Best Boer war era rules ?

[Rob]

There is some measure of misguided reason in the slow adoption of the maxim as well.  In 1870 the French Mitrailleuse were picked off by German artillery as soon as they opened up; it was therefore concluded that machine guns would not be effective in a European environment.   No-one really grasped what a mere 40 years of technical development actually meant.

And uncontrolled ammunition expenditure *was* a problem in 1870/71 as well -- mostly because poorly trained and controlled French troops would start blazing away at 1000 meters and be running low as the Germans came into effective range.

A lot of the sorrow of 1914 came from some very careful reasoning about 1870 leading to the wrong conclusions  (although there were some right conclusions in the mix)

I think we have to be careful from a modern "enlightened" perspective in assigning the military of the past to the scrapheap of incompetence. There were other constraints in place that commentators of the 21st century often fail to grasp.

Before the 1890’s weapons were still using black powder which is a slow burning propellant compared with the smokeless powder adopted by the turn of the century. This had the result that small arms would rapidly overheat after 20-30 rounds and whether you had ammo or not your rate of fire would fall because of jamming and difficulty feeding in the ammo. There is evidence this happened at Isandlwana with lots of damaged cartridges being found indicating jams in overheating Martini-Henrys. The black powder also gummed up the weapons so even when allowed to cool it was difficult to fire rapidly over a long period until they were cleaned.

The point made earlier about SLRs and squadies wasting ammo is also a little off I think, although I have had heard it said myself. Fire control in the British infantry is very strict so for the average squadie to shoot off his ammo in an uncontrolled way, it would just not happen. A section commander completely controls who fires and the rate of fire to use. The reason the SLR was restricted to semi-automatic fire is the power of the ammo. The NATO 7.62mm/51 is a full power round that will knock a man down at a 1000 metres. If you don’t hold the weapon tight you will get a cut lip/black eye the recoil is so powerful. If you fire on full auto it is completely uncontrollable. Even mid power rounds such as that used in the AK47 are difficult to control. The other point is ammo weight and bulk. If you carry 2/400 rounds of ammo for your SLR and a further 500-1000 for the section GPMG, that takes a lot of space and weighs a lot to, so you do not have an infinite supply, unless in defence where it will be dumped in bulk for you.

For machine guns I think a reason for the apparent increase in their effect in the 20th century was an advance in the tactics of their use. The earlier point and squirt methods being replaced with grazing fire and beaten zones which made barriers of bullets that attackers had to move through to get the their objective.

However apart from all this the major problem that persisted through until after WW1 was control. There was no major advance in battlefield control until the portable radio came into use.

Cheers Rob 

[Sunray]

Interesting points Rob.  From the perspective of an Army career that spanned three decades, I would make the quailfication that there were times when the auto setting on the SLR would have been useful. (FIBUA and supressive fire comes to mind)  I crossed trained with our NATO allies who had auto on their 7.62 FNs or H&Ks, yes, there was muzzle climb (all auto weapons climb) and the danger of chamber heat from a closed lock fire bolt, but with training, it was viable, and many NATO soldiers were conscripts.   I have never got a kick from an SLR - but hey, I grew up with full choke 12 and 10 bores and 303s. I fired a .50 Barnett in the States....that had serious  kick.

Your observation on 'present mindness' is valid comment. In the associated thread 'Riddle of the Sands', we unpack a little of the Edwardian mindset. However, it is my opinion that Lentulus is on the mark with his tracer, when he flags up the failure of the Mitrailleuse as a key factor in blinding European war offices to the quiet evolution of the Maxim.   But this is not monocausal as to why the HMG only became general issue in infantry battalions in 1902/03.

These luicid mature and informed debates are a feature of this forum, and hopefully help our rules reflect history and gaming pleasure. I have heard it argued that if WW1 had occurred 15 years earlier or indeed later, the carnage would not have been on an industrial scale.  The answer to the latter lies in armour and the better tactics/battlefield management, but what of the former? The Maxim was aviailable in the late 1890s, so why the delay in deployment?

Sunray out

[Rob]

Interesting points Rob.  From the perspective of an Army career that spanned three decades, I would make the quailfication that there were times when the auto setting on the SLR would have been useful. (FIBUA and supressive fire comes to mind)  I crossed trained with our NATO allies who had auto on their 7.62 FNs or H&Ks, yes, there was muzzle climb (all auto weapons climb) and the danger of chamber heat from a closed lock fire bolt, but with training, it was viable, and many NATO soldiers were conscripts.   I have never got a kick from an SLR - but hey, I grew up with full choke 12 and 10 bores and 303s. I fired a .50 Barnett in the States....that had serious  kick.

Greetings Sunray. I too have heard mention of the utility of auto for the SLR, and what I say is my opinion only, which in the context of this discussion is that the British military did not restrict it to semi-auto to stop the average squadie shooting off his ammo in an uncontrolled way. They restricted it because of its uncontrollable nature at auto with full power 7.62mm.

When I first carried it I used to think it would be better with the full auto option but I have changed my mind since the introduction of the SA80 funnily enough.

To back this up there also anecdotal evidence against auto. I have spoken to two para’s who in separate incidents say they were shot at point blank range on auto by Argentineans and they missed! The Parachute Regiment take small arms and support weapons very seriously probably more so than other infantry because they are more reliant on them, for instance they still use indirect fire with SF GPMG which is a forgotten art with most modern infantry. Anyway, one of the lessons taken to heart from the Falklands was the need for more firepower for suppressive purposes. 2 Para at Goose Green had one GPMG per section and had real difficulties moving forward. Their opinion was with more firepower they could have completed the job with less casualties. At their later action at Wireless ridge they demanded all of the support they could get but more importantly had managed to equip each section with 2 GPMG. After the Falklands my unit always went out on exercise with 2 support weapons per section, either 2 GPMG or 1 GPMG and 1 84mm.

Your observation on 'present mindness' is valid comment. In the associated thread 'Riddle of the Sands', we unpack a little of the Edwardian mindset. However, it is my opinion that Lentulus is on the mark with his tracer, when he flags up the failure of the Mitrailleuse as a key factor in blinding European war offices to the quiet evolution of the Maxim.   But this is not monocausal as to why the HMG only became general issue in infantry battalions in 1902/03.

These luicid mature and informed debates are a feature of this forum, and hopefully help our rules reflect history and gaming pleasure. I have heard it argued that if WW1 had occurred 15 years earlier or indeed later, the carnage would not have been on an industrial scale.  The answer to the latter lies in armour and the better tactics/battlefield management, but what of the former? The Maxim was aviailable in the late 1890s, so why the delay in deployment

Regarding Maxims in the 1890’s, there were a lot of competing machine guns around at the time and armies hadn’t yet discovered the tactics to get the most out of them, they were still using the point and squirt method beloved by Hollywood. I think the Maxim was the cream of the crop and it just took a little while for it to float to the top of the list.

All the best, Rob

[Leman]

Hope your British in home service uniform will have the blue helmet and not the White pith helmet.
DP

[Sunray]

Thanks Rob - enjoyed your comments.  Those of us who sported a greener shade of lid, had a love for the LMG. Many of the boys from Norton and Arbroath when south with both LMG and GPMG in their sections- effectively creating what we now call Fireteam tactics.  To those just back from XMG, it was second nature.

The 1980s British Army - and associated units from other more Senior service - had their tactical mindset shaped by Bannerman.   It was drilled into the squaddie - to wait for the FCO and clearly identify the fig11 he had in his 'SUIT' was in accordance with that little yellow bit of card.   8 Brig issued only 30 operation rds per man. Three Nine issued 40.   Even if we had full auto option - I doubt if we would have been trigger happy.  With open sights we were the best in NATO for aimed deliberate shots.   Even when the SA80 came along, the disclipine remained. Has the Helman experience changed that much ?

But back to the thread....I read last night a theory that the armies of the 1890s were obsessed with offensive tactics. Thus Maxim was seen as a defensive weapon, vunerable to artillery, so ignored, and not deployed until 1902/03 in any siginificant numbers.  

Sunray out