Pendraken Miniatures Forum

Greetings my fellow Pendrakens. I would like to revive above topic with some fresh insights and the desire to actually write a book about the potential Operation Sealion.

First up front:

• Even IF Sealion had been 100 % successful there is no way Germany can win the war.

• German armed forces have seen nothing but success thus moral will be high.

• According to my current knowledge Luftwaffe and RAF had gone into a war of attrition - which the Germans would have won if they had kept up the pressure.
  Luftwaffe and RAF had advantages over the opponent in SOME areas which imho were compensated so both were fighting an even battle.

In order to succeed:

1. RAF needs to be moved out of the picture

The pressure must be upheld untill 11th Fightergroup is withdrawn north to conserve whatever strength is left.
-> This leaves airspace free to German Bombers, particularly the Ju87s to pinpoint and eliminate threats to both airpower and the invasion.

2. The Royal Navy must be occupied elsewhere

It was decided to sacrifice the remaining pocket battleships and a Heavy Cruiser in the Atlantic, drawing sufficient RN units out while the Italians would keep forces in the Med occupied.
Diversionary attacks (Herbsreise for example) shlould split whatever seapower was left.
Luftwaffe attacks and sinks enemy shipping.

-> It is unfathomable why any major units should have been committed to counter the invasion. There were almost 40 Destroyers available to RN just in the anticipated invasion area. Removing this threat is near impossible until the actual invasion.
-> Drawing RN units away is not a one way ticket. What if RN simply refuses to commit? What if heavy units are withdrawn and light cruisers and destroyers are left to fight alone? Actually a destroyer flotilla would pose a threat to the invasion that Luftwaffe must deal with. This again draws them away from preparing the invasion and assisting it. The only way would be to commit every Stuka to guard the invasion convoy. Impossible at night and even in brought daylight the record of Luftwaffe vs RN was clearly tilted towards the sea.

-> This brings up another issue. About 40 U Boats were available to attack the RN and to guard the convoy. The rest is too big to be of any use in the channel and its approaches.
-> Protecting the invasion with extensive minefields in combination with submarines and aerial dominance is the only way this can be pulled of. Bringing the first wave over is not an issue. Bringing second wave, reinforcements AND most of all supplies over is the problem.


3. Airborne attacks

Crete has lead Hitler to believe airborne troops are too vulnerable to be of operational use. Churchill had the opposite opinion. The airborne troops were employed to take Dover and Folkestone. How 800 - 1000 men would have succeeded in taking Dover is a secret German general staff has a monopoly on.

-> Airborne attack must be moved from tactical to strategic use. German paratroopers were a crack outfit, highly motivated and particularly indoctrinated. Thus they fight and die. It is admitted that key points need to be take in order for the invasion to succeed. This includes Dover, Folkestone, Ramsgate and/or Brighton/Bexhill etc. Further a bridgehead in the flank of the first STOP Line must be taken and held.

->-> My first recommendation is a totally different approach to the airborne attack. Increase its scale and let it make the way for a smaller first wave but with increased equipment and supplies.
->-> This leads to another change in the battleplan. Airborne troops take and hold at least two airfields (ca. 2 - 3am) untill engineers can re-open them. This is the key! This attack must come as a total surprise and own airpower must be stationed on British soil ASAP! Even at best speed the first counter attack cannot be organised untill dawn - exactly when the seaborne invasion takes place and therefore reduces the heat on the paratroopers.

PROBLEM: Availability of air transport! - I need figures on this but I have learned that the prime air transport (JU52) was in short supply after Crete. Sufficient transport capacity is mandatory for this alternate battleplan.



4. The initial British counter attack

No matter which approach is taken a different plan of attack and with dominance of the air the game is much more even, possibly tilting the scale so far that the Whermacht can actually pull this off. Any counterattack will be met by a massive airpower that is stationed on British soil. Thus longer loitering time and therefore tighter control of the air.

Luftwaffe fighters must bear the brunt of rejuvenated RAF. While "every Tigermoth available" is not really doing any good (remember increased supplies and equipment) against an enemy that has their own AA defense established the ground forces will put up quite a fight. The Royal Army will - initially - be the only thing between the Germans and victory. Very quickly the British will run short of options against a superior fighting force in the field. This implies the RN needs to be kept busy and under pressure. Difficult but under the right circumstances more than doable.It will take at least untill the afternoon of S-day for the major part of the anti-invasion fleet to set sail. And with the number of threats it will take more than a day or two to arrive and do something about the invasion. I will look at the role of RN next.


5. The RN
With the first wave on shore the RN must immediately lock the beaches. With airfields in German control this will reduce but not dry up supplies. With Luftwaffe stationed on british soil AND German coastal artillery on both sides (it was planned to station some serious firepower in Dover) the RN will pay a terrible price to eliminate the invasion fleet. While it must not be neglected the invasion fleet is crucial for trade and supply within Europe (eg Rhinebarges) it can be assumed that RN will not fight and die a heroe's death. There will be the point when Admirality withdraws its surface fleet.

Interestingly a memo from September 4 1940 states Admiralities concern whether they could prevent or interfere with a German invasion. I am currently looking to get a copy of this memo, any help is appreciated. References to it can be found in a  book I am also looking for - so far without success.



6. The use of Gas

As stated above the options will run short quite fast and there have been musings about "having every intention to use gas". How might a WW1 veteran have reacted to that when his own airforce dominates the sky and his troops are establishing a beachhead?
As of 1940 Hitler had on two occasions explicitly forbidden to retaliate with gas against two incidents during the Polish campaign. Both have been minor incidents but due to the "red line" being crossed Hitler was called upon to make the decision to retaliate in kind. On at least one occasion he declined. Rumour has it the Bohemian Private had been furious about the intentionof using gas!

I find it questionable that Churchill would have ultimately supported this decision. All he could have gained was some time with the potential of a gas war he has no means to win.



The discussion should be impartial and non political. If possible please reference your opinion. In the original setup Hitler had a small window of opportunity. With the right changes this window can be widened and moreover I believe Sealion can succeed under the right circumstances. I highly doubt the 1974 Sandhurst wargame. Firstly it assumes the Germans attempt Sealion without Air Dominance and partial control of the sea. Not even Hotler was THAT thick. Secondly I find no reference in said wargame to accomodate for the shortage of equipment on British side and the morale boost the Germans had. Thirdly the original plan of Sealion is less than ideal. It can be assumed that improvisation would continue on German side and a lot of unconventional operations would take place on either side.

As stated I would like to write an actual book about the possibilities to make this operation a success.

Well my former step father was in the occupied Netherlands when the Germans where trying out their ersatz landing craft - they were utter sh*te.  Sealion as planned was unworkable as has been discussed many times before so let's leave that lie.

As you say, two things need to be dealt with the RN and the RAF.  Let's start with the RN.  Assuming the German torpedoes weren't sh*te and Prien brought some friends along and the home fleet was all at Scapa Flow, that might be enough. Still have a crap tonne of destroyers and light units to deal with.  Bear in mind that even with local air dominance, Dunkirk happened - of course that can cut both ways.   Ok so home fleet is shattered at its mooring leaving heavy Kriegsmarine units to screen the flanks of the invasion force.

The RAF - well that was a close run thing anyway. Focus everything on the airfields, don't get sidetracked by revenge missions on civilians and yes the Germans could have done better than they did.  They would still have problems going deep strategically (interdiction of supplies and reinforcements) without a heavy bomber. 

Crete is a bit of a red herring being 6 months after the fact so I don't think Adolf would be gun shy about sending in the paras.  If you are looking at going in in late '41, the Home Guard becomes much less of a gendarmerie and much more of an integrated defense force. Most of them were youngish men in reserved occupations many of whom would have had combat experience form the First War or Spain - decidedly not Dad's Army.    Keeping the Yanks and their lend lease out of the picture becomes a priority.Maybe polio takes out Roosevelt leaving a more right win isolationist president in the Whitehouse. 

So keep it early.  Move the Gigant up a bit to provide a heavy supply glider. Couple that with previous German airlanding experience and yes they could get an airfield. However, they could also get spanked like they did in the Hague.  And as I recall, there were really only two air portable divisions available.  The real problem is that maintaining an airhead is very difficult as Stalingrad proved.   To move heavy stuff in bulk you need a port,

Well dinner is served and I am not cooking for once :)  so that's it from me for now.

Didnt Churchill want to drop Anthrax on Berlin?

I am sure if it came to losing he would have authorised the use of gas

I apologise now if I come across as a bit stroppy but I've seen too many Sealion threads that were purposely written so the Germans succeed.

So,out of curiosity which angle are you going to be looking at Sealion? What the actual capabilities and resources of both sides where or will you be loading the Germans to such a point that they can't possibly fail?

I quote the following from your email

'In order to succeed:

1. RAF needs to be moved out of the picture

The pressure must be upheld untill 11th Fightergroup is withdrawn north to conserve whatever strength is left.
-> This leaves airspace free to German Bombers, particularly the Ju87s to pinpoint and eliminate threats to both airpower and the invasion.

2. The Royal Navy must be occupied elsewhere'

what date would you be looking at staging the invasion? Straight after Dunkirk when the Germans had minimal amphibious units and even less experience or September(ish) when the British Army was certainly capable of resisting the landings??

regards

Freddy326

Hi Freddy, hi PatG, Fenton and others.

I understand this is indeed is sensitive topic and me being German it sounds like sacrileg to pursue the idea this operation might have actually worked. I did not feel insulted at all by your comment and most of all there is a lot of merit in it. The idea is to leave the original order of battle intact as much as possible. And even if the Germans get "loaded" there is still a lot that can lead to their failure. So, no I am not deliberatly giving the Germans victory for any kind of purpose. I find the topic highly interesting and in general I am appalled at the level of stupidity across German High Command. I am interested in "what if" the Germans were only half as stupid and had an actual plan to pull this off?

As stated the window of opportunity is very small. You are also correct about the invasion fleet. The wake of a destoyer would have scuttled it.  Specialised invasion craft were actually built (for Sealion) and then used in the Baltic - without losses as my current source suggests. The fleet is somewhat a week point. It needs to get over fast and as much unseen as possible. Thus the initial assault must not only secure the beachhead, it must secure supply lines and flank the first line of defense. Whereas you are correct there was only 1 airborne Division but soldiers generally do not care how they ride into battle. Regular troops could be flown in via occupied airfields. Again these are light troops
and the beach assault needs to bring in the heavy stuff.

This highlights another weak point. The assault in Crete has shown aircrews with little regard to conservation of strength and equipment with some of them deliberately crashing their JU52s to get the paras into position. A Phyrric victory and not to mention that NOT invading Malta leaves Crete somewaht as a nobrainer. Again: Level of stupidity in the OKW.

Concerning airsupply and Stalingrad. I would argue that to be a bit different case. First of all the Soviets controlled airspace and the approaches to it and secondly the weather was particularly cold even for Soviet wintertime. There are examples that Luftwaffe was capable to airsupply an army if it had to and if it was given the means to do so. I think there are two examples one during France and the other during Barbarossa but I recall from memory I would certainly need to verify it. For Sealion we are talking about feasability and that is ONLY if Luftwaffe rules the sky.

Another good hint was the ME Gigant which became operational in November 1942. Even if it can be pulled forward a little, it was derived from the ME321 Glider, the JU52 is still the mainstay of the operation.

It is however important to understand that not even under the best preconditions Sealion becomes an "autowin". I think it was Raeder who told Hitler that the preconditions for Sealion would actually make the physical occupation of British soil unneccessary - again a bit of a strong statement for which I am looking for a reference.

Yes Churchill was very much advocating the use of poisonous gases long before WW2 and surprise surprise the Army stockpiled the stuff but never actually used it. The stockpile of Allied WMDs was quite low, certainly nothing Adolf could not have retaliated tenfold up untill 42 or even 43. I would need actual numbers. I am not aware of civilian defense preparations concerning gas warfare in either country. I know Gasmasks were not standard issue for German field troops. How ould the British Army distribute such amounts on short notice?

Let us stay at the gas issue for a moment. Imagine Churchill authorises such AND moreover the armed forces REALLY go ahead. Let us further consider the whole German invasion is eliminated by gas. We are in agreement this kills the soldiers and leaves a lot of equipment to the British. But it will not alter the whole strategic situation. Invasion is still feasible as all preconditions are met. Gas does not remove German air dominance and partial control of the sea (by air dominance).

Hence as the British escalate into gas warfare it is a possibility German Luftwaffe starts dropping Gas as well and with little to no RAF interference there is a bit of a boomerang here. Remember we are talking about Luftwaffe ruling the sky in the invasion area AND still control Reich airspace AND RAF being little to no threat.

Now the Homeguard. Much like the army it is at the beginning undermanned and underarmed at best. But so were the Germans. So while Britains defense was weak the German offense was virtually non-existent. Over time both Army and Homeguard become stronger and narrow the chances in an open fight. Focussing on the Homeguard I believe after the initial counter attack -and should it fail- the Homeguard would become a quasi military force. With knowledge of the area the Germans will have hell to pay for every advance. Do not underestimate the power of free men defending their own backyard. Even if the Homeguard fails to stop the Germans they will significantly delay them until the Army can mount a much stronger all out counter attack. I would go as far as saying that under these circumstances the German advantage in the field is nullified for the decisive battle. Whether an equal playing field will be enough for the British is another question. I would say it is an open match.

Again this would become a question if the Germans can resupply and replace casualties.

Concerning the lessons from Crete it is fact that Adolf used the paras only on tactical missions and in small scale thereafter. EG Mussolini or the "Feuerwehr" missions on the eastern front. The biggest issue was that not untill late the paras actually jumped with their weapons. At Crete they had small numbers of grenades and a pistol. Their rifles were dropped in marked canisters and they had to fight their way through to them. Moreover the British knew the invasion plan en detail so could concentrate their strenght and surprise still lost besides knowing everything AND having higher numbers. The problem here was communication (for both sides actually).

But again as freddy pointed out the timing is crucial! Too early and the Germans drown on approach. Too late and the British stand more than a fair chance to resist and actually win in the field.

And again my plea: Do not make political statements highlighting how bad the Germans are or were. The qualities of either side are not part of the topic. Topic is how can this succeed and I do understand odds need to be pushed quite significantly. And that is the point I am talking. We know X needs to happen so we can find out Y preconditions and then decide whether this was workable or not. Thanks again for the input. I am at National Library to get more data.

Hi,

It's not sensitive to me at all, it's the 'one-what if' i really want to game! But,I just don't get why the realities are ignored.

My Grandfather was a Lieutenant in the Rochford Home Guard which is in Essex and he always said that if the landings had taken place in 1940 then their chances of survival were pretty limited, but by 1941 they were well trained and equipped.

forget the JU52s and Crete, how many were lost during the invasion of Holland? did they have enough left to drop an airborne division? remember as well that even one lost, with it's crew over Britain, diminishes the resupply capabilities.

you could look at the option of recreating the Norway model and use destroyers and cruisers to transport the first wave, that would give the RAF and light strike force the problem of dealing with the Kriegsmarine while the Luftwaffe fly's top cover

for what it's worth I think that given luck...and I mean a lot of luck...the Germans may have got ashore but not much further.

regards

Freddy326

good idea freddy :D

I am also interested in the Sandhurst Wargames. They concluded beating the Germans at the GHQ line BUT assume the Germans would NOT have airdominance and zero resupply after day 5! Now replay the Sandhurst wargames but give the Germans dominance of the sky... :-\

What I certainly cannot fathom is ridiculing the idea of invasion as "improvisation". It has, as you said, worked quite well in Norway and the germans were mere hours before the Brits staged the same stunt.

I do not wish to insult or contradict your ancestry but "being ready for the Huns" means facing 25 battle hardened divisions that have been under fire in Poland, Norway and France. How many outfits of the British army had been blooded? Only those that got bloody noses in Dunkirk. We are in agreement that the longer the invasion is postponed the better the British fighting chances become. Hence my saying that the advantage of the Germans is closing similarily with the window of opportunity.

In total not only I am facepalming at the stupidity in OKW but also at the options that are contemplated. I am following the trail of an invasion not being necessary after controlling the air and submarines basically halting commerce. I think this would be the best chance the germans have to come to an agreement with the British. The threat of invasion or at most a limited assault just to show they can would only be the final stages of an otherwise successful western campaign.

I'm sure I didn't say Home Guard were ready in 1940, far from it in fact! They wouldn't have faced 25 divisions, maybe not even one full division but it doesn't mean that the HG would have faired any better. The HG weren't expected to stop the invasion, the best that could be hoped for would be for them to have slowed down the landings so that regulars could be bought up, assuming that the stop lines weren't finished. I've read somewhere that GB created something like 100 battalions between June and October and they were equipped.

'give the Germans dominance of the sky' You may as well then say that the Germans have control of the Channel, the seas stay calm (I've done a lot of scuba diving in the Channel) and wouldn't want to be in the middle in a flat bottom boat (sounds like a song!) even in summer!

no, not improvisation, but unlikely with the logistics that OKW had available.

The only time that 11 Group was starting to look a bit ropey was late July/August, pilot losses were outstripping replacements. By September they have started to recover and have more pilots and aircraft than before BOB whilst the Luftwaffe strength is declining. If I remember correctly 11Group would have retired to 12Group in the event of invasion. It's not easy for the Luftwaffe to get at them there.

How many barges were available for the Kriegsmarine? bear in mind that these barges were in use moving cargo around the Low Countries and Germany including to and from armaments factories, so unless they build a lot more then OKW could have ended up destablising their own industry.

Of course the other snag is how many destroyers and cruisers were left in the Kriegsmarine after Norway?

regards

Freddy326

Regarding airborne attacks, especially on airfields. Forget about it. It's simply not possible (anymore).

There were 430 JU-52 available for the airlandings around the Hague, in May '40. Of these, 280 were destroyed and/or damaged beyond repair. Not only this, but many crews were supplied by the training schools. These losses were felt for a very long time/for the rest of the war.

Also, with regards to "German paratroopers were a crack outfit, highly motivated and particularly indoctrinated. Thus they fight and die." In May '40 around 400 paratroopers were KIA around the Hague. Another 1600 or so were made prisoner, with 1200 being shipped (just in time) to the UK. So I would suggest that maybe they are human after all, and not all-conquering supermen.

I have no idea of the answer, so its just a random question really in regards to invasion

If a planned assault had happened in the UK, what role would 5th columnists and German spies played in disrupting British defences etc. Would they have made any impact?

Good question! MI-5 did manage to apprehend most if not all the German agents, but I haven't read anything that proves or disproves there were any left who hadn't given up, been turned or imprisoned. But IRA with German support, now that's different!!

according to the fountain of all knowledge aka Wikipedia

'During the Second World War, the IRA leadership hoped for support from Germany to strike against Britain during the war, and Seán Russell travelled to Germany in 1940 to canvass for arms. He became ill and died on board a German U-boat which was bringing him back to Ireland in August that year along with Frank Ryan (see Operation Dove). Stephen Hayes, the acting Chief of Staff, prepared an invasion plan for Northern Ireland and sent it to German Intelligence in 1940; this plan was later called Plan Kathleen, but it was discovered by the Irish authorities within one month of its creation.'

and

'IRA Abwehr involvement throughout the period can be broken up into three phases:
Coordination missions with the IRA preceding the French campaign,
Military missions directed against Britain for the purposes of gathering technical and weather data
Political missions against Britain undertaken later in the war, when the threat of direct German action against Britain had receded.'

regards

Freddy326

Since the German spies had by and large been turned by the British they may well have been used to spread misinformation to the Germans.

Worry about 5th columnist activity might have been more disruptive than any actual fifth columnist activity.

Biggest threat would have come from the substantial number of Brits, from government circles down, who believed the Germans would win the war. Was it Sun Tzu who said that the most successful war is the one you win without fighting it?

Hi all and thanks for another round of input. There have been other interesting developments as well in my research.

@freddy: No it was me who said they were a force to reckon with. If not initially then over time. The 25 divisions were not only the initial German plan but also the backup plan if the amended 9-15 divisions for the assault would not suffice.

Mark you I said initial plan. At the beginning of the threat GB had 26 field divisions no armour and artillery to mention and most of these troops were not armed fully or at all. But then again this was the time when Germany was not in the position to cross the channel.

Furthermore the Luftwaffe does not need to get to 11th Group. They just need to fly cover for the army and the fleet. If 11th Group or Bomber Command shows up, then there will be a fight.

The number of transport was exceeding the needed + 10% margin by about another 10%. Full figures vary to some extent but in all publications transport is sufficient.

The German fleet was non existent after Norway. Even if you count in all captured vessels, T/S/E Boats we get less than 100 craft available for this (in addition to the invasion fleet). Now with 10 – 20 equipped soldiers per load and each trip 2hours one way we get 1000 – 2000 soldiers and 3 trips. That assumes no opposition from RN. More about RN later.


@OldenBUA: The number of JU52s available for S day (Sptember 15th) was 252 not counting those under maintenance and repair. That means another 252 * 15 * 3 = 11,000 troops ferried across. Per day! Now assuming 10 % losses that would surely go down to about 7 – 8,000 soldiers. Still a considerable force. For simplicitys sake let's say 5,000 a day for 5 days and after that 2,000 plus supplies. That makes S+4 = 20,000 (initial counter attack) and S+10: 35,000 airlifted troops alone. Assuming high casualties (30%+) we count more than 20,000 still.

Paratroopers were certainly not superhuman but recalling Crete they were outnumbered and against an enemy that knew all their moves. Yet they prevailed. I find that quite impressive


@all: German intelligence is throughout the war ineffective. The only positive experience was Norway. It went so far that Canaris secretly kept the British informed and apparently said to his contact in Portugal as early as 1939 that Germany will lose the war.

Concerning the Sandhurst Wargame:

I have now learned that the umpires were not classroom generals but experienced soldiers from both sides. Cutting it short the only criticism remaining is the preconditions for the exercise. To assume the Germans would proceed despite RAF controlling the sky (yes I believe RAF on their own turf is in control) is equal to replaying this exercise and removing all British Units. It simply makes no sense. Despite the odds the initial force manages to move up to the GHQ line and is not simply defeated but starved and THEN defeated.

Let us assume the OKW was so thick as to try against such opposition. Ithoriel mentions the opportunism of British officials siding with the Germans. None of such is mentioned in the Sandhurst Wargame!

I find it quite possible SOME collaboration and appeasement would play a role should the Germans establish beachheads not to mention starting to move landside. In all publications I recently read an initial attack on the beachheads is repulsed at S+3 or S+4. It will take some days to organise a counter attack and then it may or may not succeed. Now let us imagine it really fails (as per Sandhurst) what would happen on the political front. Churchill would pay a terrible political price. Would politicians just stand by or would at least SOME of them attempt to save their own selfs? How would this destabilize politics and in effect the armed forces? Loads of questions but to assume this to go only one direction is a bit narrowing the options. There will always be opportunism to some degree.

D-Day has given us the lesson that enemy troops, once ashore, are near impossible to kick out again. Even more so if the assault is backed up by airpower. Again the major flaw in the Sandhurst Wargame.

Concerning RN: Even if the minefields, submarines and other measure would keep the Homefleet away (Quote Ruge: Some always get through) then RN has about 20 - 40 destroyers available already in the theatre plus S/E Boats and MTBs. I conclude RN cannot be removed as a factor. Can it be controlled? Perhaps. The idea to assault the harbours from air and sea comes to mind. The minefields would surely keep anything stationed in Portsmouth out for a while and the question is how fast can Portsmouth be taken. According to Cox S+10 German troops are planned to be outside London, controlling Portsmout and most of Southern England. Again a direct assault on Portsmouth, Dover and Folkestone is mandatory. With the exception of Portsmout this can be a combined sea/air invasion. Portsmouth must be taken with troops landing nearby and paras concerting that. Then and only then Southern England becomes a German play area. Quite a task but the mind rises up to the challenge.

Another problem for any kind of assault: Once it starts the British know about it and will give out "Cromwell". I assume this is factored in by Sandhurst and I am impressed that the Germans get as far as the GHQ line with a more than inadequate plan.

As of now the best option I can see is an assault end of winter 1940/41 with the ME321 available carrying 200 soldiers or a tank.

Tentative Timeline (ideal sebigboss scenario):

3am: initial para landings. Securing airfield(s) and strategic points
4am: British start mobilising. Cromwell is given out. (is that too fast?)
5am: All beaches fully manned. Initial contact with Paras
6am: Airfields in control of Paras, Airlift starting
6am: Assault on beaches. British in position. Initial (uncoordinated) counter attack on Paras fails.
10am minor ports under German control. Sealift shifting to equipment.
2pm: initial counterattack (again uncoordinated) fails
5pm: Dover out of action but under German control

S+3 Initial Coordinated counterattack faces stiff German resistance. Armour and Artillery support on both sides equal.
S+4 Dover reopened. RN arrives facing Luftwaffe operating from British bases, submarines and minefields as well as numerous smaller crafts. RN controls the night, Luftwaffe the day with smaller RN craft running interference raids. Channel is dominated by German airpower and artillery.
S+5 Coordinated resistance fades as British units withdraw. Germans maintain perimeter.
S+7/9 Germans break out of perimeter.


I admit being guided by the book "If Britain had fallen" and my suggested timeline (if all goes well) is still tentative. What I need is some more information and unfortunately when I had the books available at National Library a firealarm ended my day there :(

Sorry, but Overlord had a couple of things going in it's favour that Sealion didn't

1)The Allied invasion of Normandy in 1944 had behind it two years of planning, the Germans would have had around two months. Even allowing for the improvisational skills of some German generals, this would seem to be a tough task to get it right.

2) When launching 'Overlord', the Allies had established supremacy both in the air and at sea. The Germans, on the other hand, failed at one and had no chance at the other.

3) The Allies had developed a considerable array of specialist vehicles, landing craft etc. to carry men and equipment as safely as possible onto the invasion beaches. The Germans, on the other hand, would be relying on river barges, most of which would have been towed.

4) For all their material superiority the Allied commanders recognised that there was still a good chance that 'Overlord' would fail incurring heavy losses of men and equipment. Again, the Germans could barely hope for such superiority, so how much more likely would it have been that 'Sealion' would have been a costly failure?

Fuel for the JU-52s and their air cover? you can't move it by barge, you've nicked all of those for your troops!

'Furthermore the Luftwaffe does not need to get to 11th Group. They just need to fly cover for the army and the fleet. If 11th Group or Bomber Command shows up, then there will be a fight.'......and what would the cost to the Germans have been? don't forget that this is the critical period when the Germans would have been attempting to expand their bridgehead(s), bring in armour and heavy artillery that it wasn't possible to land in the first wave. Sorry, but German resources were such that no arm of the Wehrmacht was capable of performing all the tasks required of it to stage a successful invasion.

If I recall correctly several members of the establishment who were pro-German were quietly moved out of the way. To name but a few, the Mosleys were interned in May/June and  1940, John Amery was in Vichy France but didn't get to Berlin until 1942, Lord Halifax was appeasement rather than collaboration.

It's very difficult to capture a functioning port, the allies tried it a couple of times ! You'd need to try and take Dover and Folkestone as they the only ones that the Luftwaffe can realisticly provide fighter cover for.

I remember something about the Germans testing landing troops from river barges on the french coast and finding them unsuitable, but I can't remember were it was.

I have shamelessly grabbed this off another Sealion site as I'm at worked and can't hunt down the info

The "County Divisions" (little transport) were placed to cover the coast and the ports, the refitting regular divisions and the GHQ reserve divisions which were fully mobile.

'In July, according to Hamilton and the official war records, England had the following troops in the southeast in July:

1st London Div - Dover, Folkstone, Deal
45th Division - Rye, Pevensey
3rd Division - Worthing, Brighton
New Zealand - Reigate, Crawley

These first three divisions were either without significant transport or only partially mobile, the NZ was fully mobile (and actually, more properly part of the GHQ reserve but probably the first responders.

The GHQ Reserve in July consisted of the following divisions (west of London, Oxforshire, Wiltshire):

1st Arm'd Div (Cruisers and Matilda IIs)
2nd Arm'd Div (Cruisers, Lt tanks and Valentines)
1st Canadian
2nd London
43rd Wessex
52nd Lowland

plus an Australian division just arrived near Bristol'

it still all boils down to when you're going to invade though!

regards

Freddy326

Quote from: sebigboss79 on 17 December 2013, 01:27:38 PM
3am: initial para landings. Securing airfield(s) and strategic points
...
6am: Airfields in control of Paras, Airlift starting

The German airforce lost so many transport planes in the attack on the Hague airfields because they used a similar plan. The only problem being that some airfields were not captured (or were lost to a counterattack) when the second wave was due to land. So any kind of setback in this first phase, and your 10% losses in transport seem very, very low. And 250 planes is simply not enough, if next to twice that amount was used four months earlier. Because it seems to me that your plan involves far more objectives as well.

The basic problem (which will be much worse in Sealion) is that you're putting limited numbers of troops right in the middle of enemy territory. Ever since Norway, there are no undefended airfields anymore. And, it's not just the garrison, any/all troops in the vicinity will get involved as well.

If you want airdrops to work, you need a massive amount of them, several divisions worth, all in one go. The German army/airforce simply did not have this capability.

@Freddy: As you say: timing.

Again you correctly state: Air and sea supremacy. Germans were going to win a war of attrition. Losses, production and numbers amount to similar strengths. While Britain lost less pilots the Germans trained a lot more. Given the relative equality in the air the question is who lasts longer in that "trenchwar". That is what it essentially came to.

Fuel for my JU52s is plenty in France where they will go after delivering to the forward airbase. The fuel for my JU87s on the other hand (not to mention my fighters) is the questionable item. The barges as you said were in use for troops. Now as I am shifting troops to the JUs and MEs I get more transport capacity on sea. Which means even in the first wave I can (theoretically) have more equipment and supplies.

Against a fully functioning RAF there is no way the combined forces of the Wehrmacht can succeed. But if you recall my precondition of RAF being significantly pummeled and 11th Fightergroup being with 12th while Luftwaffe HAS bases on British soil. This would also remove the limits from ports that can be held. With immediately available airpower any port can be held. The question is how long and moreover how much damage can the British do on short notice to deny the port capacity to the invading force.

Correct again that known pro-German elements were taken care of. I think Ithoriel was more referring to the opportunistic elements. You do not know them until they show themselves.

Concerning your reserve figures my post Dunkerque figures say less than 400 tanks in the whole UK. Which is roughly the number the Germans would land as well. And forgive me but: Erprobungsverband Ostsee. The German improvised specialised landing craft did very well in the Baltic. Zero losses in 3 campaigns and evacuation at the end of the war. They must have been rather good considering the lack of experience the Germans had.

@OldenBUA: S day: 252 planes available. Which means September 15th. How many are available end of February? I also do not know but I would suggest it were some more. The objectives are in fact virtually the same. Capture a forward base (airfield(s)). Take a port (seaborne invasion plus airborne elements). Do not think airborne = paras. As I said. Fly in regular army soldiers and ship their heavy gear. But even a ME321 can transport a Panzer IV. At that time more than a match for what any other nation fielded.

For the airdrops to work. I did take opposition at the airfields into consideration. Since this is a new element and a diversion from original Sealion I am quite confident this can work and regular army units start arriving 3 hours after the assault. If the British however can deny the airfield longer than S+2 then the airborne assault will collaps. Concerning the opposition I would again like to point out that superior numbers were not able to defend against known assaults in Crete. Admitted the Luftwaffe had little regard to conservation crashlanding several JUs directly on the objectives.

Please all keep in mind this is totally fictious assuming the Luftwaffe keeps up their campaign against RAF and infrastructure rather than switching to the Blitz which accomplished absolutely nothing for the war effort. Much less I actually believe this stiffened British resolve never to surrender.

As we disucss more and more points come up that original Sealion never took into consideration. My current tasklist:

Determine potential available airtransport end of February 1941.
Look up favourable weather patterns (monlight at night, low winds etc.)
Determine figures on tanks and artillery available to both sides.


Question @ all: Should I rather just report findings and reply via PM or leave it like this?

Forgive me, all I know about Erprobungsverband Ostsee is from Leixicon der Wehrmacht and they give a strength in June 1941 of 4 freighters , 16 coasters , 5 heavy artillery carriers , 3 Light artillery carriers , 9 steam tugs , 14 converted to Behelfslandungsbooten Motorprähmen (command landing boats??), 12 barges , 24 motor boats and 9 fishing trawlers (i think that's a correct translation). I like their LWS 300 tractor though, is that on Hotchkiss running gear? but they are not a major troop carrying force!

No one is disputing the Fallschirmjager on Crete, but things could have easily have gone differently!

February in the Channel isn't something to look forward too!

While I think about it, will you be invading Greece (April) or Crete (May) or even the Soviet Union?

True the Me321 can transport a MkIV, but it's a glider so unless you've already landed specialist vehicles, they can't be moved on the ground and you've also got to ensure that those highly trained Me110 Troikaschlepp pilots doing the towing survive otherwise the 321s are stuck!

I'm happy to continue here as long as the moderators and you are  :)

Quote from: sebigboss79 on 17 December 2013, 03:45:43 PM

For the airdrops to work. I did take opposition at the airfields into consideration. Since this is a new element and a diversion from original Sealion I am quite confident this can work and regular army units start arriving 3 hours after the assault.

Maybe you're not getting what I am saying. This idea of reinforcements (Luftlande division) being flown in after capturing the airfield is exactly the same plan as was used elsewhere. Rather than a big bonus, as you seem to think, it's a very, very big liability. It was only chosen because it was the only way, as there was simply not enough transport available.

If anything goes wrong with the original plan, as I'm sure it will, those transport planes will either get shot to pieces, land on a hostile airstrip, (crash) land somewhere else in the hope of being able to take off again, or simply abandon the mission and return home, if they are lucky. This is what happened in all other plans using the same stratagem.

For Ypenburg airfield, the initial assault used 53 planes. Of these, 27 were available for the second wave, and 15 for the third wave (which was cancelled).

Quote from: OldenBUA on 17 December 2013, 07:11:20 PM
Maybe you're not getting what I am saying. This idea of reinforcements (Luftlande division) being flown in after capturing the airfield is exactly the same plan as was used elsewhere. Rather than a big bonus, as you seem to think, it's a very, very big liability. It was only chosen because it was the only way, as there was simply not enough transport available.

If anything goes wrong with the original plan, as I'm sure it will, those transport planes will either get shot to pieces, land on a hostile airstrip, (crash) land somewhere else in the hope of being able to take off again, or simply abandon the mission and return home, if they are lucky. This is what happened in all other plans using the same stratagem.

For Ypenburg airfield, the initial assault used 53 planes. Of these, 27 were available for the second wave, and 15 for the third wave (which was cancelled).

I agree - you are being massively over optimistic at getting the planes turned around.

If you look at operations like Market Garden where the aircraft where re-used there were all sorts of problems. And here they had several things in their favour:
1) Very low losses of aircraft on day 1
2) Only planning on 1 drop a day
3) Very experienced airforces and airborne forces.

Its fairly telling that the allied air portable division (52nd) was never used in this way and was used as normal infantry.

I think if you are thinking that the aircraft that drop the paras over England, can get back to base, refuel, get loaded up with infantry, then head back again, and land safely within 3 hours - this just isn't going to happen It sounds unlikely for a single aircraft let alone on a divisional scale.

Well my work is cut out.

@OldenBUA: Yes I do know about turnaround times and I do anticipate opposition. Again: See Crete. The comparison with Market Garden is actually very valid plus I have postulated fairly good weather. Thus looking for a feasible time end of February onward.
Concerning turnaround I actually calculated with 15 hours for 3 trips starting at 6am.

The more intersting question is how much juice would the British leave behind and how fast an airfield can be available for service - more like if. Interestingly the initial preparations of the defense forces were, surprise surprise against paratroopers. According to said book all possible landing places for gliders were blocked. The ME321 was available from June 1941 and if a large scale airborne drop is to be made that needs to come forward 6 months. With 20 being produced per month there are then 40 - 60 available on S-day.

That means on a single trip 8,000 soldiers or 40 tanks. A significant force of 2,000+ soldiers plus equipment and tanks becomes then available behind enemy lines. Again IF the ME321 could eb made available 6 months earlier!

We can conclude the airdrop faces similar difficulties as the whole invasion and we remember that Sandhurst ruled the invasion successful up untill the GHQ line. My losses for the aircraft may be optimistic and thus my army casualties surpass some estimates. Whatever numbers hypothetical exercises use the cannot be defended I made a choice, I could have made another. Crete could and should have gone different but it did not. As an immediate reaction Churchill orders paratroopers being trained and anti-invasion plans anticipate large scale airborne operations. As PatG initially put it: The barges are sh*te.

@freddy: The Erprobungsverbad contained some (by far not all) craft. But they worked very well. TheTroikaschlepp was conducted with  3 ME 109s the BF110 and HE111s could pull the ME321. In order for this plan to work the assault must quickly take the airfield, defend it and make it serviceable for further operations. The JU52s can land on almost any sufficiently flat surface. The HE111s have limited rough surface capability.

I am quite positive this thread is not a concern of the moderators but I would like to keep it unclogged. There is a lot I have to research and I can only do that after Christmas.


The airborne issue becomes a matter of above taking, holding and using. If that can be accomplished and moreover troops come in by air or sea to take the ground as well. Then this Sealion has a major advantage over the "real" one. I would like a comment on reaction time of the armed forces. How fast would a general alarm be sounded if said assault takes place at 3am? How fast can forces be assembled and a significant counterattack against the airfield be mounted? What would happen if those preparations coincide with the beach assault? I assume Germans knew the reaction time roughly and would time their different assault accordingly.

Interesting topic - probably my favourite 'what if' scenarios, and whilst certainly no expert, I have done a little reading on the subject.

One interesting book well worth reading if you haven't already, is "Invasion: The German Invasion of England July 1940" by Kenneth Macksey. Obviously this is suggesting a very early invasion, close on the tail of Dunkirk, at a time when many would argue the German's would have been incapable of staging an invasion.

Many good points made so far, however a couple come to mind that haven't been:

1) Re D-Day, yes the allies had the advantage of long preperation and air supremacy, but in this scenario it is being suggested that a) Germany had air supremely, certainly could have happened if the Luftwaffa had stuck to striking directly at the RAF and their bases, and b) the English coast was no 'Fortress Europe'! The invading Germans would have faced far lighter fortifications, especially with an earlier date.

2) Lack of German sea superiority has also been mentioned, but the biggest threat to the RN at this time was probably itself. I haven't got the references to hand, but the Admiralty made it clear they did not want to bring their larger vessels into the channel as lack of manoeuvrability would have made them extremely vulnerable to torpedo and/or air attack.

3) Once ashore, lack of heavy equipment would be less of a hindrance to the Germans than might be thought. If they had the assumed air superiority, they were masters of the combined arms approach, something the British were still in denial about.

4) Probably the most controversial aspect, and one people seem very shy to talk about, was the style and quality of the early high command. Morale was low for a long time after Dunkirk, and Generals had to be pressured into acting, they certainly hadn't grasped the concepts of modern war and combined arms. Look at the early North Africa campaign, where Wavell etc were happy to sit behind defenses. O'Conner etc only came into their own once let off the leash.  Obviously this situation changed dramatically later, so again an early invasion date is crucial.

5) As assumptions are being made that the Germans gain air superiority prior to invasion, what of the radar stations? Knocking these out would have been key to preventing advance warning of an approaching air assault.

6) Perhaps the greatest 'what if' ... What if the Germans hadn't allowed the British Army to escape from Dunkirk? Britain would have been a far weaker, far more demoralised target.

Just my interpretation. Ultimately, Germany' greatest weakness was Hitler's ever changing mind.

@ sebigboss79, I shall enjoy following your progress with this, and wish you the best of luck if you do decide to go ahead and write a book.

Cheers,

Kev

@sebigboss79

There was something in the newspapers a couple of years ago about the redevelopment of old airfields and the amount of explosive demolitions stuff that was being unearthed and then having to be cleared. So you may be forced to only use grass fields until engineers can clear the main sector bases.

sorry to say it again but you need to pick your landing dates and then stick to them as there are different issues almost on a monthly basis.

If you are looking at Feb 1941 then you'll be facing well equipped opposition with completed beach defences and stop lines. Invade July 1940 then it's the Germans with the logistic problems but oddly POL wouldn't be one of them as the UK was 'awash' with aviation fuel. You've just got to stop it being destroyed or incinerating your troops!!! The fuel tanks that would have been used at Dover to set light to the sea in the harbour were only removed when the M20 was extended and an extended link road was needed between same and the Archcliffe Fort roundabout.

@squirrel

1) Re D-day, true the UK coast wasn't the Atlantic Wall, but it didn't need to be. It was probably the most fortified coast that the Germans would ever have assaulted and would still need careful planning to avoid a disaster!

2)The RN quite rightly said no capital ships, but they weren't needed. The Luftwaffe weren't that good, at that time, in hitting fast manouvering ships of any sort as they hadn't been trained for that. the Dunkirk attacks were mostly against ships that were stopped or moving slowly. The Luftwaffe made something like 21 attacks against small torpedo boats during the Battle of Britain and sunk none and there were something like 700 MTBs MGBs, sloops etc, they can't be ignored.

3)Hmmm....the ground troops still need artillery and supplies. But, yes if they had full superiority and had captured the south coast airfields intact, then they could support any advance.

4)IF the British and French armies had been captured at Dunkirk, a vote of no confidence in Churchill taken, then maybe peace overtures might have been made. Stunned may have been a better word to describe the high command, but don't forget that they would have been fighting a defensive battle, so sitting behind defences may not have been a bad thing! At a local level the troops had gained valuable experience in a new type of warfare.

5) Radar Stations were useful, but not necessary, there was an extensive network of well trained observers available. Less time to respond but still giving an advance warning.

6) see 4

if you do write the book, put me down for a copy!

regards

Freddy326

Agreed, the British south coast had some impressive fortifications, in places, though I recall a documentary on tv not long ago stating that at the beginning of the war many of the guns only had a handful of rounds of ammunition, and in one caee they stated only 2! That number stuck in my mind! So sadly I'm not sure how effective they would have been.

With regard to the invading troops needing artillery support, the whole concept of 'Blitzkrieg' was that aircraft replaced it to enable forces to keep moving. With the experience gained in Poland and France, and with full air superiority, that wouldn't have been a problem!

I agree defending MTB's, MGB's etc would be a big factor, and I have no reliable source available to hand, but 700 in mid 1940 sounds optimistic. Don't forget the Germans had similar craft available as well as U-boats, hence why the RN wouldn't commit capital ships.

Cheers,

Kev

Hi folks and thanks again for the many contributions.

As stated there are issues and what ifs on a daily basis. I would like to base this scenario on the Sandhurst Wargame but as stated change the input to the following situation:

RAF 11th Group is beaten and ceases to be a factor. It is pulled back and merged with 12th Group leaving Southern England at mercy of the Luftwaffe. HE111s, DO17s and JU87 run havoc and basically control the theatre of operations. (Actually Admirality forbade any shipping in the channel at one point due to German dominance).

Germans need 10 days (8 in Original setup) to heavily mine the flanks of the invasion and assemble to Invasion force and achieving +5 Status. That leaves for S+3 days the Channel to the Germans with only limited forces available to the RN. -> I need actual figures of the forces between Poole and Ramsgate. Ramsgate to Brighton is more important the other invasion theatre was for 6th Army under von Leeb as a reserve force.

It is worth noting that none of the several plans was satisfying to any arm of the Wehrmacht. The final plan somewhat limits the scenario to Ramsgate-Brighton which means narrower corridor to defend and less forces directly available for the RN. The 6th army threatening more western beaches is a bit of a nobrainer. a) it cannot be reasonably sealed off, Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe combined cannot credibly defend such a convoy even and especially at night! b) Falling in the flanks of the British forces defending the beaches against von Rundstedt's invasion force is a useful but imho wrongly allocated threat. The initial idea of landing in the midlands would imho cut Britain in half and being caught zippers down would lead to negotiations no matter how well the southern campaign goes.

Ergo: These reserves must reach British soil differently: My suggested extended airdrop maybe?
Problem: The increased airtransport capacity is not available before mid 1941. Solution: Incorporate the airdrop in the original plan in favour of secondary landing of 6th army.
Under such preconditions I find it possible to bring forward deployment of the ME321 some months. Initial flight was in February 1941 and full scale production soon after.

While Luftwaffe runs wild and softens defenses largely unopposed the number of JU52s and ME321s will increase beyond the Original 252 JU52. Assuming average buildingspeed throughout the war I get about 20 new JU52s per month. That is additional 120 JU52s untill end February/beginning March, not counting losses and repairs. That is 370 JU52s and 40 - 60 ME321s which I will use as an input.

Certainly the precondition of Luftwaffe being unopposed would alter the strength of RN in the area but for simplicity this number shall remain the same.

Feedback for Squirrel and freddy:

1) I really enjoy the approach of "how can this work" thanks again and I am happy to put your names in as references and contributors. The first crowdwritten research :D
2) The UK has several suitable areas for landing, basically the whole east coast which cannot be credibly defended. Same goes for the Atlantikwall. Such a defense was not and is not possible.
3) RN needs no big ships, possibly not even cruisers. The problem is how many will "go through" as Admiral Ruge stated. I imagine the German subs and JU87s to constantly harrass the assortment of ships that will be tasked to counter the invasion.
4) The invasion fleet was not a "sitting duck". Besides airsupport several ships have a number of guns up to 105mm and 88mms. More than suitable to defend against MTBs. Destroyers is entirely the problem of the Luftwaffe and the German small vessels.
5) After limiting RNs movements with airsuperiority we can assume German naval forces to patrol and the invasion fleet therefore to achieve surprise. Most possibly not complete surprise but assuming a single british destroyer getting the word out before it is sunk by German forces. It will certainly take time to gather a significant force and if timing is halfway on the German side the airborne landings have succeeded and it is daylight enough so Luftwaffe can defend the fleet against the forces gathered to sink it. Some will get through and cause losses. That is anticipated in the German plan. (in fact the German plan assumed being caught in the open)
6) Germans are bringing heavy equipment. Even more so if troops are ferried by plane and make room for equipment on the ships. The original plan has some 400 tanks.
7) IF Dunkirk would have gone for the Germans (and remember Rommel and Co. were watching the British and were forbidden to interfere!) then the invasion is an almost automatic success and Great Britain under Mosley will sue for peace.
8) Radar stations were quite sturdy but their utility lines (phone, electricity) were easy targets. Assuming air superiority the Radar chain is eliminated and spotters are not particularly useful at night. Moreover it severely reduces warning time. Under these circumstances I find it very optimistic that British defenses are on full alert sooner than 6-7 am (= S+ 4-5hours). Being alert and aware does not mean you can do something about the invasion. The Germans have significant time to establish their position both at the airfields and at the beaches. Resistance seems very impossible untill mid afternnon on S-day. Such counterattack against an enemy that has set position will inevitably fail. The only chance would be a significant blow either in the very first few hours or an all out attack when the Germans break out of their perimeter. In consequence untill that break out it will be the task of the Homeguard to harrass the enemy whereer they can, leading to reprisal from the Germans.
9) I redestribute 6th Army as follows:Infantrie Divisions 56 and 62 are airferried to southern England joining the airborne landing. The remaining forces and an armoured division from strategic reserves are held in France. Should the opportunity arise this force will land in the Midlands and threaten London from the North.
10) The window of opportunity is certainly not getting bigger but you can approximate. Especially under the "given" air superiority the Germans will have the edge in the field BUT face a motivated and well dug in enemy which will level the field. It is a matter of supplies and how well the Luftwaffe can make up for the naval inferiority.
11) Use of gas: Absolutely out of question. As much as success in Sealion does not win the war for Germany, all such a move would accomplish is misery for the British Island. Even if all invading forces are eliminated the Luftwaffe still owns the sky and the Germans will retaliate. With air dominance there is little the British can do against an escalating gas war. I am quite sure Churchill would face severe concequences should he really give that order.
12) I came across other scenarios like the French fleet being taken by the Germans or the Soviets participating in the airborne assault (largest para army at the time). It seems unfathomable why Hitler did not use the Soviets for this venture and allowed the tension to build up that fast. Both dictators knew the endgame would come but the Soviets were looking forward to take on England at that time.

Again it comes down to hit one or two airfields in force, capture them reasonably intact and reachable for the seaborne invasion within 48 hours. This assault (Operation Backstab) is crucial for the whole operation. Selection criteria for the airfield: damaged but repairable within 24 hours. Defendable with 2 - 5,000 men plus tanks and fieldguns. Airfield must be operational for JU87s to make up the lack of Heavy guns.

There are a couple of issues in this that are overlooked.

The first is that winning of the initial air war was not to gain air dominance over Southern England, but to gain dominance over the north sea and the Western Approaches - without which no invasion force could have crossed the Channel. One needs to look at the naval invasions later in the war to understand that the technical and logistical problems involved were huge - even very small scale landings, like the British attack on Madagascar proved far from straight forward. An operation on the scale proposed by Sealion was in all likelihood by beyond the technical capabilities of the Germans - unless of course the British completely lost their mind and yielded to American pressure to give them the Royal Navy.

The second issue is that Sealion was never an operation that was any more than a threat. As the Russians would still have annexed the regions on the Rumanian border, which were to lead a year later to Barbarossa in order to protect the German oil supplies. One of the interesting aspects of the second world war that is overlooked is how much of the early war German propaganda was focused on the German allies, and the important role they were playing - which seems rather a side track - but in terms of policy the threat to Rumania was of far more importance than the non-preparations on the French coast for an invasion that was never going to happen.

Quote from: fateeore on 30 December 2013, 12:08:23 AM
There are a couple of issues in this that are overlooked.

Not really the ones you have mentioned, I am afraid. First and foremost if your presumptions are on track why does the Sandhurst wargame conclude the Germans CAN land, get a bridgehead and then move up to the GHQ line?

Quote from: fateeore on 30 December 2013, 12:08:23 AMThe first is that winning of the initial air war was not to gain air dominance over Southern England, but to gain dominance over the north sea and the Western Approaches - without which no invasion force could have crossed the Channel. One needs to look at the naval invasions later in the war to understand that the technical and logistical problems involved were huge - even very small scale landings, like the British attack on Madagascar proved far from straight forward. An operation on the scale proposed by Sealion was in all likelihood by beyond the technical capabilities of the Germans - unless of course the British completely lost their mind and yielded to American pressure to give them the Royal Navy.

Concerning he Western approaches please elaborate how this is relevant. Any major force would be reported and closely watched by the Irish and a picket line of German submarines. I find the task to move through submarine infested waters somewhat tricky. Moreover if the Germans manage to sink a couple of major surface combattants the RN will be wondering whether they should REALLY press such a suicide attack. After all the British ain't Japanese, are they?

Concerning the technical capabilities refer to the Sandhursr Wargames. Besides the high degree of improvisation and "make do" the battle is decided on the supply lines. One should also not forget the amount of supplies the British deposited for both military and civilians in case of an invasion. I am sure the Germans would have been sportsman enough to not touch these to feed themselves - not.

Quote from: fateeore on 30 December 2013, 12:08:23 AMThe second issue is that Sealion was never an operation that was any more than a threat.

You are correct here. Hitler hoped the British would see reason and Raeder concluded hat once the situation makes invasion possible it would not be needed anymore. But then again, while the Brits are occupied with fortifying Festung England they cannot do much elsewhere. E.G. Malta was rife to fall but when the Germans did not follow up the invasion of Crete the Med theatre became somewhat the Achilles heel not only for Rommel.

Quote from: fateeore on 30 December 2013, 12:08:23 AMAs the Russians would still have annexed the regions on the Rumanian border, which were to lead a year later to Barbarossa in order to protect the German oil supplies. One of the interesting aspects of the second world war that is overlooked is how much of the early war German propaganda was focused on the German allies, and the important role they were playing - which seems rather a side track - but in terms of policy the threat to Rumania was of far more importance than the non-preparations on the French coast for an invasion that was never going to happen.

Actually Stalin was giving Adolf quite some degree of help and having the largest airborne force in the world at that time what would have happened if the Germans had really asked for Russian troops? Stalin would have granted a limited involvement which means anything from another airborne assault to a little force of about a million throwaway troops. We can discuss possible Soviet involvement ad absurdum. Fact is under the right circumstances the GHQ line will break and Great Britain occupied. As you stated the problem solely is one of supplies in the given case. And how well land and seaborne assets fare against an enemy that commands the sky is also well documented throughout the war.

But even if Luftwaffe prooves incapable once more one must also consider the fact that any British shipping in the channel was forbidden at some time due to German guns in france dominating the channel. A somewhat peculiar notion but this, too is in the archives. Now what would happen once German artillery is also placed on British soil? What if German Stukas unopposed are based on Southern England airfields? I strongly recommend Norman Longmate's elaborations on a possibly successful Sealion, in particular is ramblings on "how close it was" and the contemplation of certain circles even at the time. Downplaying the danger certainly was not how Churchill perceived the "threat". The possibility of Britain falling was real under the right circumstances. Not more, not less. And please care to re-read my initial post: Even if Sealion is a success it is not the way to win the war.

The Sandhurst wargame is just that a wargame. Unless the Germans land there isn't much point in the German side showing up.

The Western Approaches are relevant due to Portsmouth and Plymouth. And according to plans drawn up at the time the British were planning to adopt suicidal tactics to prevent any landings. As you identify supplies are the key to any naval operation, which is why I pointed out the difficulties of later operations, most of which were carried out with capacity far in excess of anything the Germans possessed in 1940, and all of which ran into difficulties that stretched their capacity at times to breaking point.

As for Malta, this was less important than Gibraltar, and Franco withstood German and French pressure to move against that fortress.

You have an odd notion of the game being played in Eastern and Central Europe. The idea that the Russians would have supplied troops or assistance for an invasion of Britain is patently absurd. There is a world of difference between supplying food and material to buy land and short term breathing space, and actively assisting an enemy that one is planning to invade at sometime after 1942. It was the same game Hitler played in the 1930's, the same as the British and French played in the Czech crisis, it's called diplomacy.

You keep coming back to this 'fact' that the Germans dominated the channel, but I would suggest that you are misunderstanding it's significance. The RAF identified the problem was pilots not aircraft, therefore the decision was made to withdraw their force from the channel in order to minimize the risk of losing the former. Instead relying upon radar to flag up threats and to tackle them once over land, which made the task of recovering pilots that much easier. Given that this was a siege, your premise appears to be that because the besiegers controlled the airspace over the moat they controlled the castle. Which was clearly not the case, as real life events showed.

Quote from: fateeore on 30 December 2013, 02:04:03 PM
The Sandhurst wargame is just that a wargame. Unless the Germans land there isn't much point in the German side showing up.

THE Wargame of said event, refereed by professional soldiers with one of the umpires being no one less than Adolf Galland himself. I mistakenly assumed some classroom generals playing around but was pleasantly surprised at the illustre cadre that actually took part in this wargame. My only criticism and the reason for this thread is the presumption the Germans would attempt the invasion without dominance of the air. Yet said wargame conclude the Germans succeed to a large extent. Now let us debate how much MORE the Germans can do if they actully achieved dominance of the air - which they were about to.

Quote from: fateeore on 30 December 2013, 02:04:03 PMThe Western Approaches are relevant due to Portsmouth and Plymouth. And according to plans drawn up at the time the British were planning to adopt suicidal tactics to prevent any landings. As you identify supplies are the key to any naval operation, which is why I pointed out the difficulties of later operations, most of which were carried out with capacity far in excess of anything the Germans possessed in 1940, and all of which ran into difficulties that stretched their capacity at times to breaking point.

The actual plans drawn where about when to withdraw the fleet to Canada. And the original plans and any plans I have read about did not contain any "prevent the landing at all costs" clause, I am quite sure about that. The military sense to sacrifice the RN to prevent a landing is, my apologies, ridiculous. OKW calculated that 90 % losses of the invasion force were acceptable. So throwing away the fleet to destroy half a million German troops accomplishes what for the defense? Exactly: Zero.

While Admiral Ruge stated that "some will get through" I still fail to see the impact of any force in/near the Channel on the actual invasion. You assume the somewhat 40 Destoyers Britain could muster on short notice plus the MTBs will defend themselves against the Luftwaffe (in excess of 1,000 Bombers just waiting to sink them) PLUS German artillery (the reason why Churchill forbade any operations in the Channel) AND the forces the Kriegsmarine had and would muster to defend the invasion fleet? Well..Good luck I guess.... and that does not take into account the heavy minefields Ruge was going to lay for 10 days. Face it: The first 3-4 days only the forces within the minefields are combat effective. Royal Navy becomes a factor once the Homefleet sails from Scapa flow (through minefields submarines and Luftwaffe) to counter the invasion. Well not the invasion but the supplies. And of course the Luftwaffe would rather watch the display of seapower than to sink it once it enters the confines of the channel.

Quote from: fateeore on 30 December 2013, 02:04:03 PMAs for Malta, this was less important than Gibraltar, and Franco withstood German and French pressure to move against that fortress.

The importance of Malta was highlighted multiple times. You might find Rommel's pondering about the thorn in his side quite interesting. For Gibraltar:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Felix    actually quite a good summary for once from wikipedia.

The importance of Gibraltar is highlighted several times but the war in Egypt is lost and won via the neutralisation of Malta. Again I find it an interesting task to move the fleet from Gibraltar to interfere with German/Italian supply lines when the Axis Airpower would control the Med.

Quote from: fateeore on 30 December 2013, 02:04:03 PMYou have an odd notion of the game being played in Eastern and Central Europe. The idea that the Russians would have supplied troops or assistance for an invasion of Britain is patently absurd. There is a world of difference between supplying food and material to buy land and short term breathing space, and actively assisting an enemy that one is planning to invade at sometime after 1942. It was the same game Hitler played in the 1930's, the same as the British and French played in the Czech crisis, it's called diplomacy.

No, it is called having studied these events for over 20 years. Concerning the Red Army the documents show a great eagerness of the officers shaking hands at the river Bug to tackle England next. It was admittedly Hitler's fault to let the relations with the Soviets detoriate that rapidly. Stalin had no mind about any offensive operations until 1944 and even when told the exact time and date of the German attack the preparations to retaliate were limited to bringing Moscows AA defence to 75% alert. Some units at Brest Litowsk were specifically told not to fire back even when the Germans crossed the river in boats. The events of Barbarossa up until Stalingrad pretty much speak for themselves.

Quote from: fateeore on 30 December 2013, 02:04:03 PMYou keep coming back to this 'fact' that the Germans dominated the channel, but I would suggest that you are misunderstanding it's significance.

The order that forbade any British shipping is well documented, check the National archives or the book I mentioned before. I would like to point out another event occurring after German dominance of the Channel had been lost: Operation Cerberus. So even under much less preferable odds the Germans were (still) able to do pretty much what they wanted. I am not sure you are on top of events.

Quote from: fateeore on 30 December 2013, 02:04:03 PMThe RAF identified the problem was pilots not aircraft, therefore the decision was made to withdraw their force from the channel in order to minimize the risk of losing the former. Instead relying upon radar to flag up threats and to tackle them once over land, which made the task of recovering pilots that much easier. Given that this was a siege, your premise appears to be that because the besiegers controlled the airspace over the moat they controlled the castle. Which was clearly not the case, as real life events showed.

The airfields close to the intended landing areas were manned when the Battle of Britain started which makes your statement appear a little strange. If you wish to call this a siege then I must correct your presumptions. IF (and had you bothered to read the thread you would know it is an IF) the Germans win air superiority instead of starting to bomb London THEN and only then RAF will withdraw to the Midlands to conserve strength. This then implies the usefulness of Chain Home has reached its end as there is no forces to use the information. Whether the Germans are so kind NOT to bomb the installations is entirely another matter but if Luftwaffe commands the sky they presumably would take every opportunity to weaken the resistance by bombing infrarstructure. So the Germans do not controll only the airspace, they also command all four castle towers - in the given scenario.

Even at the best assumptions (and the numbers Churchill was given by RAF were knowingly exaggerated) the Battle of Britain had become a stalemate where losses on both sides were moving in scale. Basically a trench war in the sky. Now who would win such a battle when both sides can replace losses in planes and pilots but only one side's plane production capacity is being attacked?

Please, so far all comments have been very sensible and constructive but this is close to utter nonsense. Your research is sloppy especially concerning the Royal Navy. You might find the memo of Admirality dated September 4th 1940 quite interesting. It refers to the concerns Admirality has about their ability to prevent and interfere the German landings under the presumption the Luftwaffe controls the sky. So when military professionals both at the Sandhurst Wargame and the actual Royal Navy of 1940 grant the Germans the possibility to succeed I do not see how your version of events is credible at all. Again please remove politics/hating Jerry/Rule Britannia from this thread and try to add value with facts. Particularly freddy has been most helpful in this matter mostly because he was (or so I assume) checking his facts and was willing to research these matters beyond the "Hitler bad, Churchill rules" nonsense.

Let's keep everything friendly in this one please, very easy for it to stray into bickering.  All posts are valid, and the content and accuracy of them can be discussed politely.

Quote from: Leon on 30 December 2013, 10:11:20 PM
Let's keep everything friendly in this one please, very easy for it to stray into bickering.  All posts are valid, and the content and accuracy of them can be discussed politely.

Hear, hear.
Cheers - Phil.

Please.

I agree. Sealion 2.0 is hypothetical. You can argue as many "what if's" as you want, but surely the point of Mr BigBoss's game is to kick around a few ideas?

Agreed. I've read all the posts and have taken on board all points of view, which are equally valid IMHO.

But surely it all hinges on the German ability to achieve air superiority?

Interestingly, there was a program on the Battle of Britain on Yesterday yesterday (yes, you did read that correctly). Their research effectively debunked some of the hoarier myths surrounding the battle, e.g.

1) The Germans would have knocked out the RAF in southern England if they had continued to attack the British airfields. In fact, at the height of the German offensive only one airfield (Manston in Kent) was non-operational for more than twenty-four hours. As the British found out in the Falklands campaign, permanently knocking out airfields (even with much improved weapons) is next to impossible.

2) Both sides outrageously exaggerated enemy losses - which is why the Germans were convinced they were close to breaking through.

3) Both sides made the elementary mistake of assuming that the enemy's units were the same size as their own. However, a German staffeln was normally 12 aircraft strong, whereas a British squadron at full strength was 18 - 20 aircraft strong. The Germans were therefore underestimating British strength whilst the British, for their part, reckoned that the Germans had far more aircraft than they actually had.

4) The Germans were actually losing the war of attrition. The British aircraft industry was comfortably out-producing its German opponents - in fighters at any rate. There was never a shortage of aircraft. As one veteran said, "we woke up in the morning and there they were - as if by magic."

5) There was never a shortage of pilots either. If you examine RAF strength records (and they still exist) there were always more pilots than aircraft available.

6) The Germans left it too late. By the end of September, with no sign of the RAF being beaten, it was obvious even to Hitler that any invasion would have had to have been postponed.

Having said all that, let me endorse fsn's comment. It's a wargame, for Pete's sake, a work of fiction. Assume whatever you like, but do it! I for one will read the report with interest.       

Welcome here fsn and no please do not add Centurions :P

The initial idea is indeed "how could it happen" and as a number of people smarter than me suggested it could. Most notably Winston S. Churchill and the quoted book by Norman Longmate.

There already has been a lively and healthy discussion on options, most notably freddy. What is not helpful is repetition of points that have been raised and discarded. E.g. the potential involvement of the Royal Navy. It is in my eyes not adding value to take facts out of context such as insisting on Royal Navy playing Kamikaze when the real plans called for a withdrawal of all heavy units to Canada. This point in particular was discussed by Longmate concluding that the Germans would be quite unhappy and impose harsher terms and that Britain would rather live under those than to hand the Germans any of his Majesty's ships.

Longmate finds it strange that many people adopt the "Napoleon could not do it" contemplation and that since the Germans are the bad guys they naturally have to loose. If such was the case then why was the Homeguard/LDV established? Why were so many defenses built throughout Britain? Why was the Bank of England's Gold reserves shipped to Canada? Why was the former King evacuated? Why the plans to evacuate the Governments in Exile and the British Government?

There is only one answer: Sealion was a possibility. Not a foregone conclusion!

The Sandhurst Wargame concluded the Germans are able to land and break out of the beachheads besides the RAF contesting the command of the air (a typical British understatement: Luftwaffe in said scenario does not much more than valiantly die). Moreover the Germans are beaten when the combined sea and air power of the Empire cuts them off and yet it takes prepared defenses as the GHQ line to end the invasion.

The question asked with this thread is: What if the Germans truly had established air dominance (THE prerequisite of Kriegsmarine, Luftwaffe and the Wehrmnacht).

The remaining question is the inability of the Germans to transport and supply an invasion.

Initially the mere idea of the Germans being able to assamble enough transportation has been ridiculed.
Then the transportation was there.

Secondly the quality of said transportation was ridiculed.
Sandhurst concluded it sufficient and able to ferry the invasion force to the landing areas. Besides RAF, interference by the RN AND the invasion force being detected quite early.

If such an illustre cadre including Galland conclude that the invasion itself is successful (which does not mean the campaign is) besides all odds against the Germans then who am I to dispute that?
I am the one, or rather one of the many, that still ask these "what if" questions. What if the Germans were not as thick as Sandhurst assumed? What if they did indeed wait to establish control of the air?

To me the invasion force is much like the Homeguard: Very much underestimated.
By September (initial S-day) the Homeguard had become an effective paramilitary force. Maybe not enough to do more than anger the Germans BUT definitely good enough to stall their advance. Let us not forget the Homeguard would fight pretty much a Guerilla war against the Germans which generally benefits the local force defending its own turf. Now if it is acknowledged that the Homeguard is indeed a factor then why can people not accept that Sealion IS possible, can succeed and indeed scared the crap out of Winston to such an extent that the orders he gave were given?

@Heartsblue: Please provide evidence of these figures concerning aircraft (link to the records you mentioned). These are the first to credit the British with a slight advantage in the air. My own research (war archives and historians such as Piecalciewicz) shows equality in production and with losses as they were the strength of each air force moved in scale. Which means no one was gaining anything with the exception the Luftwaffe had the means to hurt British infrarstructure while they were fighting. There was no such credible threat from Bomber Command at that time.

My current WiP conclusion is that while the Germans might (with air superiority as a prerequisite) actually occupy the majority of the British Island it would not accomplish them aything. For the current chain of events please refer to an earlier post of mine.

1) The Royal Navy would operate from Canadian waters and the Med.
2) With the King out of country and the PM sacrificing himself defending Downing Street there is no one that could and would surrender to the Germans. Heck even Mosley was more a patriot than Hitler's sockpuppet.
3) While the British Island is not a base for operations against Nazi Germany, NI will be a thorn in Adolf's side, the Americans WILL take Iceland sooner than they were and the role of de Valera in Ireland is somewhat doubtful as well.
4) A resistance movement beyond anything the French were staging would constantly make occupation an every day hell.
5) An Allied invasion (possibly later than 1944) would end the war in their favour. Even with the industrial potential of France and Great Britain, the Germans are outproduced 10 to 1 by the Americans.

What channel was that 'Yesterday' program on Hertsblue? I'd like to try and catch it as it appears to contradict the majority of accounts I've read on the balance of the Battle of Britain.

So far, all of my research, which is certainly far from complete, concurs with sebigboss'.

Cheers,

Kev

Quote from: Squirrel on 31 December 2013, 12:32:05 PM
What channel was that 'Yesterday' program on Hertsblue? I'd like to try and catch it as it appears to contradict the majority of accounts I've read on the balance of the Battle of Britain.

So far, all of my research, which is certainly far from complete, concurs with sebigboss'.

Cheers,

Kev

You are not by chance the Kevin from the alternative history forum  :-\ ?

Once you have obtained the original accounts, could/would you verify their sources and comment? Would save me some hassle.
Roland

Quote from: sebigboss79 on 31 December 2013, 12:20:03 PM

@Heartsblue: Please provide evidence of these figures concerning aircraft (link to the records you mentioned). These are the first to credit the British with a slight advantage in the air. My own research (war archives and historians such as Piecalciewicz) shows equality in production and with losses as they were the strength of each air force moved in scale. Which means no one was gaining anything with the exception the Luftwaffe had the means to hurt British infrarstructure while they were fighting. There was no such credible threat from Bomber Command at that time.

You might try this: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minister_of_Aircraft_Production (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minister_of_Aircraft_Production) Particularly the section headed "Beaverbrook"
According to Ministry records the British aircraft industry delivered 1,875 fighters between May and August 1940.
On this table http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_aircraft_production_during_World_War_II (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_aircraft_production_during_World_War_II) Messerschmitt delivered 1,667 Bf 109s for the entire year. I discount the Bf 110 which was withdrawn early on as a liability.

@ Squirrel
"Yesterday" is the channel, Kev. (Freeview 19, Sky 537, Virgin 194). I don't know if they will repeat the programme anytime soon, I happened on it purely by chance.   

Quote from: Hertsblue on 31 December 2013, 01:37:33 PM
You might try this: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minister_of_Aircraft_Production (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minister_of_Aircraft_Production) Particularly the section headed "Beaverbrook"
According to Ministry records the British aircraft industry delivered 1,875 fighters between May and August 1940.
On this table http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_aircraft_production_during_World_War_II (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_aircraft_production_during_World_War_II) Messerschmitt delivered 1,667 Bf 109s for the entire year. I discount the Bf 110 which was withdrawn early on as a liability.

@ Squirrel
"Yesterday" is the channel, Kev. (Freeview 19, Sky 537, Virgin 194). I don't know if they will repeat the programme anytime soon, I happened on it purely by chance.   

Can you refer the original sources? Wikipedia is somewhat unreliable in research, no offence.
Are actual strengths also taken into account? (Luftwaffe > RAF) Does it take into account the Brits did not manufacture much more than those fighters while the Germans output in Bombers was also quite significant?

You should also look at the figures pre-France 1940 where Luftwaffe was significantly outnumbered but yet had air superiority all the time as the BF109 was the better fighter. How many of those 1,875 are Spitfires? The figures should tell that actually Hurricanes and Tempests made the bulk of fighters and 11th Group was particularly gifted with Spitfires. These would not be available to other groups.

Staying with wikipedia the Battle of Britain site states (in summary) the numbers were quite equal on both sides when one considers rates of losses and production figures. The problem with the Luftwaffe is that 3 Commanders ran 3 separate campaigns while Goring demanded something different every day. The whole campaign was a display of incompetence and yet it hurt the Brits!

Quote from: sebigboss79 on 31 December 2013, 12:43:29 PM
You are not by chance the Kevin from the alternative history forum  :-\ ?

Not me, I'm not registered over there, though I occasionally look around.

Thanks Hertsblue, I'll keep an eye out for a rerun or 'catchup' on Sky. Interesting that it completely contradicts a documentary I watched a few days before Christmas ....

Cheers,

Kev

Long time no post but ran into a chap serving in the RAF.

He basically stated: "Two more weeks and RAF would have folded."

Unfortunately we did not have the luxury to linger around but he had some good advice for me and we shall continue our conversation at a more convenient time.
The topic is not forgotten!

Hi Sebigboss,

Long time no hear!

I think the comment of "Two more weeks and RAF would have folded." may have need to be explained a bit further if you can. I was under the impression that the RAF strategy was to withdraw to 12 Group if the airfields were knocked out?

Yes I do try to check the facts before I post them and avoid the rhetoric from either sides!!

@Leon strangely I thought this forum was being quite good natured! other sealion threads I've been in have descended into ranting long before this!

regards

Freddy

Hi freddy and wb

Sadly the gent had to dash but I will get in touch with him. He quickly gave me some leads to the Imperial War Museum.

The "fact" comment was not meant to be offensive, more like: Whatever the facts are please share the sources as well. Yes the source may be wrong but that happens in a discussion.

Generally the forum is very friendly -unlike others- and especially being German I see a lot of people will frown at the mere notion of the idea that Sealion could have been anything but a desaster.

As I stated simply ask all participants to acknowledge how inedaquate and incompetent Sealion was planned. Something the Germans had not been doing up to then!
Secondly I would ask to contemplate the fact that besides asuming massive advantages for the British side the Sandhurst Wargame concluded the Germans would successfully land and move as close as the GHQ line.

Now the question we are asking here is: What if the Germans had been a bit more competent AND what if they had attempted the invasion on more favourable terms as the Sandhurst Wargame suggests.

Game On

QuoteNow the question we are asking here is: What if the Germans had been a bit more competent AND what if they had attempted the invasion on more favourable terms as the Sandhurst Wargame suggests.

I found "Invasion!" by Kenneth Macksey to be a very good read and a very plausible 'what if?' scenario. At the back of the book he addresses many of the issues that both the Germans and British would have faced if an invasion was attempted. Alongside this I would add "Fighter" by Len Deighton that gives a very good overview of the Battle of Britain and again the issues faced by both sides.

Quote from: Steve J on 14 February 2014, 10:15:09 AM
I found "Invasion!" by Kenneth Macksey to be a very good read and a very plausible 'what if?' scenario. At the back of the book he addresses many of the issues that both the Germans and British would have faced if an invasion was attempted. Alongside this I would add "Fighter" by Len Deighton that gives a very good overview of the Battle of Britain and again the issues faced by both sides.

I have read Sealion (Cox) and If Britain had fallen (Longmate), also good stuff.
And as to the previous post let me add that despite the suggested possibility of a fully successful Sealion there is no chance of a German Victory Parade at the end of the war. Eventually the Americans are drawn into open fighting and the combined powers will overcome any alliance the Germans could possibly forge.

I think that Sealion succeeded! it took 70 years but its happened :-

Our roads are full of BMW's, VW,s Audis, Mercedes and Skodas.
Our Kitchens full of Bosch appliances,
Supermarkets full of German wine ,
Henning Wehn on the radio
Angela Merkel in charge o the European Union and on TV
Germans Familly in Buckingham Palace

And to cap it all flippin Seb in Scotland !!!!!   :)

 :-bd ~X( =O =O m/

QuoteHenning Wehn on the radio

I find him extremely funny on the radio, especially 'The Unbelievable Truth'. Oh and by the way Skoda were/are Czech, not German ;).

But from an area that was German/Austrian once (before we took them back) *ducks for cover*

The Sudetenland by any chance ;).

I would need to check but I seem to recall it was an Austrian-Hungarian wepons manufacturer....

Gentlemen,

This discussion could quickly disintegrate into a historical nitpicking. Can't we just agree that Europe has been messy, map wise, forever?

Quote from: Steve J on 14 February 2014, 08:10:44 PM
I find him extremely funny on the radio, especially 'The Unbelievable Truth'. Oh and by the way Skoda were/are Czech, not German ;).

Yep he is really good.

I included tham as they were annexed by Germanyin 1938 and Skoda are now part of the Volkeswagen Audi group using the same parts.

Quote from: fsn on 14 February 2014, 10:24:41 PM
Gentlemen,

This discussion could quickly disintegrate into a historical nitpicking. Can't we just agree that Europe has been messy, map wise, forever?

I think that most of the world is messy map wise - especially in africa where the borders were drawn on a map in a meeting in london.