian army would be totally exposed, but especially such cooperation must be done without because the Bavarians, 8th Federal Corps and the reserves would be still further from the Austrians theatre of war. The Hanoverians anyway could not be on the March, and all of Bavaria would be wide open to an unhindered enemy invasion. Therefore, on 18th June the Austrian cabinet was informed that Bavaria could not agree to her troops union with Northern Army."

Any use?

Mollinary

[holdfast]

The 'What if' appears to be playing fast and loose with time and space, which academic historians are inclined to do, to the frustration of those whose lives were ruled by same.

[mollinary]

The 'What if' appears to be playing fast and loose with time and space, which academic historians are inclined to do, to the frustration of those whose lives were ruled by same.

Amen to that, but I think you do Benighoff a big favour by calling him an 'academic'!

[cameronian]

Well he has got a Phd in a related subject, despite this he managers to be sensationally wrong most of the time. I must say I have never heard of any Bavarian plan suggest anything more radical than a defense of the Main.

BTW and not apropos Bavaria, 'Dombey and Son' is being serialised on BBC Radio 4 xtra, its available on line in omnibus editions, quite the best dickens ever, highly recommended.

[toxicpixie]

I've  nowt to add to the veracity of the claims but that's interesting.

It looks like the usual problem with alt history - what seems a small and potentially likely change to produce a divergence worth looking at is underpinned by ignoring a pretty massive set of actual real issues which generate what actually happens!

[KTravlos]

A bit of a hijacking here

One of the biggest issues with many counter-factual done about the Asia Minor Campaign (Greek-Turkish War of 1919-1923), is that they ignore the fact that due to the character of the two opposing forces, and of the transportation network, large scale winter campaigning was impossible (which is why the war lasted so long). Thus you have all the guys arguing that a Venizelist victory in November 1920 would had led to quick action, forgetting that the army would not had been to march before March 1921 (which is when the Royalist army marched to defeat at First and Second Inonu). You have stupider inanities, like having the Venizelist army making the jump from Izmir/Smyran to Ankara in the period between

Now as a political scientist I actually find counter-factuals useful (See James Fearon's article on that). But you need to be careful and know the history well. Also remember the iron rule of strategy "Only a miracle at the Operational Level can make up for mistakes at the Strategic/Theater Level-On the other hand it is much easier to make for Operational mistakes if you have the advantage at the Strategic/Theater Level"

[Leman]

It will still get played though, as does the Martian invasion of 1910. Not sure it is worth making a fuss about.

[toxicpixie]

Well yes, doesn't mean it's not interesting to explore or play, just that it's often a lot less likely that history can be sent down a different path for want of a nail. At least without ignoring the whole state of the nail making economy and military applications of such, and the political & social structure behind the nail, and....

Given the rather... difficult... state of Austrian command and logistics as was, would the Bavarians turning up with the Saxons have done any good, or would it have just been more confused troops confusing the command structure over confused marching and orders?

[Leman]

Probably would have been just as much of a disaster, but give these chaps their due for making it possible to find out, rather than wasting precious time arranging for an Orc invasion of the Austrian Empire.

[toxicpixie]

Nah, the Orcs are in power over in Albion, wondering whether they should be allying with Napoleon's Elves against the Dwarves in Prussia or nibbling away the Tzars undead legions...

Actually, if you've got Bavarians for 1866/70ish it would make a good excuse to get them on the table against "not the French"...

[Leman]

As a historical scenario Bavarians  v. Prussians at Kissingen 1866 is well worth a play. It appears in both Bruce Weigle's 1866 and Neil Thomas'  C19th rules.

[toxicpixie]

Actually, that's a good point, and a real dust up of a scrap.

I tend to write off the West as a sideshow but there's some good actions there.