Recommendations for aircraft tactics please

Started by LesD, 10 October 2021, 10:58:05 AM

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LesD

Hi

Could anyone recommend reference sources for the use of aircraft in WW2.

Thank you in advance

Les


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John Cook

Quote from: LesD on 10 October 2021, 10:58:05 AM
Hi

Could anyone recommend reference sources for the use of aircraft in WW2.

Thank you in advance

Les


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You'll need to be a lot more specific.  Are you interested in tactical, operational or strategic doctrine?  Also what theatre are you interested in, what campaign and which nationality? 

LesD

Quote from: John Cook on 10 October 2021, 12:15:15 PM
You'll need to be a lot more specific.  Are you interested in tactical, operational or strategic doctrine?  Also what theatre are you interested in, what campaign and which nationality? 


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LesD

Quote from: LesD on 10 October 2021, 01:45:18 PM

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My main area of interest is in the support of infantry and armour support. The period is initially 1939/40 to cover the German offensive through Poland and onto Dunkirk.

Les


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sultanbev

10 October 2021, 07:32:04 PM #4 Last Edit: 10 October 2021, 09:02:04 PM by sultanbev
If you find such a book let me know, not seen one in 45 years of research.

Tactical air support of the battlefield didn't really exist in 1939-40 - most airstrikes by everyone other than the Germans was on rear area targets such as truck columns, trains, or pre=planned raids on static targets such as bridges, important cross-roads or entire towns thought to be occupied by the enemy.
Wargaming is far too liberal in it's use of tactical air support for even modern gaming in most sets of rules. The reason being because we love to see the models and factor in their effects.
In practise, when you crunch the numbers, most armies WW2 to present day have on average one flight of bombers/attack planes per battalion fielded, which is convenient for wargamers, but in reality it was rare for a single flight to be attacking - you'd have the whole squadron or even wing attacking one target battalion pretty much simultaneously, or none at all.

In 1939-40 the Germans were the only ones with a definitive attempt at tactical close air support. Each mobile brigade HQ had a air liaison officer of some sort with radios that could contact aircraft and the army brigade HQ. Even then that usually meant they could bring in aircraft sooner on a static target, once discovered by the ground recce units, and pre-bombard it, and the supply echelons just behind, rather than interdict in the middle of a moving battle.

What you'll find is dribs and drabs of information in multiple sources, without one definitive source, that I know of. One I do recommend although it focuses on later war is:
Aggressors vol.1 Tank Buster vs Combat Vehicle, Alex Vanags-Baginskis, Airlife Publications (1990)  ISBN 1-85310-149-4

although it focuses more on technology rather than process.

The main point that is often overlooked is not that ground attack planes caused material damage - it was vastly overstated - but that a targeted unit would scatter and hunker down under air attack, and that dispersal would take around 2 hours to regroup. So in effect the morale effect of airstrikes was far greater than their damaging effect.
Another thing overlooked is the role of attack aircraft in what is, in effect, the counter-battery role. Your roaming squadrons of Stukas or Ju-88 might be able to see artillery batteries firing from behind the lines, whereas trying to spot a platoon of 47mm anti-tank guns shooting out of a village would be virtually impossible.
Virtually all artillery battalions in WW2 had some kind of AA weapons as standard, even if it was only a couple of machine guns - there was a reason for that.

There is some good discussion here:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Close_air_support
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA481546 (pdf to download)

Big Insect

Really good points - well made
But as you say 'gamers' tend to scream loud & long if their favourite ground attack aircraft doesn't appear almost every other turn to support their attack, with pin-point accuracy.
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Ithoriel

The cab ranks of Typhoons and Tempests says more about the Allies' industrial might and aerial supremacy than the effectiveness of ground attacks. If you have the production capacity and air superiority, why wouldn't you?
There are 100 types of people in the world, those who understand binary and those who can work from incomplete data

steve_holmes_11

Quote from: Ithoriel on 10 October 2021, 09:19:49 PM
The cab ranks of Typhoons and Tempests says more about the Allies' industrial might and aerial supremacy than the effectiveness of ground attacks. If you have the production capacity and air superiority, why wouldn't you?

Those Hawkers blew up a lot of trains and canal barges - none of which were within seven leagues of the frontline.


As others have said, the Germans came closest to Army Air cooperation in the 39-40 campaigns.
As with much of their early war doctrine, this was an attempt to compensate for weaknesses elsewhere.

Stukas, because of artillery limitations.
88s fired flat because of limited antitank capability.


I've found YouTube quite informative about air equipment, organisation and tactics.
It comes, howeve, with a coupe of reservations:
1. You can lose hours of your life there.
2. Don't get suckered in by the War Thunder fanboyz.


Lord Kermit of Birkenhead

Most close air support wasn interdiction, and still is. Operations in the battle area are risky, lots of flack and risk blue on blue hits. Also welcome
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LesD

Quote from: sultanbev on 10 October 2021, 07:32:04 PM
If you find such a book let me know, not seen one in 45 years of research.

Tactical air support of the battlefield didn't really exist in 1939-40 - most airstrikes by everyone other than the Germans was on rear area targets such as truck columns, trains, or pre=planned raids on static targets such as bridges, important cross-roads or entire towns thought to be occupied by the enemy.
Wargaming is far too liberal in it's use of tactical air support for even modern gaming in most sets of rules. The reason being because we love to see the models and factor in their effects.
In practise, when you crunch the numbers, most armies WW2 to present day have on average one flight of bombers/attack planes per battalion fielded, which is convenient for wargamers, but in reality it was rare for a single flight to be attacking - you'd have the whole squadron or even wing attacking one target battalion pretty much simultaneously, or none at all.

In 1939-40 the Germans were the only ones with a definitive attempt at tactical close air support. Each mobile brigade HQ had a air liaison officer of some sort with radios that could contact aircraft and the army brigade HQ. Even then that usually meant they could bring in aircraft sooner on a static target, once discovered by the ground recce units, and pre-bombard it, and the supply echelons just behind, rather than interdict in the middle of a moving battle.

What you'll find is dribs and drabs of information in multiple sources, without one definitive source, that I know of. One I do recommend although it focuses on later war is:
Aggressors vol.1 Tank Buster vs Combat Vehicle, Alex Vanags-Baginskis, Airlife Publications (1990)  ISBN 1-85310-149-4

although it focuses more on technology rather than process.

The main point that is often overlooked is not that ground attack planes caused material damage - it was vastly overstated - but that a targeted unit would scatter and hunker down under air attack, and that dispersal would take around 2 hours to regroup. So in effect the morale effect of airstrikes was far greater than their damaging effect.
Another thing overlooked is the role of attack aircraft in what is, in effect, the counter-battery role. Your roaming squadrons of Stukas or Ju-88 might be able to see artillery batteries firing from behind the lines, whereas trying to spot a platoon of 47mm anti-tank guns shooting out of a village would be virtually impossible.
Virtually all artillery battalions in WW2 had some kind of AA weapons as standard, even if it was only a couple of machine guns - there was a reason for that.

There is some good discussion here:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Close_air_support
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA481546 (pdf to download)
Thank you for the link

I must confess my initial research indicated that between 2-5% of lost German armour could be attributed to aircraft. The source of this was the numerous YouTube videos on the net.

Les


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sultanbev

That percentage loss isn't necessarily wrong, but it would be losses to interdiction airstrikes - ie, when the tanks are moving up in column to or from a battle, not actually in the battle itself. Sometimes those tanks would be on tank transporters or even rail flatcars - many Soviet tanks in 1941 were lost when caught moving up on trains.

In wargaming terms, if you have a game where reinforcements or a flank march is coming on, having an interdiction airstrike would create a probability that those reinforcements arrive 2 hours later, or not at all, after being bombed off table. Making such a rules mechanism would be easy enough, but not terribly exciting game play.

steve_holmes_11

Perhaps more significant than that 2% loss is the pinning effect of allied air superiority.

You'll find various reports of German vehicles laagerd up under woodland canopies, effectively unable to move during daylight.

I've no figures, but one can imagine the difficulty of bringing reinforcements against the advancing allies.
Consider also the risks and losses incurred during forced night marches.


Ithoriel

It's not even just the threat of attack. It's hard to launch a successful attack under a sky full of aircraft watching your attack force assemble. Even more reason to move by night with all the attendant risks, as steve_holmes_11 mentions.

There's a morale effect too, if you are under constant threat of air attack and the enemy don't seem to be.

Exemplified by the BEF's view of the RAF during the Dunkirk evacuation and the late war German saying,"If it shows up white it's American, if it shows up blue it's British and if it doesn't show up at all it's the Luftwaffe."

There are 100 types of people in the world, those who understand binary and those who can work from incomplete data

John Cook

Quote from: LesD on 10 October 2021, 01:48:50 PM
My main area of interest is in the support of infantry and armour support. The period is initially 1939/40 to cover the German offensive through Poland and onto Dunkirk.

Les

You asked about sources.  Here are some books I found useful when I was planning my Spanish Civil War and Fall of the Low Countries/France projects a few years ago.  I'm not sure if they are the sort of thing you are looking for but I found them useful.

German Air Force Operations in Support of the Army:  Paul Deichman.  Written over 50 years ago with the intention of informing the USAF about fighting the Soviets, it also covers the Spanish Civil War and early WW2 campaigns.  In 1940 the Germans were the only ones who had an established tactical air support doctrine, integral to their approach to warfare.  Not sure if it is still in print.
The Rise and Fall of the French Air Force – French Air Operations and Strategy 1900-1940:  Greg Baughen.  About two thirds of the book covers WW1 and the inter-war period.  It explains the decline of the French air force and the dominance of the strategic bomber in military thinking.  The remaining chapters examine French air operations in 1940.
The RAF in the Battle of France and the Battle of Britain – A Reappraisal of Army and Air Policy 1938-1940: Greg Baughen.  The book is really in two parts, the Fall of France and the Battle of Britain.  In short the British, like the French, were obsessed with the strategic bomber.  I suspect you will find the first part more of interest to you, where it takes a look at the doctrine, such as it was, of air support to ground forces and why it was not good enough in the 1940 campaign in France.
The Battle for the Hague 1940: EH Brongers.  If you are interested in early airborne operations, although this one is a general account, it does demonstrate how not to do it.  The Dutch handed the Germans a bit of a hiding, such that its effect was still being felt a year later when the Germans attacked Crete. 
The Fall of Eben Emael: Prelude to Dunkirk: James Mrazek  Accounts of the attack on Eben Emael are also worth searching out and although this one is quite old it is worth a read as it does go into some detail of the German use of gliders.
Osprey Booklets.  Osprey series are worth a search through. You might find some useful titles in the Air Campaign and Aviation Elite series.  I found The Condor Legion 1936 - 1939, Holland 1940, Norway 1940 all provided insights into Luftwaffe doctrine, and Luftwaffe Schlachtgruppen which is about German ground attack units specifically though it covers the entire war.
Hope this helps. 

LesD

Quote from: John Cook on 12 October 2021, 11:55:15 PM
You asked about sources.  Here are some books I found useful when I was planning my Spanish Civil War and Fall of the Low Countries/France projects a few years ago.  I'm not sure if they are the sort of thing you are looking for but I found them useful.

German Air Force Operations in Support of the Army:  Paul Deichman.  Written over 50 years ago with the intention of informing the USAF about fighting the Soviets, it also covers the Spanish Civil War and early WW2 campaigns.  In 1940 the Germans were the only ones who had an established tactical air support doctrine, integral to their approach to warfare.  Not sure if it is still in print.
The Rise and Fall of the French Air Force – French Air Operations and Strategy 1900-1940:  Greg Baughen.  About two thirds of the book covers WW1 and the inter-war period.  It explains the decline of the French air force and the dominance of the strategic bomber in military thinking.  The remaining chapters examine French air operations in 1940.
The RAF in the Battle of France and the Battle of Britain – A Reappraisal of Army and Air Policy 1938-1940: Greg Baughen.  The book is really in two parts, the Fall of France and the Battle of Britain.  In short the British, like the French, were obsessed with the strategic bomber.  I suspect you will find the first part more of interest to you, where it takes a look at the doctrine, such as it was, of air support to ground forces and why it was not good enough in the 1940 campaign in France.
The Battle for the Hague 1940: EH Brongers.  If you are interested in early airborne operations, although this one is a general account, it does demonstrate how not to do it.  The Dutch handed the Germans a bit of a hiding, such that its effect was still being felt a year later when the Germans attacked Crete. 
The Fall of Eben Emael: Prelude to Dunkirk: James Mrazek  Accounts of the attack on Eben Emael are also worth searching out and although this one is quite old it is worth a read as it does go into some detail of the German use of gliders.
Osprey Booklets.  Osprey series are worth a search through. You might find some useful titles in the Air Campaign and Aviation Elite series.  I found The Condor Legion 1936 - 1939, Holland 1940, Norway 1940 all provided insights into Luftwaffe doctrine, and Luftwaffe Schlachtgruppen which is about German ground attack units specifically though it covers the entire war.
Hope this helps. 
Thank you

Les


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