First Falklands Game

[Sunray]

Points well made and taken.  You were right to play the game get a sense of the rules and keep initial terrain simple.

The Falklands is notoriously difficult to game, and I commend your efforts.   It soon becomes evident that if you stick to the script the Argentine forces after Goose Green retreat to the high vital ground around Stanley and the only option for the Task Force is to (a) advance to contact and (b) deliberate night attack.    This does not convert well to the table.

I must confess for this reason I have never got beyond the invasion and the classical defence mounted by NP 8901.  It is a great daylight game with the 06.30 landings in Yorke Bay and the fighting withdrawal to Government House.   The figures were Gripping Beast.  It should work even better with 10mm Pendraken.

The scrap at King Edward Point (South Georgia) with a very creditable firefight waged by Mills Marauders that  showed what 22 pissed off Royals could do on a bad day.   It really was not in the rules of Argentine Polo  to engage a corvette with a Charlie G and hole her below the water line.    They also demonstrated why one should not try to establish an LZ in a  Royal Marine's Killing Zone   Note - only one Marine casualty. 

One thing that emerged from the official MoD debrief was that unsupported infantry action (no offence to Blues & Royals) required a lot more ball than had been anticipated.  Suppressive fire expended belts and mags at a rate unknown to the British squaddie.   In the 1980s we were tight when it came to loosening off ball.  Partly the aimed shots discipline, partly the culture of Operation Banner, and partly because we were accustomed  to  close support from AFVs in conventional Battle Group doctrine.   

  Replenishment became an issue, and it was common practice to "recycle" the 7.62 from Argentine dead and prisoners to maintain action.   

As you continue to roll the dice it might be useful to see modified Falkland Rules emerging that reflect the troops, the terrain and the unique tactical conditions.   It was not conventional modern war as we know it. 


Best wishes

[Duke Speedy of Leighton]

Brilliant ideas,
South Georgia was definitely discussed, possibly 1:150 aerial photo graph as a map? How annoyed was the Argentine ship commander? Very! they also put the ship's main gun out of action with a LAW too!

My shopping list at the moment consists of:
British 2" mortars (the eagle eyed amongst you notice 82mm doubling up)
British Tripod mounted GPMG
Argentine HMGs (.50cals?)
Argentine super bazookas (any proxies, or should I use recoilless rifles).
Maybe two more Amtraks for the Argentine forces and more special forces?

[Gennorm]

A South Georgia scenario would have to be called "Sod that, I'll make their eyes water" after Mills' reaction to orders to put up only token resistance.

Ideally every war has its own set of rules as they all seem to have their unique factors. The ammo issue is an interesting one that could be incorporated, and it probably happened in other conflicts of the time.

Nick

[Sunray]

Ideally every war has its own set of rules as they all seem to have their unique factors. The ammo issue is an interesting one that could be incorporated, and it probably happened in other conflicts of the time.

Nick

Nick, welcome to the forum.

God lad, you make me feel old when you use phrases like 'conflicts of the time'.   Two quick responses to your comment.  If we take the late 1970s to early 1980s as the parenthesis there frankly weren't a lot of 'conflicts of the time' going on in the world that were compatible to Operation Corporate  and none I can think of where ALL your reserves of logistical kit was in a cargo hold under Air Attack Red.   We were operating 7,500 miles from our spare parts and replacements.

Actually  "conflict" is a misnomer - the Falklands was not some little bush war in Third World.  It was  conventional warfare on a howbeit small scale and inside a designated "zone", but  involving land , sea and air battles  between two professional armed forces. 

It was not a land battle that the British Army had trained for, nor was it a prolonged conflict where one could refine and adapt the tactical doctrine.  (A lot of what did emerge turned out to be wrong, but that's another story).  For the first time since 1939-42 we fought without air superiority.   This does not detract from the valiant efforts by the Harrier pilots, but the modest CAPs they mounted did not dominate the skies.   It was a new experience for the post war British soldier to hear aircraft and hit the dirt before practising recognition skills. 

I remember in the Post Falklands Army, if a bit of kit was hard to find or impossible to requisition, the smug reply from the QM was
"Sorry Sir, the items you requested seem to be  no longer available.  They were last seen being loaded on the Atlantic Conveyor."

I am sure you will find bush war scenarios where the insurgent forces - in true Maoist doctrine - picked up and used the enemy kit.  But the British Army weren't an insurgent force, and our battles were not guerrilla fire fights.   Our logistics and training  were simply unprepared for the amount of ball that the task required.

I was never on South Georgia.  However from google maps the topography for Grytviken is pretty basic.  It is a day light action on a small scale. Pendraken had a corvette and Revell has just released theirs in 1/144. 

[Sunray]

Again, fantastic fight, Lemmey, and thanks for the notes on the casualties.

Sunray - I think some of us may view the Royal Marines a bit differently than what you've indicated in your second paragraph.  While I agree they would undoubtedly make best use of supporting arms/fires in support of the assault, it seems like you just wrote (paraphrasing) "what makes the Royal Marines elite is the fact that when they are fired on, rather than assault they will find a place to hide until supporting fires have taken care of the issue."  Probably not your intent, but that's how it reads to me.


V/R,
Jack

No Jack, not my intent, and sorry if my words conveyed that impression. The eternal problem with a short blog that one cannot qualify.  The Royal Marines I had the privilege to serve with always impressed me with their ability to fight with their heads.   When you are fired on you take cover unless you are a Fig 11.   You then formulate your response to regain the initiative in the fire fight.   What makes the Royals unique as a special force is that brand of initiative.   Yes, they put their lives in harms way  and they lost good men, but as well trained and thinking  professionals they used all supporting fire, weapons and tactics available to downsize their casualties and win the fire fight and dominate the killing ground.  

That's your primary task in a fire fight.  There are no rules in real life combat as to how you do it. 

If you are the attacking force as the British were, with dug in enemy regulars in prepared positions , you need all that support company and all other available sources of friendly fire can give you - otherwise ...you shall not grow old as we that are left grow old...


Cheers

[bigjackmac]

Sunray,

Good to go, sounds like we're on the same page with that statement, thanks. 
Having said that, the RMs I served with definitely had some rules for real life combat 

V/R,
Jack

[Sunray]

Sunray,

Good to go, sounds like we're on the same page with that statement, thanks. 
Having said that, the RMs I served with definitely had some rules for real life combat 

V/R,
Jack

I was thinking war game type rules -  I won't mess up this thread with any more of my ramblings, but its sufficient to say I was still in my teens when my first comrade was KIA. (Operation Banner).   In cross training with other NATO forces I made the observation that many suffered from Blank Round Syndrome - they considered themselves bullet proof.   We who had been with 39 and 8 knew that we were mortal.

And many of those mortal  lives were saved by an impromptu O Group  behind a rock whilst a Corporal came up with another 'cunning plan'.    I would rather wait 5 minutes for the old and bold in Support C to get their act together and be confident of the result.  Or was that just the Norton way ?


   When it comes down to it the golden rule is you won't let your mates down.   And that attitude of mind is what decides who is selected to wear the lid and who is rejected.   

Cheers

[Sunray]

Just a short post script.  In 1983 I visited most the  Falkland battlefields. (battlemountains would be a more accurate term).

The finest action - in my opinion - which epitomises the blend of professionalism, "a desire to avoid futile and useless casualties" [Lt-Co AF Whitehead] an intelligent use of ALL available  support (about 1500 rounds of 105 to be exact - not just the 29 Gunners but from HMS Glamorgan), the confidence to scrap a Warminster  battle plan with improvised alternatives  and raw courage under fire-  is  the Battle of Two Sisters.


The opposition were not raw conscripts but the elite of 5th Marine Infantry.

If you want a flavour of the Falklands I commend the Wikipedia account pf Two Sisters  that is  online.  It even captures Dyton's dismay as he discerned from the fall in volume of fire that Zulu were running out of ball, and the need for desperate measures of reckless gallantry to press the attack home.

[Gennorm]

Hi Sunray, It's frightening how long ago the war was. In fact the time since then is nearly as long as from WW2 to the Falklands 

Operation Corporate was an amazing achievement. Only the USA definitely also had the ability to do it and the Soviets would have struggled to emulate it. Operating at the end of that logistical trail is what is often forgotten about. Logistics is an issue elsewhere too, as many armies are poorly organised. I wouldn't rate the Iraqis or Iranians as logistically adept, and I can imagine the Ethiopians and Somalis would have had limits on ammo; all were fighting in full-on conflicts around that time. The fact that was a load of ball and shell in the first place is impressive.

The ability to change a plan on the hoof and improvise is what marks out the better armies from the rest.

Nick

[bigjackmac]

Sunray,

"I was thinking war game type rules..."
Ahh, well, I certainly feel like a donkey then

"...I was still in my teens when my first comrade was KIA."
Must have been tough at that age.  I was 23, practically an old man, then not again until 28, when I was definitely an old man (by our standards).  And that was following 9/11, so it really snowballed from there.

"...many suffered from Blank Round Syndrome..."
If you think it was bad then, you should have seen us after we received Interceptor vests with SAPI plates (sorry, I'm making some assumptions about your years of service based on your age/tied to Falklands).

"When it comes down to it the golden rule is you won't let your mates down."
Certainly.  For all the talk, in the US at least, that we'd gone soft and were raising only lazy, self-centered, self-gratifying lumps, it restored my faith to see what our 18 and 19 year-olds did in Fallujah (I was 30 at the time!), absolutely selfless.  I was with Bravo Co, 1st Bn, 5th Marines at the time; I don't know if they were technically the best unit I was ever with, but what they accomplished in the streets with only rifles, pistols, and hand grenades certainly makes it seem so, certainly as my memories get more hazy with nostalgia

Take care.

V/R,
Jack

[Sunray]

Hi Sunray, It's frightening how long ago the war was. In fact the time since then is nearly as long as from WW2 to the Falklands 

Operation Corporate was an amazing achievement.

The ability to change a plan on the hoof and improvise is what marks out the better armies from the rest.

Nick

Thanks for this Nick.  Just to put the record straight the Paras and Royals were never meant to tab/yomp across East Falkland.  The idea was to use the choppers to airlift them into LZs and then muster in FUP's prior to assault, but the all changed with Atlantic Conveyor going down and it was back to the 19th century LPC.

The success of the LPC had a negative effect on the British Army.  We assumed a macho pride in doing things on foot.   It became a national trade mark.   We actually forgot that in most modern tactical situations it is essential to have mechanised mobility.

When it came to Desert Storm we were naïve enough to deploy our special forces,  22 SAS on foot, to take out Scuds.  You can read the tragedy that unfolds in Billy Mitchell's book Bravo Two Zero  We forgot that the correct mode of deployment in the wastes of the desert was like Mayne and Stirling in WW2.  Fast 4x4s bristling with MGs. 

[Gennorm]

Sunray, I know. The loss of the AC was a real blow. Thankfully they were fit enough to yomp/tab and the Argentines weren't expecting it.

It's a long time since I read B2Z, but I thought there was mention of the Pink Panthers in it with the decision being made not to use them as they were to hide close to the MSR although I may be wrong. I'm not so sure that the Army went off mechanisation in practice despite the bluster - the Saxon came into service soon after Corporate, the Royals still had their Snocats for their main job and Granby was virtually all mechanised with some attacks defying doctrine and going in on the Warriors when resistance was found to be weak.

Nick

[Sunray]

Yes, Nick, I will need to qualify the above remarks.  The British Army - post Falkland - did overemphasise that troops could deploy on foot and all kit could  'man-portable' [ I used to feel sorry for the Milan teams as they stumbled past] .  There are two schools in Army high command.  Those who have come from conventional  infantry/cavalry backgrounds and those who have been special forces like Parachute Regiment and SAS.  The BAOR was firmly in the conventional school, and the new kit like the Warrior was well received.  Mechanised tactics were refined and  Granby vindicated the British Battle Group approach.  1 Staffs deployment was a piece of model practice as mechanised infantry.  Even in going in as you say, they refined overwatch into a fluid mechanised version of Fire team 'fire and movement' that had not been possible with the 432.

The Royals were smart enough to know there was a time when its right to yomp and a time when its right  to hitch a lift. Any time they were deployed with armour they were a joy to work with.

The other school had champions like that  De la Billiere  [ I am not a fan] who had a tendency to promote suicide missions with scant attention to detail - to the point that the missions were not viable.   He got his petulant way with Brave Two Zero.   In Corporate there were men with balls in 6 Boat troop who stood up to him.   His revenge was to wreck their careers.

I must apologise to forum members for hijacking this thread.  I am happy to communicate via personal if you want more meat on the bone .  Moderators  please feel free to delete named individual.   

[Duke Speedy of Leighton]

Not at all.

[Techno]

I must apologise to forum members for hijacking this thread.  I am happy to communicate via personal if you want more meat on the bone .  Moderators  please feel free to delete named individual. 

Must be one of the most relevant 'hi-jacks' ever on the forum.
I think we can let you off, Sunray. 

Cheers - Phil