Cheerio fellow gamers. May it be frowned upon but I am playing mindgames about the possibility of Operation Sealion being a success. First of all the reasons why it COULD be successful:
1. 25 Battle hardened divisions invade an island that has not been facing invaders in a thousand years, give or take.
2. Available land defenses 26 divisions, most of them ill-equipped. Little to no tanks (less than 400 iIrc, 250 of the light tanks)
We all know the reasons why Sealion was doomed. To my mind comes:
1. Idiotic planning of battle
a) Terror bombing instead of stratagic bombing. Failure to achieve air superiority, although the RAF was at their breaking point. The Luftwaffe simply did not have the reserves.
b) Naval inferiority and ill planning (Z Plan instead of commerce raiding...)
c) Inept plan for assault (Cancellation of grand scale air assaults, landing at the most obvious place...)
2. British resistance would increase on a daily basis, the invading force would have a high price to pay.
3. Hitler's illusions about "England".
For such an assault the German Kriegsmarine did gather sufficient transportation to cover the initial assault, three diversive assaults and was ready to sacrifice ALL (yes ALL) cruisers they had in the fleet. They however failed to provide ongoing support by supply. The High Command of the Navy was very positive the Royal Navy would command the area of invasion and crush any attempt of reenforcement and resupply.
ARGUMENT 1: The Luftwaffe commanding the sky would have given the Royal Navy a hard time REACHING the channel -> Air superiority is a MUST for the attempt to invade.
ARGUMENT 2: Would the Royal Navy just stand by and sail into their own doom IF Luftwaffe owned the sky? Would RN attack "all or nothing" OR would they conserve their strength maybe even sail to Canada to fight another day? (Any documents there??) After all the channel zone is not exactly the most favourable zone for manoevering a battlefleet.
ARGUMENT 3: A MASSIVE airborne assault pre-invasion could capture airfields (to base fighters and Stukas immediately) and if located strategically also a port. The port must be captured largely intact and the invasion fleet must contain heavy equipment mostly. This leaves initial fighting to a small number of assault troops AND the airborne element. (Hit first, hit hard!) Following elements can be airlifted and use prepositioned equipment should the Royal Navy cut off the beaches.
Question: I seem to remember a strategic document from the Royal Navy which stated considerable doubt about being able to prevent the invasion. Does anyone know about such documents as I do know at least one exists. I am aware of the 1974 Sandhurst military game and I dispute its findings.
First and foremost said wargame assumed Luftwaffe was incapable to achieve, much less maintain (local) command of the sky. Attempting an invasion under these circumstances is beyond insane, even for the Private from Bohemia.
Secondly in said wargame the Royal Navy sailed almost unhindered to the sites of invasion and by its sheer presence crushed the invasion. Both do not seem very likely and Luftwaffe would have immediately abandoned any other tasks in order for the prestige to attack and sink large portions of the Royal Navy. It is fair to assume massive losses enroute and while in the area of operation. It comes down to the question does the Luftwaffe have planes to spare or is the Royal Navy willing to loose X amount of warships. This assumes little to no effect of submarines and minefields.
Thirdly it assumes perfect responses of the british side and lacks acknowledgement of the military "skills" the German Army gained in the previous campaigns as well as the lack of experience of most british troops
As I have only read part of said paper I may lack in depth knowledge about certain areas but from the preconditions stated in the wargame it is clear that such an invasion would have failed pretty quickly. It is also clear not even Hitler would have been crazy enough to attempt an invasion under the circmstances given in that wargame.
We are all quite happy Sealion did not work out I am sure but I would like to open a discussion about eventualities.
1. Two days before Sealion massive airborne assault in Southern England. Faint assault in the Midlands by sea and air.
2. Possibility of German "commando" raids to capture Churchill and/or the King.
3. Immediate positioning of airpower in captured airfields.
4. Beaches under attack from landside (Singapore reloaded) and successful arrival of equipment.
5. Response time of the Royal Navy? (I give it 2 days minimum to arrive. Assuming no interference by Luftwaffe, submarines or mines)
I would like to especially concentrate on the role of the Royal Navy. Do we have any servicemen on this forum? Has anyone read papers by the Navy casting doubt on being able to handle the invasion easily?
Depending on which kind of sources you use you will find doubts if the Luftwaffe was able to field such a massive assault of airborne troops. Crete was a disaster and only upon loosing the first 150 transporters (JU 52s) all available planes in the southern theatre were released to prevent failure. If Sandhurst can assume lack of air superiority I can assume otherwise and give the Germans the ingenuinity and resourcefulness to successfully invade via air.
It is clear that the Royal Navy must be the decisive factor in my assumptions.
Achievement of the beachheads is time-critical!
It is also clear that Luftwaffe has no way of handling the Royal Navy AND RAF at the same time (hence air superiority is a must!)
Would Royal Navy be willing to come under attack from both sides of the channel? (Prince of Wales was not yet sunk by planes in the Pacific so I assume the Navy would have sailed anyways)
IIRC 'Invasion' by Kenneth Macksey sets out the pre-conditions for a successful German invasion, which mainly included complete air superiority. Again from memory the Germans were very close to destroying fighter command, and thus achieving said pre-condition, before Goering decided to switch targets (see Len Deighton's 'Fighter' for more details).
Not Göring decided. Hitler did.
I remember Göring ranting with Galland about this and saying "The Führer does not WANT to go to England" . Whether this is true or not.. :-\
Basically Hitler was a coward at sea and wished to avoid any sea warfare if possible. all he was fond of was building battleships (drawing monsters with 32 inch guns and over 300 metres length)
Yep, I have the same information. Switching the bombing targets gave fighter command the breathing space they needed.
The Luftwaffe couldn't operate at night. The Royal Navy could. 50x DD, 20 Cruisers and a few BB converging from 2 directions = dead invasion fleet. That's excluding auxiliary craft like trawlers armed with 12pdrs and Lewis guns and MTBs. it would only take 1 fleet DD to get in amongst the landing barges to destroy a battalion. The barges were quite tough, so almost bullet-proof, but only capable of 4 knots on a flat sea, most were towed, so sink the tugs, 6x 4.7" guns and 8x 2pdr pom-poms is going to make short work of a gaggle of wooden boats that are drifting, even if some were armed with 37mm PAK36 or 105mm FH18 howitzer in fixed bow mounts.
Try it as a naval wargame. 5 tugs each towing 5 barges, between them carrying an infantry regiment, 1 in 3 barges with a fixed gun mount 37mm/77mm/105mm, at 4 knots in sea state 4 on an overcast dusk/dawn. Against a sole 30knot destroyer.
I've never seen a regiment of infantry surrender at sea to navy vessels, but we would have that night.
As for the Luftwaffe, they lost a lot of Ju-52 in Holland, not enough to prevent an air assault 3 months later, but their capacity was less than ideal. If I recall they had optimistic plans to deliver one regiment of 3 battalions required 2 trips across the Channel! The air assault was our biggest danger, but after 3 days of rampaging across southern England to DOver to see the invasion fleet wrecked, would have left them no choice to surrender.
At the end of the day the Kriegsmarine weren't prepared to be wiped out despite what Hitler might have thought, and Churchill was prepared to sacrifice the RN home fleet to prevent the invasion.
There was also the RAF plan to arm every Tiger Moth and other obsolete light plane with MGs and light bombs to attack the invasion beaches. And when that failed we would have thrown in the mustard gas. The Germans were aware of this as they fitted some Sdkfz 11 with CBW decontamination gear for the invasion.
This whole story has been done to death somewhere, think it was on the TOE Yahoo grouo, a while back.
A lot of people imagine Sealion as D-Day in reverse, because of the massed landing craft with bow ramps we had that could go right up the beach. The German barges were not like that. Due to their draught and the beach slopes and tides, it would have taken 15 minutes to unload over the beaches something like a PAK35/36 or motorbike, and 45 minutes for anything bigger, imagine doing that under fire in a sea-state 4. In some cases they would have waited for the tide to turn before unloading, hours after arrival.
I don't doubt they would have landed troops. I don't doubt they would have taken places inland. Their casualties would have been heavier than ours at D-day. Although more from naval intervention. It's what happens afterwards. Exactly how are they going to be resupplied when the planned turnaround for the 2nd wave was to take 48 hours? (collect barges off beach when tide high, sail to France, load up, sail back, wait for tide to be right...)
The best book from the German point of view (actual planning, TOE, barge conversions, etc) is Peter Schenk's Invasion of England 1940, Conway Maritime Press (1987) ISBN 0-85177-548-9
Mark
Some objections to you Mark
The Luftwaffe DID operate at night. Question is WHEN nightime airwarfare became common in the Luftwaffe but you can trust any sane military man (ok Göring was not exactly sane but...) would have ordered an all out attack to prevent the landings or make them happen.
I would question the Royal Navys will to sacrifice itself besisdes Churchill ordering them to do so. As stated above I totally concur that RN was able to wipe out anything the Germans could ever put to sea. I doubt much of the RN would actually arrive at the site of the landings if Luftwaffe controlled the skies. Sailing into battle under enemy airpower is simply suicide. Besides Dieppe 1942 I do not recall it to be a british tradition to be Kamikazes...
Again, it is mandatory to own the sky eg. RAF is not a factor anymore so the RN becomes the main target of German airpower. Operating against enemy air end up like it did for Repulse and Prince of Wales. And that is against less than 100 planes not a whole airforce.
Losses of the remaining cruisers would not weigh THAT heavy for the German war efforts. 2 more heavy cruisers, 3 (+2) light cruisers and more than 24 destroyers were already planned, partly launched and would have pushed through along with 6 H-Class battleships to make up for those losses. Initial readyness for the Z plan was 1944. A considerable fleet to defend against the US Fleet. Additionally there is serious doubt if the Americans had actually declared war on the Germans. Roosevelt wanted to, his people did not. Pearl Harbour actually did not deter US-German relations to the point of declaring war. Hitler declared war, on December 11th iIrc.
The invasion fleet was - compared to D-Day 4 years later (!!!) -a joke, true enough. Care to observe my amendements in post 1. Manpower via air, supplies and equipment via ship. If 3 tank divisions, 1 motorised division plus heavy equipment, anti air an most of all the infantry is landed all that needs to be done is supply them. THERE is the crucial point. RN would definately interfere with it and so would any RAF plane that still can get into air. It would have forced the Germans to rely heavily on requisitioning, something they did in Poland, France etc. It was for example the policy that occupation is paid for and supplied by the occupied country.
Summa summarum, get in, get off the beach and RN can sail around and be targets as long as they wish. How long do you think any sane RN captain would sail around in the channel area (not exactly the place where you want to get caught by the enemy) and begged for bombardement from 2 shores? If largely unopposed by RAF what would hinder Luftwaffe to fly in and out as they pleased? Relationship with the Soviets was still good, supplies coming plenty and regular from them and continous begging when they can hit the Brits (sic). I dare not think what would happen IF Adolf had been smart enough to ask Joe S. to do some airborne landings (maybe in the Midlands.)
Speaking of Midlands I do not know of any plans what would the British have done if a significant force had landed there, threatening to cut the country in half and march down south. There was actually the call for a faint attack of 4 divisions across via Leeds in the Sealion plannings.
Although in the end the war was lost from the moment it was started in '39 there would have been hell to pay if Sealion had gone right for the Germans. It did not take a Canaris to see that. von Rundstedt knew as well as Canaris that Germany cannot win. All that can be sought is reasonable peace terms. In fact Canaris was talking to British intelligence up untill '44, he knew of the D-Day plans and so on...
I'm not an expert on this but have read a bit about it.
In Summer 1940 was any airforce good at sinking capital ships? There are plenty of examples from a year or more later, but not many from 1940. At Dunkirk very few RN ships were sunk, and they were parked up on the beach.
As you mention re-supply is a major issue - the Germans really seemed to have been treating crossing the channel as a big river crossing - I think they would have come majorly unstuck when they tried to get supplies and reinforcements across. You mention local resupply, which is OK for food and perhaps fuel, but not much good for ammo and spare parts. German tactics were to land at high tide, and allow the falling tide to strand the barges to allow unloading - not exactly the way landing craft worked - this would have slowed resupply down even longer.
At D-Day the allies shipped over vast amounts of material - and were getting stuff across the channel faster than the Germans could get it in my road and rail (obviously heavily interdicted) - but this took the two biggest naval powers in the world to produce the ships to support this.
Looking at the initial allied landings both Europe and Pacific, there was a steep learning curve even for militaries with a strong marine tradition.
The river barges were supposed to be so un-sea worthy that I have seen suggestions that simply sailing destroyers fast through them would be enough to sunk them due to the wash/wake. This also indicates that bad weather (quite common in the channel!!) would cause lots of problems.
Landings in the midlands (presumably the East coast) would mean a much longer sea crossing, much much longer than the channel, and at longer ranges for fighter cover. Initial landing areas would probably be favourable on the Lincolnshire coast as it is nice and flat - but attacking across towards Liverpool would have to cross the Pennines which would be very defensible.
Air superiority - didn't the RAF have a lot of fighter cover in the north that was deliberately not committed to the Battle of Britain?
Basically the Germans never really seemed up for a cross channel invasion - perhaps as a continental army they knew their limits? Marching 1000 miles across Russia seemed a better bet than crossing 25 miles of sea?
It would never have worked, the NAvy would have torn the invasion fleet to pieces, then they would never have got past the Walmington On Sea Home Guard!
Fred - answer to capital ships is no, but no doubt there would have been 1 or 2 U-Boats in the approaches. The AP bombs used at Pearl Harbour were improvised from battleship shells, but the Japanese had efficent torpedo aircraft, Germans didnt in 1940.
Air superiority is also iffy. since Dowding would have abandoned the South east airfields, pulling his bases out of range for the 109's and then going for any deep penetrations. Given the British were building more fighters than the Germans clearing the skys was probably impossible.
Then there is the Heer plan - its completly impossible, on simple logistic grounds. The D-Day landing force is only about a third of that which the Germans intended to use, and the frontage about a 1/4. There was only 1 airbourne division, and 1 mountain division so an airhead isnt an option either, particularly since both of those units were out of action due to losses in the Netherlands, coupled with a lif shortage as well.
Home Guard - much better than we allow today. Most would have had some combat experiance in WWI, even if the kit was a bit iffy.
IanS
@ sebigboss79
individual planes could operate at night in 1939-41, but concentrating 100 Stukas and Ju-88 to target the Royal Navy dashing at 25 kts down the channel in the dark is just not gonna happen. Can you imagine all the mid-air collisions! I don't think they even trained to fight at night back then with tactical bombers. According to Schenk's book there was only I gruppe that had just trained in effective anti-shipping tactics in daylight by 1940. For all the Luftwaffe's successes in Norway, they didn't prevent the British objective of withdrawal.
And the point is you'd have to get them all, If even only 1 cruiser and 10 destroyers got through the air and naval cordon, it would have been a massacre. Sure, we would have lost several ships on the way in, but not all of them. The U-boats can be discounted as all their torpedoes were generally faulty then, although they didn't know till afterwards, and even if they weren't they would only get one shot off as the warships passed overhead.
the much vaunted German naval building plan could have been carried out - but it would have been 3000 Panzers they didn't build. A Heer with no Tigers and 1500 less Panthers tanks? Something both Germany and Russia realised early on - the colassal amount of steel that goes into capital ships can make a lot of tanks or artillery.
If I recall we did hold substantial reserves of fighters and army units in the Midlands/North so as to be out of reach of the Luftwaffe air attacks, but near enough to interdict enemies over the South-East.
And 25 divisions?Perhaps. The second more realistic plan was for 7 Inf Divisions and 2 Mountain Divisions. The 2nd wave had 5 Inf Divs and 4 Panzer Divisions, assuming ports could be captured intact., the third wave 4 divisions.
Also Coastal artillery was proven to be no threat to ships mid channel - it had a hit rate of 0.14% from France, and that was against non-manouevring transport ships moving slowly. The coastal artillery was good at local defence, keeping the RN from shelling the ports where the barges were concentrated. But didn't halt the RAF strikes, over 50 barges had been knocked out by September 21st in air raids.
The other thing people forget is that the Rhine barges were an essential part of the German economy - every week out of service as naval transports reduced their GDP a bit.
But, to postulate your original question if they had been successful, or Britain had sued for peace. The German occupation plans removed most of the male able-bodied population from 1943 to work in mainland factories. I would imagine a resistance movement would have carried on, especially in northern England, Scotland and Ireland where the terrain is more suited. And would the Americans have liberated us first? Or do it secondary after France?
One scenario I saw postulated that the major problem would have been food, by 1944-45 of an occupation, death by starvation would have been an issue across the country. The liberation of the country was an Allied drive in, much like Norway was in 1945.
Mark
Quote from: sebigboss79 on 06 January 2013, 03:00:27 PM
... I doubt much of the RN would actually arrive at the site of the landings if Luftwaffe controlled the skies. Sailing into battle under enemy airpower is simply suicide. ...
As said before, that's the key point where I believe you are mistaken. It may have been true in 1944 with American carrier based airpower in the Pacific. Even in 1943 in the Mediterranean, the Luftwaffe attacks on shipping weren't all that succesful. It certainly wouldn't be all that better in 1940. Even with full air superiority, even in daylight. The Luftwaffe just wasn't trained or equipped for attacks on shipping in 1940. Just IMHO, correct me if I'm wrong. But I think there were very few succesful attacks on ships by the Luftwaffe in 1940.
Lets just be clear on this: There is no WIN for the Germans even if Sealion IS successful (this is highly doubtful)
@sultanbev, one plane, one torpedoe, byebye HMS Hood, know what I say? Fair enough planes are not the matchwinner for the German side. But "dashing at 25knots" ? Surely into minefields. I think not. All in all the task at hand is to delay the RN untill the second wave is off the beaches 3-5 days. A tough call since RN has all the time they need to clear mines, sink subs and can choose from which side to attack!
But what if submarines seriously start opposing the RN as soon as it clears Scapa. I do not know about you or the RN but I cannot SEE if that torpedoe fired at my ship is gonna go boom or not. Even if there is no damage but it is highly annoying and slowing down. RAF can definately protect the RN but leaves the Luftwaffe do whatever they want with Southern England. Decisions, decisions.
For the Dunkirk desaster there are several explanations: Weather was bad enough to prevent Luftwaffe from intereference. PLUS the ongoing rumours that Göring (or Galland) went to the BEF and told them to p.. off as they did not really want to fight fellow "Aryans". Whatever you believe is true but fact is Luftwaffe was not used to full efficiency at Dunkirk while the Army "watched" the BEF boarding their ships.
The initial assault was to reach 26 divisions in total. Those are crack formations that have been under fire in at least 2 campaigns. The BEF had just been kicked in the rear and the 25 (!!) divisions the Army actually had were at best half equipped, some not even had rifles, much less any artillery or AT capability. Speaking of tanks I ask you to recall the figurees after the disaster in France when there was a total of 400 tanks left, 250 of them light tanks with MGs. "Try to stop Panzers with Rifles and handgrenades".
Mentioning economics is interesting! Do you have any figures for that? To my limited knowledge of wartime economics "trade" came virtually to a halt within Germany and people attempted to supply themselves locally. No barges needed for that. As for the heavy industry there is something called "important wartime means of production" and those remained untouched.
About the RN: No you do NOT need to "get them all". You can't. You have to delay the RN and sink as many as possible. With portions of the RN being lured away by decoy raiders and landings (Churchill was obsessed with sinking the "pocket battleships") the German Navy had plans to release "Scheer", "Hipper" and "Lützow" into the Atlantic pre-invasion. You think Britain would just let them raid the Atlantic because "there could be an invasion"? Definately not. You do not need to sink, you need to make unavailable by occupying them elsewhere or damaging sufficiently.
Now before someone mention the Med division forget it. The Italians had been instructed to raise havoc enough to keep those ships busy for a while.
Have not heard the Z Plan being called "vaunted" in a while. Even Raeder was opposed to it. It was sutpidity par excellence right from the start. It is an option AFTEr Sealion has been successful. Not to MAKE Sealion work. There are plans to reduce the German Army after an armistice and build the Zplan navy as well as a HUGE Luftwaffe to deter any invasion attempts. Check Giordano-If Hitler had won for further plans.
When was Norway liberated and how? :P So much for Americans willingness to liberate ;D.
@ianrs54: I also heard Dowding intended to "pull back" to conserve strength but the production rates you cite are not true. The BF109 was produced much faster and in higher quantities as the Spitfire or Hurricane. The problem is with the pilots. Britain had more and could replace shot down pilots whereas German pilots shot down are POWs.
Would "pulling back" be an option for the RN?
@OldenBUA. I seem to remember Luftwaffe was ordered NOT to attack British warships unless at open sea. Not sure when this order was revoced but it existed way into 1940. The problem is FINDING them. The Luftwaffe did not have enough Scouts untill the FW 200 was in service and those were limited to scouting the convoys.
@sultanbev: Yes the German forces would have experienced resistance movement. maybe not as bad as in France or in the Balcans but still....
The "liberration" is not often discussed but D-Day was successful because Britain had been available to stage this stunt. I cannot see any way for a cross Atlantic invasion of either the British island(s) nor France. In such a scenario I would argue the route via Middle East and Africa to be the most viable option. ANother problem is that the US population was not too keen on going to war in Europe "again". The Japanese is a different issue. Keep in mind that Roosevelt wanted to but would have been badly mauled by his own countrymen if he had.
@Fred: What makes you think the British defenses in the Midlands would have prevailed against a determined assault of 3-5 German divisions? I cannot envision the military genius as to have enough forces there to prevent such a landing. The key was the flexibility of reserves but that was Brookes idea so the remote and beach defenses were actually quite week from September/November '40 onwards.
I argue IF Britain had relied on Army they would have lost. If relying on RN the outcome is doubtful but relying on RAF (and the German inadequacy to deal with that) has won the war then an there. Beat the RAF and you can make Sealion happen.
Mentioning Mustard Gas. As the British arsenal was a total joke (total supplies of ALL agents was less than what the Germans could have used to retaliate) I would argue against "first use". Especially since Hitler himself had issued the order to ignore local usage of gas (3 incidents in Poland) against German formations. Now let us imagine the reaction of a madman seeing the British use Mustard Gas against the beaches. With RAF being pulled back or "broken" I do not see how a retaliation strike would fail to win the whole war. WMD are first and foremost political weapons. Lets not ignore that. Do you really believe the Nazis had not called upon Soviet stocks should their own not suffice? The moment Brooke uses gas Britain looses. And I am sure Brooke was aware of it.
I am also sure that an invasion was not needed if air and commerce war is going well for the German side.
Just a couple of points:
What makes you think Russian help would be given to the Germans? Stalin was suspicious of everyone. He would much rather of seen the Germans battered by the British (and the British battered by the Germans) than either easily victorious. I'm not sure who he would have preferred to see win. But I can't see him giving any material support - air landing Russian troops sounds like just a way of saving German lives.
Midlands - far more about the geography than any military strength.
Total agreement that the British army would have been very weak post Dunkirk - but the real issue is how many troops the Germans could land and supply - 25 divisions sounds wholly improbable. I can't remember after D-Day how long it took to get that many troops ashore but it was a long time with very good shipping and air superiority.
With respect to Stalin and Russian help. Remember the pact between Hitler and Stalin? Stalin's dream was a long drawn out war in the west, followed by organised resistance, revolution and the spread of communism. To make this happen, assisting Hitler's Germany in any possible way was very much on the cards. I've just read that Geman navy ships and subs were refuelled in Murmansk during the Norway campaign. Raeder even sent a personal 'thank you' note, and got a 'no thanks, we were glad to be of service' reply from the Kremlin.
How far would the help from Stalin have gone? I don't know. It could be said that Hitler was the only person that Stalin really trusted. But, anything as blatant as Soviet paratroopers attacking England, probably not. Stalin did not want to get directly involved in the war. But other help could be given (and gladly too). The last Soviet train with supplies for Germany crossed the border on 22 July 1941. Of course, just a few hours later, Barbarossa put an end to all that. But why do you think it took three days to convince Stalin that it was for real, and not just another plot from the West to sow discord between two allies?
Surely the only way to resolve this matter is to wargame it? OK, Finding all relevent details will be pretty well impossible, but you have the basics available. It would be a fairly cumbersome proposition, depending on how much detail you put into it, but very entertaining.
What are wargames for if not to explore the "what if"?
How far would Stalin go?
Well....when Soviet and German formations met in Poland '39 the Red Army guys asked "So when do we go to England?". Stalin supplied the fuel and other resources so Hitler could run over France. Again they asked: When do we go to deal with England. The question should rather be WHY did Hitler not ask for substantial help?
As stated before Churchill knew what Stalin was like but considered him the lesser of 2 evils. Whereas Stalin was fond of the idea to roll over all of Europe after the Capitalists had slaughtered themselves. Hence no declararion of war when Stalin invaded Poland, and rather coming to terms after Barbarossa started.
Stalin knew that the Red Army was in no state for a war before 1944 ! Maybe hence his hesitation? Actually the declaration of war from the German side was met with the following reply: " Do you really think we deserve this?"
Wargaming might be an option but again I argue invasion IS possible if carried out right. The problem is even then the war cannot be won.
The initial landing and also the second wave of resupply is definately not an issue. Further supply becomes the major exercise as the RN and RAF would definately interfere massively with those, possibly concentrate solely on this. Two negative points for that strategy: British Army runs out of "room" pretty quickly given the fact we are talking about an island. Secondly if concentrating on starving the Germans the RN/RAF cannot assist in keeping the invasion force within their limits.
The thing is once those troops are in the country it is hard to push them out. Harder than the German task of supply I daresay. How would you get supplies into the country if you were British and any ship is bombed or torpedoed? We are still talking about an island. So that argument works both ways.
Agreed Midlands favour the defender. Plus fighting on home turf usually gives you an edge. YET you have to have significant forces there, which I doubt the British had at that time. Brooke changed a lot about the deployment and after those changes were implemented it was near impossible to break through the british lines I argue. In short: The short time where Britain was weak, was also the time where invasion was phisically impossible for the German side.
And what if Britain moved to counter an invasion in the Midlands? How about second invasion in the south cathcing the British army between two hammers..... In SUCH a case the RN WOULD have been the decisive force.
But again to prevent any contrary argument. ANY invasion must to a great extent come as a surprise attack. D-Day vs Dieppe.
The latter has shown that you should not land unsupported troops of limited quality right into the srongest point of defence where the "resident" troops currently hold an exercise how to repell an invasion attempt.
Fascinating discussion â€" great topic Sebigboss79!
I tend to agree that the deciding issue would have been one of supply. Even if both ends of the Dover Straits were successfully mined (and I’d contest that that would be a big “ifâ€!) then it wouldn’t take long before this line was breached by the Royal Navy.
If the MBTs and Destroyers based at Portsmouth were to get amongst the supply vessels I don’t imagine they’d last long. Assuming then that some airfields were captured intact (although many were mined to prevent their use by the enemy) I cannot see the Luftwaffe being able to cope with the quantity of supplies required, particularly as their losses increased over the course of the campaign (look at the losses suffered later by the Luftwaffe during the invasion of Crete).
In short, even after an initially successful invasion I can see the Wehrmacht running out of petrol before too long â€" just look at Operation Dragoon; despite the huge resources available to the Allies, the lead units, who had landed in Southern France on the 15th August were suffering from severe fuel shortages by 20th August - IIRC this was also with uncontested supply routes!
We are all quite happy Sealion did not work out I am sure but I would like to open a discussion about eventualities.
1. Two days before Sealion massive airborne assault in Southern England. Faint assault in the Midlands by sea and air.
'Msssive' airbourne assault using what? The Germans had very few air landing units at the time.
An assault in the Midlands? From where? Using what? The Germans had no sea trasnport fleet to speak of, and the RN together with the coastal batteries and RAF would have neutralised the Kriegsmarine.
2. Possibility of German "commando" raids to capture Churchill and/or the King.
No possibility at all.
There may have been the slight possibility that suicidal assassins could have killed either Churchill or the King but even this is remote at best. Far more likely that either chap would have been killed in the Blitz.
And what would killing or capturing either of these men have achieved?
3. Immediate positioning of airpower in captured airfields.
Except the airfields were well defended (with numerous inward-looking pill boxes, hard points and trench defences), heavily mined (preventing 'immediate use'), and there were Home Guard units dedicated to sabotaging the airfields if captured.
4. Beaches under attack from landside (Singapore reloaded) and successful arrival of equipment.
'Landside'? Who's attacking and from where?
If you're talking air-landing troops, isn't this a breach of basic air-landing doctrine of the time? (That airdropped troops are their to interdict enemy reinforcements, secure routes inland, etc.?)
The attack on Singapore was somewhat different wasn't it?
5. Response time of the Royal Navy? (I give it 2 days minimum to arrive. Assuming no interference by Luftwaffe, submarines or mines)
OK, lets say the RN is delayed in engagements with U-Boats or possibly German surface fleet action (the improbability of Luftwaffe action has already been well covered). Lets say, in fact, it takes 4 days for the RN to arrive, as they also meet and have to clear a path through a mine-screen.
Once the RN is in the Channel, the games up for Jerry...
Sealion is a great 'what if' scenario, but given the realist assessment of the situation at the time, Hitler made the right choice not to invade.
Personally given the boats available to the Germans i think its simply not possible that an invasion would or could happen. They may have got lucky with the weather and managed to put a first wave onto England's south coast beach but that would have been pretty much it. Any advance beyond the South Downs Ridge, without serious, full-scale resupply and reinforcement was never possible. Germany simply did not have the neccessary materiel nor the strategic and tactical advantages to pull it off.
I think there's also a more compelling arguement - Hitler never intended to invade in any case. The posturing was intended to force a treaty with Britain, secure his western front and open the primary engagements to the East. As i understand it, crudely Hitler's offer to Britain was 'i'll have Europe as a German land-Empire, you can have your sea-Empire, lets call it evens'... ;D
I beleive Hitler nevver really intended to Invade Britain it was a major bluff to get us to sign a treaty so he could look east and get his living room frmo Russia. But I feel some of the facts here are distorted.
the Luftwaffe in 1940 after the B.E.F had escaped back to britain had started a quiet substantial campaign against British shipping travelling down the East coast. This was partly to force the R.A.F to engage it's fighters over the North Sea. thus partially negating the return to fight/POW effect of fighting over the South east. for this campaign they used JU87,JU88 and Me110's to attack the shipping with the ME109's flying fighter cover :-\
for the
For the British Home Fleet to get to the Chanell it would have to travel down 2 very constricted waterways to get there in a very short time the Eastern group would have to travel down from Scapa Flow down the East coast of the UK they would of had a lot of German surface ships, Minefields and attacks from the Luftwaffe. The Western group for speed would have to travel down the Irish sea. :-\
Again you would not have to destroy these capital ships to be effective you only need one effective mine or Torpedo to slow down one of the Capital ships would the other ships leave this or race on to defend the Islands. :o
Also the main plan of the British Army at the time was to defend the beaches then Fall back to the GHQ line, and we all know how well these lines are good at being defended. I think the main question here is would the British Land forces be able to hold out against what was at the time a very Battle Hardened German Army.
just my ten penny's worth ???
regards
Sean
From what I have read, main reason the British government was so concerned about an invasion was because they were not willing to risk their capital ships in the constrained waters of the channel. Capital ships were viewed not just as weapons of war but 'power', a threat, and necessary for bargaining should the worst happen.
Royal Navy command knew that sending Capital ships into the English Channel would be suicide if Germany had air superiority (which they did) due to the threat of u-boats. The effective weapon against u-boats was destroyers of which at least 30 had been sunk already by the Luftwaffa if I recall correctly.
The two primary reasons Sealion wouldn't have succeeded, lack of an invasion fleet capable of putting a battle worthy army on the beaches, and the fact Hitler still believed England would seek terms.
Cheers,
Kev
Quote from: Squirrel on 07 January 2013, 07:17:17 PM
Royal Navy command knew that sending Capital ships into the English Channel would be suicide if Germany had air superiority (which they did)
When did the Luftwaffe have air superiority over the Channel?
Quote from: sebigboss79 on 05 January 2013, 07:40:13 PM
1. 25 Battle hardened divisions invade an island that has not been facing invaders in a thousand years, give or take.
Battle hardened, where? Most of the German forces that invaded Poland spent their time following an enemy that was falling back to a better defensive line, which was almost immediately made untenable by the Soviet invasion that subsequently led to the Polish defeat (but not surrender). The speed of the advance during the invasion of France created a similar effect. The first time the German forces faced an enemy in force, fully determined to fight was when Rommel attacked Tobruck. There they faced 200 years of concentrated British belligerence in the form of the 9th Australian division. The Germans received a bloody nose. Coincidentally this division had been formed from Australian units sent to protect Britain from German invasion in 1940.
Some units saw combat in these invasions but ’25 Battle hardened divisions’ I hardly think so. Motivated with a (possibly falsely held) high morale yes, battle hardened no.
Quote from: sultanbev on 06 January 2013, 01:58:24 AM
The Luftwaffe couldn't operate at night. The Royal Navy could. 50x DD, 20 Cruisers and a few BB converging from 2 directions = dead invasion fleet. That's excluding auxiliary craft like trawlers armed with 12pdrs and Lewis guns and MTBs. it would only take 1 fleet DD to get in amongst the landing barges to destroy a battalion. The barges were quite tough, so almost bullet-proof, but only capable of 4 knots on a flat sea, most were towed, so sink the tugs, 6x 4.7" guns and 8x 2pdr pom-poms is going to make short work of a gaggle of wooden boats that are drifting, even if some were armed with 37mm PAK36 or 105mm FH18 howitzer in fixed bow mounts.
Not to mention the MGBs and MTBs of the Coastal Forces. Exercise Tiger and Slapton Sands come to mind.
Wow, I often read quite stupid stuff from Brits when it comes to Germany and WW2, but this one puts it over the top. The Wehrmacht lost 17.469 Dead and 36.995 wounded in Poland alone..quite a few for a relaxed promenade to Warsaw. And not to forget those 46.059 (!) German soldiers who were killed in France. Its a real pity that "Die Blitzkrieg Legende" by Karl-Heinz Frieser has never been translated into English for it does away with a lot of myths sourrounding the early campaigns of WW2.
Oh yeah, but I forgot, the first real battle was of course against those British uber-forces in North Africa (" 200 years of concentrated British belligerence" :o :o :o :o may god be with us) everyhing before that was just kindergarten.
Quote from: Luddite on 07 January 2013, 07:25:45 PM
When did the Luftwaffe have air superiority over the Channel?
Around the time that they were bombing our cities with impunity and the RAF were fighting for their, and our, lives. At that point there was no way the RAF could have protected Capital ships from air attack, just as they couldn't during the Dunkirk evacuation.
I often think people forget how close we were to defeat, which actually devalues the the valour of those who continued to fight.
Cheers,
Kev
Quote from: Squirrel on 07 January 2013, 08:42:22 PM
Around the time that they were bombing our cities with impunity and the RAF were fighting for their, and our, lives. At that point there was no way the RAF could have protected Capital ships from air attack, just as they couldn't during the Dunkirk evacuation.
I often think people forget how close we were to defeat, which actually devalues the the valour of those who continued to fight.
Cheers,
Kev
Hmm...i'm not sure the Luftwaffe achieved air superiority.
We were technically at
air parity... http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_supremacy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_supremacy)...hence the
possibility of Operation Sealion speculation. :D
Hi
Been a fascinating topic
Few points
Freisner's Blitzkrieg Legend IS available in English - published by Annapolis Naval press - get it on Amazon - superb book on the myths of May 1940.
Also do not forget RAF not purely defensive force and made numerous raids on the harbours and Rhine collection points for the prajms/ barges and transports - these were certainly stepped up as September approached. As German radar limited/non-existent the Luftwaffe spent much time on readiness and patrolling duties to protect these points - to protect these as well as project power over Southern England was stretching them beoynd their capability
The slow cross channel convoys - probably going slower than Caesar's invasions even in good weather - meant they were a hostage to fortune. Even if sufferred low losses to do the return journey, refuel and reload and do the next journey meant there was no rapid surge and buildup. Even with a modicum of resistance ammo would soon have run out.
As for the dream that Stalin would help Germany at the operational level is stretching the commitment he had with the Nazis - resources yes, but his hope was a long Franco-German war. When this failed to materialise the resources went up - fear and the hope that this would delay any thoughts of the east. If SeaLion went ahead it would have been intriguing time in the Kremlin - defeat of England would have meant they would be next and would perhaps have pressed them for a more belicose stance. Stalin being the reader of history would have viewed it from perspective of 1809 and Alexander change of stance as Napoleon became embroiled in Spain to demand more control in the East after having been bosom buddies only a year or so before at Tilsit or in his case the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact
Finally one rather cynical wargame mate of mine said Sealion could be gamed in 1 die roll - Each pip being 1 day before the German's surrendered. I think he had a point - it was always more of a threat than a cogent plan
Quote from: Luddite on 07 January 2013, 03:51:21 PM
We are all quite happy Sealion did not work out I am sure but I would like to open a discussion about eventualities.
1. Two days before Sealion massive airborne assault in Southern England. Faint assault in the Midlands by sea and air.
'Msssive' airbourne assault using what? The Germans had very few air landing units at the time.
An assault in the Midlands? From where? Using what? The Germans had no sea trasnport fleet to speak of, and the RN together with the coastal batteries and RAF would have neutralised the Kriegsmarine.
2. Possibility of German "commando" raids to capture Churchill and/or the King.
No possibility at all.
There may have been the slight possibility that suicidal assassins could have killed either Churchill or the King but even this is remote at best. Far more likely that either chap would have been killed in the Blitz.
And what would killing or capturing either of these men have achieved?
3. Immediate positioning of airpower in captured airfields.
Except the airfields were well defended (with numerous inward-looking pill boxes, hard points and trench defences), heavily mined (preventing 'immediate use'), and there were Home Guard units dedicated to sabotaging the airfields if captured.
4. Beaches under attack from landside (Singapore reloaded) and successful arrival of equipment.
'Landside'? Who's attacking and from where?
If you're talking air-landing troops, isn't this a breach of basic air-landing doctrine of the time? (That airdropped troops are their to interdict enemy reinforcements, secure routes inland, etc.?)
The attack on Singapore was somewhat different wasn't it?
5. Response time of the Royal Navy? (I give it 2 days minimum to arrive. Assuming no interference by Luftwaffe, submarines or mines)
OK, lets say the RN is delayed in engagements with U-Boats or possibly German surface fleet action (the improbability of Luftwaffe action has already been well covered). Lets say, in fact, it takes 4 days for the RN to arrive, as they also meet and have to clear a path through a mine-screen.
Once the RN is in the Channel, the games up for Jerry...
Sealion is a great 'what if' scenario, but given the realist assessment of the situation at the time, Hitler made the right choice not to invade.
Personally given the boats available to the Germans i think its simply not possible that an invasion would or could happen. They may have got lucky with the weather and managed to put a first wave onto England's south coast beach but that would have been pretty much it. Any advance beyond the South Downs Ridge, without serious, full-scale resupply and reinforcement was never possible. Germany simply did not have the neccessary materiel nor the strategic and tactical advantages to pull it off.
I think there's also a more compelling arguement - Hitler never intended to invade in any case. The posturing was intended to force a treaty with Britain, secure his western front and open the primary engagements to the East. As i understand it, crudely Hitler's offer to Britain was 'i'll have Europe as a German land-Empire, you can have your sea-Empire, lets call it evens'... ;D
One after the other:
1: They DID. It would have stripped them of even a Fieseler Stork to bring the Führer his lunch but it WAS feasible.
Assaulting the midlands was planned to be from norwegian ports. As stated in my initial post the Kriegsmarine HAD solved the transportation problem. We are not talking about a sustained supply route but an assault! Planned were 6 large merchant ships. Initial plan called for a total of 400 men on those ships (command style) just to flush the RN out. The sense of such an approach is debatable. A direct assault would on the other hand lead to RN involvement - which was the only goal of this diversion in OKW's plans! My idea is why not expand this and actually give the Brits more t handle than they can. We are not in the "this is Britain, we win". Such an attitude I would contest back to the AWI where you lost cos the French and (military good) Germans fought on the other side. Wellington did not win Waterloo, it was Blucher turning his army around and march them into battle again and still it was a close one!
2: What would it achieve? Well shock. The CIC, King, Military commanders are dead. Even if you have replacements immediately all Britain would know that NO ONE is safe. Thats all the sense there has to be for such an attack.
3: Surprise air assault by a massive force does not lead to automatic victory but your argument is more patriotic than military sensible and viable. British airpower is decimated in such a scenario. Defense of abandoned airfields is highly dubious at best. I do not think anyone can keep a whole airbase (abandoned) fully manned to repel a hypothetic assault. Such an assault would have been daring and rather unconventional, ergo a determined assault is likely to succeed, bunkers or not. I contest that the Atlantic Wall was a much better defense than those and yet it was breached withing hours.
4: Airborne troops landing directly behind the beach defenses. Beach defenses were strong under Ironside and only thinned out when Brooks changed the strategy. No matter how strong they come under attack from 2 sides. Not the position you wanna be in. Supply and troops are 2 days away under Brooks. Plenty of time for a 2 sided attack to succeed.
5: Correct. ONCE they ARE in. Delayed by Submarines and air attacks. Military sense of sending a battlefleet into confined sea, dominated by enemy air, aside I still conest much of the RN would actually arrive AT the channel, only to be sitting ducks while german shipping is held in ports to conserve it. The outcome of such a move is easily predicted.
6. Germans never had FULL air superiority. PARITY as you correctly identified it, was well enough for the British.
@Squirrel: Hence the IF. Air superiority has been and still is the key. As well as the element of surprise and use of unconventional tactics.
@J.S. The "stupid" is less to the fact of missing knowledge but an ongoing "Imperial" superiority feeling. Same with Americans. Please people, this is not the place for "we have won, we are right" attitudes. It is clear to any informed person that WW2 was a no-win situation for the Germans. All they could do is hold the storm as long as possible. So PLEASE keep it free from 70 year old resentments and on topic!
Fact is Stalin was only waiting his time. He knew he was next and hoped to delay German attack untill 42 if not 44 when the Red Army had been ready.
Fact is America would, at some point, have intervened. HOW remains open to debate but they definately would not watch Hitler terrorising the world.
@Bernie: Correct. As said before Hitler had his illusions about Britain untill the end. I think the Wehrmacht woke up in '42 when ordered to attack the Kaukasus, leading tot otal defeat of a whole front. How come German and British officers are said to have been celebrating together on D-Day?
As stated befre it was such closer than people may think or admit nowadays besides knowing better.
I do not see the speed of the crossing as a problem, IF heavy equiment and tanks is their main cargo and the men arrive via air. Mind you my hypothesis is much different from both real plan and the Sandhurst wargame. Stills upplies are the key, mainly ammo as food would have been requisitioned from the population. AND lets not forget a German blockade by submarines would have a similar effect on all British so supplies are hard to argue in any direction. Given majority of the land is still in British hands it is easier for them as for the Germans.
With airsuperiority at the landing site and transports both sea and air available (for air a big IF concerning losses in the initial assault) it is as Luddite said "on even terms" and unfortunately a landbattle on even terms is a cakewalk for the Germans.
For the argument of battle hardened troops. The losses speak for themselves and you are not really saying the Allies were also just running away in France, are you? The German Army at that time simply was not stoppable. The only incident untill Africa (overpowered and outproduced rather) and Soviet Union (madness) was when de Gaulle, against his orders, requisitioned a tank batallion and actually attacked the Germans who were on the verge of breaking. Being recalled and the failure to exploit the successes of de Gaulle lost the campaign. There was rumours that de Gaulle was intended to be shot for "dereliction of duty" and "disobeying a direct order".
Soviet help is neither needed nor implemented in any of those 3 plans. But what if? I am not aware of Soviet airborne capabilities but Stalin had no problem sending millions against the Germans. Ever other man gets ammo, the man in front of him the gun. Another suicide raid maybe against Scapa Flow? Interesting thought there :-\
The following links give an idea of what happened during the Sandhurst wargame, which is of interest given the above points of view:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Sea_Lion_:_The_Sandhurst_Wargame
http://mr-home.staff.shef.ac.uk/hobbies/seelowe.txt
I don't have the Macksey book to hand, but IIRC he gives the pre-conditions the Germans would have required to be able to launch a seaborne operation with some guarantee of success. If I get chance I will see if I can dig them out tonight.
Good debate though :).
Some very interesting documents from a year or so after the threat of invasion. Well worth a look.
http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/jscsc/jscsc-library/archives/operation-sealion
Quote from: Steve J on 08 January 2013, 01:43:01 PM
The following links give an idea of what happened during the Sandhurst wargame, which is of interest given the above points of view:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Sea_Lion_:_The_Sandhurst_Wargame
http://mr-home.staff.shef.ac.uk/hobbies/seelowe.txt
I don't have the Macksey book to hand, but IIRC he gives the pre-conditions the Germans would have required to be able to launch a seaborne operation with some guarantee of success. If I get chance I will see if I can dig them out tonight.
Good debate though :).
The whole idea of said wargame is to be contested. One assumption was that the invasion was attempted WITHOUT proper air support and lack of air superiority. I believe we concur how viable such attempt and how much biased the end-result therefore is. Why did Sandhurst actually allow the Germans guns and tanks? Ah, ok would have been a bit too obvious then.
Tilting the balance to one side by making the enemy overly stupid is not really academic or serious! HENCE the room for us to speculate.
I'm not sure how much input Adolf Galland et al had on the wargame parameters etc. Would be interesting to find out though.
Quote from: Steve J on 08 January 2013, 01:58:00 PM
Some very interesting documents from a year or so after the threat of invasion. Well worth a look.
http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/jscsc/jscsc-library/archives/operation-sealion
VERY GOOD LINK!!!!!!
Let us go through the points made on page 4.
a) - c) cannot really be contested. The forces were available, gathered and sufficiently equipped. Ongoing supply is a different matter!
d) What is meant by this? My idea is to land and unload while enemy interference is kept to minimum.
e) RUBBISH. Total control of the air is mandatory in order to be able to support the landing. Without such support via air (against defenses and RN!) any invasion attempt is an empty threat.
f) Any doubt about that?
Read through it. Very concise. Only point I dispute is German Morale and the production figures of air assets. Germany had no lack of planes (BF109s) but lacked pilots.
Will probably print these out for future reference and so that I can read them at leisure.
I think its in the Deighton book 'Fighter' there is a quote by a fighter pilot (Spit or Hurricane). He carefully nurses his shot up kite back to the airfield, only to be berated by the Senior member of his ground crew - "Why did you not bail out? I could have a new plane here tomorrow. I've got to fix this one now". The problem the RAF were having were pilots.
The problem the Germans had was logistics - No Mulberry Harbours, no PLUTO, no planning.
Quote from: Last Hussar on 22 January 2013, 11:25:19 PM
The problem the Germans had was logistics - No Mulberry Harbours, no PLUTO, no planning.
This is the key point. A sucessful German invasion would have depended in capturing south coast harbours intact. (I did a study may years ago on how long it took to get Cherburg operational after capture). Without Mulberry D Day would have stalled. There is a limit on what you can resupply by air and by invasion barge.
Like many European military thinkers, the German command tended to view the channel as a very wide river. Even Cold War Warsaw Pact thinking was a bit muddy regarding UK invasion). Hither was an opportunist. If he could have invaded Britain and Ireland in 1940 he would have done so. The opportunity passed with the failure to win the air war, and he reverted back to the real objectives in the east.
Sunray out
Quote from: Steve J on 08 January 2013, 02:38:51 PM
I'm not sure how much input Adolf Galland et al had on the wargame parameters etc. Would be interesting to find out though.
From what I remember in the Sandhurst game he was running the Luftwaffe.
So its safe to say he had a LOT of input.