A few of us in our club game EARLY (v. early) WW1 in 10mm. Brigade - Div level games: Inf Company / Cav Sqn / section of 2 arty guns are the tactical units.
What we're trying to do is get a better idea of EARLY arty tactics / doctrine. Accounts refer to the use of guns in direct fire and hidden batteries - reverse slope or tree-line with an officer in the open reporting fall of shot by voice command. NO radios or field telephones here! No creeping barrages. No indirect fire.
Question is this - have we got this idea right? Can anyone point us to a good source on really EARLY WW1 arty tactics?
;)
That certainly agrees with my limited reading, the Affair of Néry being a classic example for both sides
No good sources I can point you to unfortunately
Helion has a book, "Mons: An artillery Battle" by David Hutchinson that does a good job describing the British artillery. It also discusses being on the receiving end of the German fire (and the number of dud shells they had).
As the back of the book says "The British went into battle without much of its field artillery. The German field artillery went into battle with totally defective ammunition."
From memory:
3 batteries of 18 pdr field guns to each battery of 4.5 inch howitzers.
No sophisticated arrangements for forward observer communication.
So in a mobile battle a setup that Wellington would be familiar with.
Guns firing line of sight, on or close by the infantry front lines.
Howitzers might deploy behind an obstacle and lob shells over, but not far back as the spotter could not wander far from the battery.
(Any idea how far the human voice will carry over an artillery barrage).
Signaling flags were an option, but one that might strongly hint at the concealed location of the battery.
(The boffins were still working on 2 tin cans joined with a bit of string).
I seem to recall a German account which was astonished (and delighted) at the British tactical deployment of their guns so far forward (at Le Cateau?) where they could be easily silenced by their German opponents. Any one else remember this in any more detail, or is it the febrile imagining of a decaying mind?
Can confirm effectiveness of at least some German counter-battery fire.
My paternal grandfather was a horse handler/ ostler/ whateverthearmycalledthem with the Royal Horse Artillery in 1914.
German counter-battery fire buried him to about half-way up his arms .... more of a problem than it might sound, given he was upside down at the time!
Other survivors dug him out in time but he was left partially deaf.
Quote from: mollinary on 04 November 2019, 06:47:42 PM
I seem to recall a German account which was astonished (and delighted) at the British tactical deployment of their guns so far forward (at Le Cateau?) where they could be easily silenced by their German opponents. Any one else remember this in any more detail, or is it the febrile imagining of a decaying mind?
I recall reading something similar - but couldn't say where.
Quote from: mollinary on 04 November 2019, 06:47:42 PM
I seem to recall a German account which was astonished (and delighted) at the British tactical deployment of their guns so far forward (at Le Cateau?) where they could be easily silenced by their German opponents. Any one else remember this in any more detail, or is it the febrile imagining of a decaying mind?
The British infantry learned a lot form the Boer War.
I recall the artillery also upping its game in that war, through no specifics, though it seems that any lessons didn't stick.
It seems that by 1914 the gunners had returned to 1815 and were left to face "The mauser's 'alf mile 'ail".
A very vague story form my now departed grandmother concerned 2 cousins (twins) from a fortunate branch of the family.
She would have been about 6 years old when she recalled them visiting with their mounts.
Recently finished at Cambridge and got up in their Horse Artillery Lieutenant's finery.
An article in the parish newsletter, and all the neighbours agreed they were the handsomest young men they had ever seen.
Neither saw the Christmas of 1914.
A bit of googling revealed this piece on infantry artillery cooperation (a primitive creeping barrage, through it sound more like a localised "shooting in" of an infantry assault).
It's likely that this level of cooperation was developed in theatre, and not adopted as an army standard.
QuoteThe British had success when they ceased using artillery by itself and used it in conjunction with infantry.
British General Buller linked the use of artillery and the movement of infantry into continuous interlocking assaults upon each hill south of Ladysmith.
As soon as shelling had finished in a location the infantry moved.
The front collapsed on the 27th when use was made of a creeping curtain of shell fire sent over the heads of advancing infantry destroying everything 100 yards ahead of them.
It was this tactic of the creeping barrage that has been described by Pakenham as "revolutionary".
Hi
Apologies to Dr Dave for going off topic but couldn't resist it!
Ithoriel - SNAP! My grandfather was a 'driver' in III Brigade Royal Horse Artillery in 1914 (attached to the cavalry division of the BEF), later rising to the dizzie heights of bombardier and more importantly surviving the war. Interestingly (for me anyway) his middle name was 'Sherman' I presume because he was born in the same year (1891) that a certain civil war general died.
Cheers Paul
The 18pdrs mainly fired case shot hence being so far forward they were the armies shot guns.
Their infantry fell in swathes.
my granddad was the driver to a section of guns, i.e lead team. :)
I'm conscious that the title requests a source.
The Wikipedia page on the QF 18 Pounder Gun is useful - particularly this section: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QF_18-pounder_gun#1914 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QF_18-pounder_gun#1914)
Another unsourced anecdote I've recalled concerned one of the many encounters during the 1914 war of movement.
The British had deployed along a sunken road, the battery deploying around a solitary tree.
An observer climbed the tree to improve his view.
Once the Germans engaged, it was apparent that the tree was a superb landmark to determine the precise range to the British lines.
Sappers were summoned and set about felling the tree.
What courage to stand in the open swinging an axe under an enemy barrage.
It sounds very much a "learn as you go" operation.
Quote from: MartinKnight1333 on 07 November 2019, 07:45:26 AM
The 18pdrs mainly fired case shot hence being so far forward they were the armies shot guns.
Their infantry fell in swathes.
my granddad was the driver to a section of guns, i.e lead team. :)
Bear in mind that Case was also the old artillery term for Shrapnel.
This required a flat trajecttory to create a long beaten zone, so reduced effective range form 7,000 yards to below 3,000.
Quote from: steve_holmes_11 on 07 November 2019, 10:05:23 AM
Bear in mind that Case was also the old artillery term for Shrapnel.
This required a flat trajecttory to create a long beaten zone, so reduced effective range form 7,000 yards to below 3,000.
Cannister = Case
Shrapnel (after its inventor) = Spherical Case
Two different rounds with different ranges and applications.
Quote from: T13A on 05 November 2019, 08:53:02 PM
Hi
Apologies to Dr Dave for going off topic but couldn't resist it!
Ithoriel - SNAP! My grandfather was a 'driver' in III Brigade Royal Horse Artillery in 1914 (attached to the cavalry division of the BEF), later rising to the dizzie heights of bombardier and more importantly surviving the war. Interestingly (for me anyway) his middle name was 'Sherman' I presume because he was born in the same year (1891) that a certain civil war general died.
Cheers Paul
This seems to be a theme, a relative (some sort of great uncle I think) was a driver on the Somme, who was buried alive under the body of a horse when the battery was hit by shellfire. Again he was dug out in time by his mates, but suffered from claustrophobia later in life (not really surprising). He only survived because the poor horse had shielded him from the worse of the blast from the explosion.
In the Russo-Japanese War both sides made use of semaphore and telephones to control indirect fire. However these were in static situations such as Port Arthur or where both sides had plenty of preparation such as Mukden
Quote from: John Cook on 07 November 2019, 02:33:29 PM
Cannister = Case
Shrapnel (after its inventor) = Spherical Case
Two different rounds with different ranges and applications.
Quite true, but I cannot find any reference to a cannister type round for the 13 or 18 pounders in 1914.
The shrapnel shell was the only one on general issue to the field batteries at the very beginning of the war, the very first HE being rolled out in September 1914.
Thus any reference to the firld artillery firing case is likely to mean shrapnel.
Quote from: steve_holmes_11 on 08 November 2019, 09:19:59 AM
Quite true, but I cannot find any reference to a cannister type round for the 13 or 18 pounders in 1914.
The shrapnel shell was the only one on general issue to the field batteries at the very beginning of the war, the very first HE being rolled out in September 1914.
Thus any reference to the firld artillery firing case is likely to mean shrapnel.
FWIW I have a book published by Pen and Sword called called "The Gunners of August 1914" by John Hutton which has a bit of info in it:
"Most of the guns at the beginning of the war were only equipped to fire shrapnel, which meant they were used largely as long-range shotguns. Only the howitzers (which were few in number) were provided with high explosive shells."
"Each brigade of artillery had a signal section attached to it, which was capable of establishing line communications (wireless communications were not yet developed) to only two batteries at one time. The theory was that the brigade commander would always be close to the other battery."
"In 1914 guns would be deployed in open or semi-open conditions; on the one hand this made it easier to bring down accurate fire, but on the other it meant that the British guns could be easily spotted by the enemy. New equipment (specifically the number 7 dial sight and number 3 director or survey instrument) had been introduced to allow the guns to fire indirectly onto their targets from covered positions out of sight of the enemy. The prevailing orthodoxy, however, despite the use of indirect fire tactics during the Russo–Japanese War, in particular at the battle of Sha-ho in September 1904, continued to stress the importance of a battery commander being able to exercise voice control over his guns from the observation post. This meant that, as the battery commander had himself to be able to see the enemy, the guns were normally deployed in either open or semi-open positions. "
Quote from: steve_holmes_11 on 08 November 2019, 09:19:59 AM
Quite true, but I cannot find any reference to a cannister type round for the 13 or 18 pounders in 1914.
The shrapnel shell was the only one on general issue to the field batteries at the very beginning of the war, the very first HE being rolled out in September 1914.
Thus any reference to the firld artillery firing case is likely to mean shrapnel.
I was speaking in general terms really and, I think you are right. I too am not aware of a specific case or cannister round for either the 13 pdr or 18pdr, only Shrapnel as you say. I am less sure about the vocabulary of gunners at the time but I can't imagine any reference to case meaning other than Shrapnel. The type of ammunition provided for the 13pdrs and 18pdrs in 1914 is indicative of their role as direct support to infantry/cavalry , pretty much as artillery had been for decades, if not centuries, and is why they were not grouped together for wider artillery missions. That was left to the 4.5 inch howitzers and 60pdrs, which were provided with HE ammunition.
Chaps, huge thanks. Really interesting info here. Much of what you've been saying has confirmed my suspicions: Very very limited indirect fire if any, and then from a position within voice command distance of the btty commander/ observer.
That is exactly why the 18prs fired cannister to destroy troops.
Also I read an account recently by an infantry man, that at the Somme the went away from using H.E on the wire as it had little effect, where as shrapenel did more damage to dense wire!!
Test were done on Slaisbury a few years back when I was near Larkhill, its failing in my opinon was the wire was not dense enough, nor thick enough like the German wire, nor were enough rounds shot to come to the correct conclusion.
My sources are two different set of 6 volumes on each year of the war, out of print im affraid being 1920's editions.